### All the ideas for Michael Burke, Joseph Levine and Albert of Saxony

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these philosophers

15 ideas

###### 7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 2. Types of Existence
 16664 Everything that exists is either a substance or an accident [Albert of Saxony]
###### 9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
 16235 Persistence conditions cannot contradict, so there must be a 'dominant sortal' [Burke,M, by Hawley]
 14753 The 'dominant' of two coinciding sortals is the one that entails the widest range of properties [Burke,M, by Sider]
###### 9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / b. Unifying aggregates
 16072 'The rock' either refers to an object, or to a collection of parts, or to some stuff [Burke,M, by Wasserman]
###### 9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / b. Cat and its tail
 14751 Tib goes out of existence when the tail is lost, because Tib was never the 'cat' [Burke,M, by Sider]
###### 9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
 16071 Sculpting a lump of clay destroys one object, and replaces it with another one [Burke,M, by Wasserman]
 16234 Burke says when two object coincide, one of them is destroyed in the process [Burke,M, by Hawley]
 13278 Maybe the clay becomes a different lump when it becomes a statue [Burke,M, by Koslicki]
###### 9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / d. Coincident objects
 14750 Two entities can coincide as one, but only one of them (the dominant sortal) fixes persistence conditions [Burke,M, by Sider]
###### 9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 6. Successive Things
 16703 God could make a successive thing so that previous parts cease to exist [Albert of Saxony]
 16699 Successive entities just need parts to succeed one another, without their existence [Albert of Saxony]
###### 17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / d. Explanatory gap
 7876 Even if we identify pain with neural events, we can't explain why those neurons cause that feeling [Levine, by Papineau]
 7877 Only phenomenal states have an explanatory gap; water is fully explained by H2O [Levine, by Papineau]
 7878 Materialism won't explain phenomenal properties, because the latter aren't seen in causal roles [Papineau on Levine]
###### 26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / f. Ancient elements
 16570 Elements are found last in dismantling bodies, and first in generating them [Albert of Saxony]