Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Michael Burke, DH Mellor / T Crane and Aristotle

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1002 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 1. Nature of Wisdom
Wisdom is scientific and intuitive knowledge of what is by nature most precious [Aristotle]
Wisdom does not study happiness, because it is not concerned with processes [Aristotle]
Knowledge chosen for its own sake, rather than for results, is wisdom [Aristotle]
There is practical wisdom (for action), and theoretical wisdom (for deep understanding) [Aristotle, by Whitcomb]
Wisdom seeks explanations, causes, and reasons why things are as they are [Aristotle, by Politis]
1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 2. Wise People
Aristotle thinks human life is not important enough to spend a whole life on it [Nagel on Aristotle]
Wise people can contemplate alone, though co-operation helps [Aristotle]
It is not much help if a doctor knows about universals but not the immediate particular [Aristotle]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 1. Philosophy
All philosophy begins from wonder, either at the physical world, or at ideas [Aristotle]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 2. Invocation to Philosophy
Without extensive examination firm statements are hard, but studying the difficulties is profitable [Aristotle]
If each of us can give some logos about parts of nature, our combined efforts can be impressive [Aristotle]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 3. Philosophy Defined
Philosophy has different powers from dialectic, and a different life from sophistry [Aristotle]
Philosophy is a kind of science that deals with principles [Aristotle]
Absolute thinking is the thinking of thinking [Aristotle]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 4. Divisions of Philosophy
If only natural substances exist, science is first philosophy - but not if there is an immovable substance [Aristotle]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / a. Philosophy as worldly
Free and great-souled men do not keep asking "what is the use of it?" [Aristotle]
Unobservant thinkers tend to dogmatise using insufficient facts [Aristotle]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / c. Philosophy as generalisation
Wisdom is knowledge of principles and causes [Aristotle]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / d. Philosophy as puzzles
Inquiry is the cause of philosophy [Aristotle]
Translate as 'humans all desire by nature to understand' (not as 'to know') [Aristotle, by Annas]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 6. Hopes for Philosophy
Even people who go astray in their opinions have contributed something useful [Aristotle]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 7. Despair over Philosophy
Most people are readier to submit to compulsion than to argument [Aristotle]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 2. Analysis by Division
Begin examination with basics, and subdivide till you can go no further [Aristotle]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 7. Limitations of Analysis
Trained minds never expect more precision than is possible [Aristotle]
1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 1. Aims of Science
The object of scientific knowledge is what is necessary [Aristotle]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 1. On Reason
Didactic argument starts from the principles of the subject, not from the opinions of the learner [Aristotle]
There is pure deductive reasoning, and explanatory demonstration reasoning [Aristotle, by Politis]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 2. Logos
Human beings, alone of the animals, have logos [Aristotle]
For Aristotle logos is essentially the ability to talk rationally about questions of value [Roochnik on Aristotle]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 4. Aims of Reason
Reasoning is a way of making statements which makes them lead on to other statements [Aristotle]
Aristotle is the supreme optimist about the ability of logos to explain nature [Roochnik on Aristotle]
Reason grasps generalities, while the senses grasp particulars [Aristotle]
Reasoning distinguishes what is beneficial, and hence what is right [Aristotle]
Assume our reason is in two parts, one for permanent first principles, and one for variable things [Aristotle]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 6. Coherence
Maybe everything could be demonstrated, if demonstration can be reciprocal or circular [Aristotle]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 7. Status of Reason
Intelligence which looks ahead is a natural master, while bodily strength is a natural slave [Aristotle]
It is readily agreed that thinking is the most godlike of things in our experience [Aristotle]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 9. Limits of Reason
