Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Michael Burke, Barry Maund and Robert C. Stalnaker

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these philosophers


81 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 1. Nature of Metaphysics
I don't think Lewis's cost-benefit reflective equilibrium approach offers enough guidance [Stalnaker]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / a. Systems of modal logic
Non-S5 can talk of contingent or necessary necessities [Stalnaker]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 7. Barcan Formula
To say there could have been people who don't exist, but deny those possible things, rejects Barcan [Stalnaker, by Rumfitt]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / b. Axiom of Extensionality I
In modal theory, sets only exist in a possible world if that world contains all of its members [Stalnaker]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 1. Ontology of Logic
Logical space is abstracted from the actual world [Stalnaker]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
We regiment to get semantic structure, for evaluating arguments, and understanding complexities [Stalnaker]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / e. or
In 'S was F or some other than S was F', the disjuncts need S, but the whole disjunction doesn't [Stalnaker]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / c. Names as referential
To understand a name (unlike a description) picking the thing out is sufficient? [Stalnaker]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 1. Nature of Existence
A nominalist view says existence is having spatio-temporal location [Stalnaker]
Some say what exists must do so, and nothing else could possible exist [Stalnaker]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 1. Nature of Properties
Properties are modal, involving possible situations where they are exemplified [Stalnaker]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 10. Properties as Predicates
I accept a hierarchy of properties of properties of properties [Stalnaker]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / a. Dispositions
Dispositions have modal properties, of which properties things would have counterfactually [Stalnaker]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 4. Impossible objects
Predicates can't apply to what doesn't exist [Stalnaker]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
Persistence conditions cannot contradict, so there must be a 'dominant sortal' [Burke,M, by Hawley]
The 'dominant' of two coinciding sortals is the one that entails the widest range of properties [Burke,M, by Sider]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / b. Unifying aggregates
'The rock' either refers to an object, or to a collection of parts, or to some stuff [Burke,M, by Wasserman]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / b. Cat and its tail
Tib goes out of existence when the tail is lost, because Tib was never the 'cat' [Burke,M, by Sider]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
Sculpting a lump of clay destroys one object, and replaces it with another one [Burke,M, by Wasserman]
Burke says when two object coincide, one of them is destroyed in the process [Burke,M, by Hawley]
Maybe the clay becomes a different lump when it becomes a statue [Burke,M, by Koslicki]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / d. Coincident objects
Two entities can coincide as one, but only one of them (the dominant sortal) fixes persistence conditions [Burke,M, by Sider]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 7. Substratum
For the bare particular view, properties must be features, not just groups of objects [Stalnaker]
Possible worlds allow separating all the properties, without hitting a bare particular [Stalnaker]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / a. Essence as necessary properties
An essential property is one had in all the possible worlds where a thing exists [Stalnaker]
'Socrates is essentially human' seems to say nothing could be Socrates if it was not human [Stalnaker]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / b. Essence not necessities
Necessarily self-identical, or being what it is, or its world-indexed properties, aren't essential [Stalnaker]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
Bare particular anti-essentialism makes no sense within modal logic semantics [Stalnaker]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects
The bundle theory makes the identity of indiscernibles a necessity, since the thing is the properties [Stalnaker]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 3. Types of Necessity
Strong necessity is always true; weak necessity is cannot be false [Stalnaker]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / a. Conditionals
In nearby worlds where A is true, 'if A,B' is true or false if B is true or false [Stalnaker]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / d. Non-truthfunction conditionals
Conditionals are true if minimal revision of the antecedent verifies the consequent [Stalnaker, by Read]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 2. Necessity as Primitive
Necessity and possibiliy are fundamental, and there can be no reductive analysis of them [Stalnaker]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 4. Necessity from Concepts
Conceptual possibilities are metaphysical possibilities we can conceive of [Stalnaker]
The necessity of a proposition concerns reality, not our words or concepts [Stalnaker]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 5. Modality from Actuality
Modal concepts are central to the actual world, and shouldn't need extravagant metaphysics [Stalnaker]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 3. A Posteriori Necessary
