### All the ideas for Michael Burke, Joseph Levine and Ian McFetridge

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23 ideas

###### 3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 1. For Truthmakers
 18487 We want to know what makes sentences true, rather than defining 'true' [McFetridge]
###### 7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 7. Facts / a. Facts
 18488 We normally explain natural events by citing further facts [McFetridge]
###### 9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
 16235 Persistence conditions cannot contradict, so there must be a 'dominant sortal' [Burke,M, by Hawley]
 14753 The 'dominant' of two coinciding sortals is the one that entails the widest range of properties [Burke,M, by Sider]
###### 9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / b. Unifying aggregates
 16072 'The rock' either refers to an object, or to a collection of parts, or to some stuff [Burke,M, by Wasserman]
###### 9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / b. Cat and its tail
 14751 Tib goes out of existence when the tail is lost, because Tib was never the 'cat' [Burke,M, by Sider]
###### 9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
 16071 Sculpting a lump of clay destroys one object, and replaces it with another one [Burke,M, by Wasserman]
 16234 Burke says when two object coincide, one of them is destroyed in the process [Burke,M, by Hawley]
 13278 Maybe the clay becomes a different lump when it becomes a statue [Burke,M, by Koslicki]
###### 9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / d. Coincident objects
 14750 Two entities can coincide as one, but only one of them (the dominant sortal) fixes persistence conditions [Burke,M, by Sider]
###### 10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
 12184 Logical necessity overrules all other necessities [McFetridge]
 15084 In the McFetridge view, logical necessity means a consequent must be true if the antecedent is [McFetridge, by Hale]
 12181 Traditionally, logical necessity is the strongest, and entails any other necessities [McFetridge]
 12180 Logical necessity requires that a valid argument be necessary [McFetridge]
 12183 It is only logical necessity if there is absolutely no sense in which it could be false [McFetridge]
 12192 The mark of logical necessity is deduction from any suppositions whatever [McFetridge]
 15083 The fundamental case of logical necessity is the valid conclusion of an inference [McFetridge, by Hale]
###### 10. Modality / B. Possibility / 2. Epistemic possibility
 12182 We assert epistemic possibility without commitment to logical possibility [McFetridge]
###### 10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 1. Sources of Necessity
 12187 Objectual modal realists believe in possible worlds; non-objectual ones rest it on the actual world [McFetridge]
###### 10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 5. Modality from Actuality
 12186 Modal realists hold that necessities and possibilities are part of the totality of facts [McFetridge]
###### 17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / d. Explanatory gap
 7876 Even if we identify pain with neural events, we can't explain why those neurons cause that feeling [Levine, by Papineau]
 7877 Only phenomenal states have an explanatory gap; water is fully explained by H2O [Levine, by Papineau]
 7878 Materialism won't explain phenomenal properties, because the latter aren't seen in causal roles [Papineau on Levine]