A very hungry man cannot choose between equidistant piles of food [Aristotle]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 3. Non-Contradiction
The most certain basic principle is that contradictories can't be true at the same time [Aristotle]
We cannot say that one thing both is and is not a man [Aristotle]
For Aristotle predication is regulated by Non-Contradiction, because underlying stability is essential [Roochnik on Aristotle]
Aristotle does not take the principle of non-contradiction for granted [Aristotle, by Politis]
A thing cannot be both in and not-in the same thing (at a given time) [Aristotle]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 4. Contraries
In "Callias is just/not just/unjust", which of these are contraries? [Aristotle]
Contraries are by definition as far distant as possible from one another [Aristotle]
The contrary of good is bad, but the contrary of bad is either good or another evil [Aristotle]
Both sides of contraries need not exist (as health without sickness, white without black) [Aristotle]
Two falsehoods can be contrary to one another [Aristotle]
There is no middle ground in contradiction, but there is in contrariety [Aristotle]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 5. Opposites
If everything is made of opposites, are the opposed things made of opposites? [Aristotle]
Not everything is composed of opposites; what, for example, is the opposite of matter? [Aristotle]
2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 1. Dialectic
It is the role of dialectic to survey syllogisms [Aristotle]
Dialectic starts from generally accepted opinions [Aristotle]
Dialectic aims to start from generally accepted opinions, and lead to a contradiction [Aristotle]
2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 3. Eristic
Competitive argument aims at refutation, fallacy, paradox, solecism or repetition [Aristotle]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 1. Definitions
There can't be one definition of two things, or two definitions of the same thing [Aristotle]
Definitions are easily destroyed, since they can contain very many assertions [Aristotle]
The material element may be essential to a definition [Aristotle]
The parts of a definition are isomorphic to the parts of the entity [Aristotle]
If we define 'man' as 'two-footed animal', why does that make man a unity? [Aristotle]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 3. Types of Definition
You can't define particulars, because accounts have to be generalised [Aristotle]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 4. Real Definition
Aristotelian definitions aim to give the essential properties of the thing defined [Aristotle]
Definitions are of what something is, and that is universal [Aristotle]
Definition by division needs predicates, which are well ordered and thorough [Aristotle]
You can define objects by progressively identifying what is the same and what is different [Aristotle]
An Aristotelian definition is causal [Aristotle, by Witt]
A definition must be of something primary [Aristotle]
Only substance [ousias] admits of definition [Aristotle]
Definitions need the complex features of form, and don't need to mention the category [Aristotle, by Wedin]
Sometimes parts must be mentioned in definitions of essence, and sometimes not [Aristotle]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 5. Genus and Differentia
The differentia indicate the qualities, but not the essence [Aristotle]
Aristotelian definition involves first stating the genus, then the differentia of the thing [Aristotle, by Urmson]
Whiteness can only belong to man because an individual like Callias happens to be white [Aristotle]
A definition is of the universal and of the kind [Aristotle]
Definition by division is into genus and differentiae [Aristotle]
If the genus is just its constitutive forms (or matter), then the definition is the account of the differentiae [Aristotle]
If I define you, I have to use terms which are all true of other things too [Aristotle]
We describe the essence of a particular thing by means of its differentiae [Aristotle]
In definitions the first term to be assigned ought to be the genus [Aristotle]
The genera and the differentiae are part of the essence [Aristotle]
Differentia are generic, and belong with genus [Aristotle]
'Genus' is part of the essence shared among several things [Aristotle]
Aristotle's definitions are not unique, but apply to a range of individuals [Aristotle, by Witt]
Species and genera are largely irrelevant in 'Metaphysics' [Aristotle, by Wedin]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 6. Definition by Essence
The definition is peculiar to one thing, not common to many [Aristotle]
What it is and why it is are the same; screening defines and explains an eclipse [Aristotle]