Critics say there are just an a priori necessary part, and an a posteriori contingent part [Stalnaker]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
A 'centred' world is an ordered triple of world, individual and time [Stalnaker]
If it might be true, it might be true in particular ways, and possible worlds describe such ways [Stalnaker]
Possible worlds allow discussion of modality without controversial modal auxiliaries [Stalnaker]
Possible worlds are ontologically neutral, but a commitment to possibilities remains [Stalnaker]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / d. Possible worlds actualism
Given actualism, how can there be possible individuals, other than the actual ones? [Stalnaker]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
A possible world is the ontological analogue of hypothetical beliefs [Stalnaker]
We can take 'ways things might have been' as irreducible elements in our ontology [Stalnaker, by Lycan]
Kripke's possible worlds are methodological, not metaphysical [Stalnaker]
Possible worlds are properties [Stalnaker]
Possible worlds don't reduce modality, they regiment it to reveal its structure [Stalnaker]
I think of worlds as cells (rather than points) in logical space [Stalnaker]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
Why imagine that Babe Ruth might be a billiard ball; nothing useful could be said about the ball [Stalnaker]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / b. Rigid designation
Rigid designation seems to presuppose that differing worlds contain the same individuals [Stalnaker]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
Unlike Lewis, I defend an actualist version of counterpart theory [Stalnaker]
If possible worlds really differ, I can't be in more than one at a time [Stalnaker]
If counterparts exist strictly in one world only, this seems to be extreme invariant essentialism [Stalnaker]
Modal properties depend on the choice of a counterpart, which is unconstrained by metaphysics [Stalnaker]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / d. Haecceitism
Anti-haecceitism says there is no more to an individual than meeting some qualitative conditions [Stalnaker]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 6. Knowing How
Ryle's dichotomy between knowing how and knowing that is too simplistic [Maund]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 1. Perception
Perception is sensation-then-concept, or direct-concepts, or sensation-saturated-in-concepts [Maund]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / a. Sense-data theory
Sense-data have an epistemological purpose (foundations) and a metaphysical purpose (explanation) [Maund]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 6. Inference in Perception
One thesis says we are not aware of qualia, but only of objects and their qualities [Maund]
The Myth of the Given claims that thought is rationally supported by non-conceptual experiences [Maund]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 8. Adverbial Theory
Mountains are adverbial modifications of the earth, but still have object- characteristics [Maund]
Adverbialism tries to avoid sense-data and preserve direct realism [Maund]
18. Thought / C. Content / 1. Content
Thought content is either satisfaction conditions, or exercise of concepts [Maund, by PG]
18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content
Meanings aren't in the head, but that is because they are abstract [Stalnaker]
How can we know what we are thinking, if content depends on something we don't know? [Stalnaker]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
If you don't know what you say you can't mean it; what people say usually fits what they mean [Stalnaker]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference
In the use of a name, many individuals are causally involved, but they aren't all the referent [Stalnaker]
One view says the causal story is built into the description that is the name's content [Stalnaker]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 2. Semantics
'Descriptive' semantics gives a system for a language; 'foundational' semantics give underlying facts [Stalnaker]
We still lack an agreed semantics for quantifiers in natural language [Stalnaker]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 6. Truth-Conditions Semantics
To understand an utterance, you must understand what the world would be like if it is true [Stalnaker]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 8. Possible Worlds Semantics
Extensional semantics has individuals and sets; modal semantics has intensions, functions of world to extension [Stalnaker]
Possible world semantics may not reduce modality, but it can explain it [Stalnaker]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 10. Two-Dimensional Semantics
Two-D says that a posteriori is primary and contingent, and the necessity is the secondary intension [Stalnaker]
In one view, the secondary intension is metasemantic, about how the thinker relates to the content [Stalnaker]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
A theory of propositions at least needs primitive properties of consistency and of truth [Stalnaker]
I take propositions to be truth conditions [Stalnaker]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 3. Concrete Propositions
A 'Russellian proposition' is an ordered sequence of individual, properties and relations [Stalnaker]
Propositions presumably don't exist if the things they refer to don't exist [Stalnaker]
19. Language / F. Communication / 2. Assertion
An assertion aims to add to the content of a context [Stalnaker, by Magidor]
19. Language / F. Communication / 5. Pragmatics / b. Implicature
An assertion is an attempt to rule out certain possibilities, narrowing things down for good planning [Stalnaker, by Schroeter]