### All the ideas for Michael Burke, Michael della Rocca and Dorothy Edgington

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37 ideas

###### 4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 2. Tools of Propositional Logic / c. Derivation rules of PL
 14273 Conditional Proof is only valid if we accept the truth-functional reading of 'if' [Edgington]
###### 9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
 16235 Persistence conditions cannot contradict, so there must be a 'dominant sortal' [Burke,M, by Hawley]
 14753 The 'dominant' of two coinciding sortals is the one that entails the widest range of properties [Burke,M, by Sider]
###### 9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / b. Unifying aggregates
 16072 'The rock' either refers to an object, or to a collection of parts, or to some stuff [Burke,M, by Wasserman]
###### 9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / b. Cat and its tail
 14751 Tib goes out of existence when the tail is lost, because Tib was never the 'cat' [Burke,M, by Sider]
###### 9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
 16071 Sculpting a lump of clay destroys one object, and replaces it with another one [Burke,M, by Wasserman]
 16234 Burke says when two object coincide, one of them is destroyed in the process [Burke,M, by Hawley]
 13278 Maybe the clay becomes a different lump when it becomes a statue [Burke,M, by Koslicki]
###### 9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / d. Coincident objects
 14750 Two entities can coincide as one, but only one of them (the dominant sortal) fixes persistence conditions [Burke,M, by Sider]
###### 9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / a. Essence as necessary properties
 14380 The distinction between necessary and essential properties can be ignored [Rocca]
###### 10. Modality / A. Necessity / 1. Types of Modality
 12205 There are two families of modal notions, metaphysical and epistemic, of equal strength [Edgington]
###### 10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity
 12207 Metaphysical possibility is discovered empirically, and is contrained by nature [Edgington]
###### 10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
 12208 An argument is only valid if it is epistemically (a priori) necessary [Edgington]
 12206 Broadly logical necessity (i.e. not necessarily formal logical necessity) is an epistemic notion [Edgington]
 12185 Logical necessity is epistemic necessity, which is the old notion of a priori [Edgington, by McFetridge]
###### 10. Modality / B. Possibility / 6. Probability
 13857 Truth-functional possibilities include the irrelevant, which is a mistake [Edgington]
 14281 A thing works like formal probability if all the options sum to 100% [Edgington]
 14284 Conclusion improbability can't exceed summed premise improbability in valid arguments [Edgington]
###### 10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / a. Conditionals
 13768 Validity can preserve certainty in mathematics, but conditionals about contingents are another matter [Edgington]
 13853 It is a mistake to think that conditionals are statements about how the world is [Edgington]
###### 10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / b. Types of conditional
 13770 There are many different conditional mental states, and different conditional speech acts [Edgington]
 14269 Maybe forward-looking indicatives are best classed with the subjunctives [Edgington]
 14270 Simple indicatives about past, present or future do seem to form a single semantic kind [Edgington]
###### 10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / c. Truth-function conditionals
 13764 Are conditionals truth-functional - do the truth values of A and B determine the truth value of 'If A, B'? [Edgington]
 13765 'If A,B' must entail ¬(A & ¬B); otherwise we could have A true, B false, and If A,B true, invalidating modus ponens [Edgington]
 14274 Inferring conditionals from disjunctions or negated conjunctions gives support to truth-functionalism [Edgington]
 14275 Truth-function problems don't show up in mathematics [Edgington]
 14276 The truth-functional view makes conditionals with unlikely antecedents likely to be true [Edgington]
 14290 Doctor:'If patient still alive, change dressing'; Nurse:'Either dead patient, or change dressing'; kills patient! [Edgington]
###### 10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / d. Non-truthfunction conditionals
 13859 X believes 'if A, B' to the extent that A & B is more likely than A & ¬B [Edgington]
 14271 Non-truth-functionalist say 'If A,B' is false if A is T and B is F, but deny that is always true for TT,FT and FF [Edgington]
 14272 I say "If you touch that wire you'll get a shock"; you don't touch it. How can that make the conditional true? [Edgington]
 13855 A conditional does not have truth conditions [Edgington]
###### 10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / e. Supposition conditionals
 14282 On the supposition view, believe if A,B to the extent that A&B is nearly as likely as A [Edgington]
 13854 Conditionals express what would be the outcome, given some supposition [Edgington]
###### 10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / f. Pragmatics of conditionals
 14278 Truth-functionalists support some conditionals which we assert, but should not actually believe [Edgington]
 14287 Does 'If A,B' say something different in each context, because of the possibiites there? [Edgington]