Essence is not all the necessary properties, since these extend beyond the definition [Aristotle, by Witt]
A definition is an account of a what-it-was-to-be-that-thing [Aristotle]
2. Reason / E. Argument / 3. Analogy
Some things cannot be defined, and only an analogy can be given [Aristotle]
2. Reason / E. Argument / 7. Thought Experiments
Thinking is not perceiving, but takes the form of imagination and speculation [Aristotle]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 2. Infinite Regress
Not everything can be proven, because that would lead to an infinite regress [Aristotle]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 8. Category Mistake / a. Category mistakes
The differentiae of genera which are different are themselves different in kind [Aristotle]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 1. Truth
Simple and essential truth seems to be given, with further truth arising in thinking [Aristotle]
Truth is either intuiting a way of being, or a putting together [Aristotle]
Truth is a matter of asserting correct combinations and separations [Aristotle]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 3. Value of Truth
Piety requires us to honour truth above our friends [Aristotle]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 6. Verisimilitude
If one error is worse than another, it must be because it is further from the truth [Aristotle]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 1. For Truthmakers
Truth-thinking does not make it so; it being so is what makes it true [Aristotle]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / a. What makes truths
The truth or falsity of a belief will be in terms of something that is always this way not that [Aristotle]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / b. Objects make truths
A true existence statement has its truth caused by the existence of the thing [Aristotle]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 10. Making Future Truths
It is necessary that either a sea-fight occurs tomorrow or it doesn't, though neither option is in itself necessary [Aristotle]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
A statement is true if all the data are in harmony with it [Aristotle]
Statements are true according to how things actually are [Aristotle]
Falsity says that which is isn't, and that which isn't is; truth says that which is is, and that which isn't isn't [Aristotle]
Aristotle's truth formulation concerns referring parts of sentences, not sentences as wholes [Aristotle, by Davidson]
4. Formal Logic / A. Syllogistic Logic / 1. Aristotelian Logic
Aristotelian identified 256 possible syllogisms, saying that 19 are valid [Aristotle, by Devlin]
Aristotle replace Plato's noun-verb form with unions of pairs of terms by one of four 'copulae' [Aristotle, by Engelbretsen/Sayward]
Aristotle listed nineteen valid syllogisms (though a few of them were wrong) [Aristotle, by Devlin]
Square of Opposition: not both true, or not both false; one-way implication; opposite truth-values [Aristotle]
Aristotelian syllogisms are three-part, subject-predicate, existentially committed, with laws of thought [Aristotle, by Hanna]
Aristotelian sentences are made up by one of four 'formative' connectors [Aristotle, by Engelbretsen]
4. Formal Logic / A. Syllogistic Logic / 2. Syllogistic Logic
Aristotle's said some Fs are G or some Fs are not G, forgetting that there might be no Fs [Bostock on Aristotle]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 2. Tools of Propositional Logic / e. Axioms of PL
An axiom is a principle which must be understood if one is to learn anything [Aristotle]
The axioms of mathematics are part of philosophy [Aristotle]
Axioms are the underlying principles of everything, and who but the philosopher can assess their truth? [Aristotle]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 1. Modal Logic
Modal Square 1: □P and ¬◊¬P are 'contraries' of □¬P and ¬◊P [Aristotle, by Fitting/Mendelsohn]
Modal Square 2: ¬□¬P and ◊P are 'subcontraries' of ¬□P and ◊¬P [Aristotle, by Fitting/Mendelsohn]
Modal Square 3: □P and ¬◊¬P are 'contradictories' of ¬□P and ◊¬P [Aristotle, by Fitting/Mendelsohn]
Modal Square 4: □¬P and ¬◊P are 'contradictories' of ¬□¬P and ◊P [Aristotle, by Fitting/Mendelsohn]
Modal Square 5: □P and ¬◊¬P are 'subalternatives' of ¬□¬P and ◊P [Aristotle, by Fitting/Mendelsohn]
Modal Square 6: □¬P and ¬◊P are 'subalternatives' of ¬□P and ◊¬P [Aristotle, by Fitting/Mendelsohn]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 4. Alethic Modal Logic
There are three different deductions for actual terms, necessary terms and possible terms [Aristotle]
4. Formal Logic / G. Formal Mereology / 1. Mereology
Are a part and whole one or many? Either way, what is the cause? [Aristotle]
Aristotle relativises the notion of wholeness to different measures [Aristotle, by Koslicki]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 6. Classical Logic
Demonstrations by reductio assume excluded middle [Aristotle]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 7. Second-Order Logic
Predications of predicates are predications of their subjects [Aristotle]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 1. Logical Consequence
Something holds universally when it is proved of an arbitrary and primitive case [Aristotle]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 3. Deductive Consequence |-
Deduction is when we suppose one thing, and another necessarily follows [Aristotle]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 1. Bivalence
For Aristotle bivalence is a feature of reality [Aristotle, by Boulter]
In talking of future sea-fights, Aristotle rejects bivalence [Aristotle, by Williamson]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 2. Excluded Middle
A prayer is a sentence which is neither true nor false [Aristotle]
Everything is either asserted or denied truly [Aristotle]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
For Aristotle, the subject-predicate structure of Greek reflected a substance-accident structure of reality [Aristotle, by O'Grady]
Aristotle places terms at opposite ends, joined by a quantified copula [Aristotle, by Sommers]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / d. and
'Are Coriscus and Callias at home?' sounds like a single question, but it isn't [Aristotle]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 7. Predicates in Logic
Aristotle's logic is based on the subject/predicate distinction, which leads him to substances and properties [Aristotle, by Benardete,JA]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 1. Quantification
Affirming/denying sentences are universal, particular, or indeterminate [Aristotle]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 3. Objectual Quantification
Aristotelian logic has two quantifiers of the subject ('all' and 'some') [Aristotle, by Devlin]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 1. Axiomatisation
Aristotle's axioms (unlike Euclid's) are assumptions awaiting proof [Aristotle, by Leibniz]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 2. Aporiai
Aporia 3: Does one science investigate all being, or does each kind of being have a science? [Aristotle, by Politis]
Puzzles arise when reasoning seems equal on both sides [Aristotle]
We must start with our puzzles, and progress by solving them, as they reveal the real difficulty [Aristotle]
Aporia 4: Does metaphysics just investigate pure being, or also the characteristics of being? [Aristotle, by Politis]
Aporia 1: is there one science of explanation, or many? [Aristotle, by Politis]
Aporia 2: Does one science investigate both ultimate and basic principles of being? [Aristotle, by Politis]
Aporia 5: Do other things exist besides what is perceptible by the senses? [Aristotle, by Politis]
Aporia 10: Do perishables and imperishables have the same principle? [Aristotle, by Politis]
Aporia 6: Are the basic principles of a thing the kinds to which it belongs, or its components? [Aristotle, by Politis]
Aporia 7: Is a thing's kind the most general one, or the most specific one? [Aristotle, by Politis]
Aporia 8: Are there general kinds, or merely particulars? [Aristotle, by Politis]
Aporia 9: Is there one principle, or one kind of principle? [Aristotle, by Politis]
Aporia 11: Are primary being and unity distinct, or only in the things that are? [Aristotle, by Politis]
Aporia 12: Do mathematical entities exist independently, or only in objects? [Aristotle, by Politis]
Aporia 13: Are there kinds, as well as particulars and mathematical entities? [Aristotle, by Politis]
Aporia 15: Are the causes of things universals or particulars? [Aristotle, by Politis]
Aporia 14: Are ultimate causes of things potentialities, or must they be actual? [Aristotle, by Politis]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 1. Mathematics
Mathematics is concerned with forms, not with superficial properties [Aristotle]
Mathematical precision is only possible in immaterial things [Aristotle]
Mathematics studies the domain of perceptible entities, but its subject-matter is not perceptible [Aristotle]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 2. Geometry
Geometry studies naturally occurring lines, but not as they occur in nature [Aristotle]
The essence of a triangle comes from the line, mentioned in any account of triangles [Aristotle]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / a. Numbers
We perceive number by the denial of continuity [Aristotle]
Pluralities divide into discontinous countables; magnitudes divide into continuous things [Aristotle]
Perhaps numbers are substances? [Aristotle]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / c. Priority of numbers
One is prior to two, because its existence is implied by two [Aristotle]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / g. Real numbers
Parts of a line join at a point, so it is continuous [Aristotle]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / m. One
The one in number just is the particular [Aristotle]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / a. Units
A unit is what is quantitatively indivisible [Aristotle]
Units came about when the unequals were equalised [Aristotle]
If only rectilinear figures existed, then unity would be the triangle [Aristotle]
Unit is the starting point of number [Aristotle]
The unit is stipulated to be indivisible [Aristotle]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / c. Counting procedure
Two men do not make one thing, as well as themselves [Aristotle]
When we count, are we adding, or naming numbers? [Aristotle]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / a. The Infinite
Without infinity time has limits, magnitudes are indivisible, and numbers come to an end [Aristotle]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / c. Potential infinite
Infinity is only potential, never actual [Aristotle]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / j. Infinite divisibility
A continuous line cannot be composed of indivisible points [Aristotle]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / b. Greek arithmetic
Some quantities are discrete, like number, and others continuous, like lines, time and space [Aristotle]
The idea of 'one' is the foundation of number [Aristotle]
Number is plurality measured by unity [Aristotle]
Each many is just ones, and is measured by the one [Aristotle]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / a. Structuralism
Mathematics studies abstracted relations, commensurability and proportion [Aristotle]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / a. For mathematical platonism
It is a simple truth that the objects of mathematics have being, of some sort [Aristotle]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / b. Against mathematical platonism
Aristotle removes ontology from mathematics, and replaces the true with the beautiful [Aristotle, by Badiou]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / a. Mathematical empiricism
Ten sheep and ten dogs are the same numerically, but it is not the same ten [Aristotle]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 2. Types of Existence
Existence is either potential or actual [Aristotle]
Some things exist as substances, others as properties of substances [Aristotle]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / a. Nature of Being
Things are predicated of the basic thing, which isn't predicated of anything else [Aristotle]
There are four kinds of being: incidental, per se, potential and actual, and being as truth [Aristotle, by Wittgenstein]
Being is either what falls in the categories, or what makes propositions true [Aristotle, by Aquinas]
There is only being in a certain way, and without that way there is no being [Aristotle]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / e. Being and nothing
Non-existent things aren't made to exist by thought, because their non-existence is part of the thought [Aristotle]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / f. Primary being
Primary being must be more than mere indeterminate ultimate subject of predication [Politis on Aristotle]
Primary being ('proté ousia') exists in virtue of itself, not in relation to other things [Aristotle, by Politis]
The three main candidates for primary being are particular, universal and essence; essence is the answer [Aristotle, by Politis]
Primary being is either universals, or the basis of predication, or essence [Aristotle, by Politis]
Non-primary beings lack essence, or only have a derived essence [Aristotle, by Politis]
Primary being is both the essence, and the subject of predication [Aristotle, by Politis]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / g. Particular being
Substance (ousia) may well be, most fully, the primary subject of predication [Aristotle]
Other types of being all depend on the being of substance [Aristotle]
If nothing exists except individuals, how can there be a science of infinity? [Aristotle]
Being must be understood with reference to one primary sense - the being of substance [Aristotle, by Gill,ML]
There is no being unless it is determinate and well-defined [Aristotle, by Politis]
Aristotle discusses fundamental units of being, rather than existence questions [Aristotle, by Schaffer,J]
Nothing is added to a man's existence by saying he is 'one', or that 'he exists' [Aristotle]
Existence requires thisness, as quantity or quality [Aristotle]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 4. Abstract Existence
The incommensurability of the diagonal always exists, and so it is not in time [Aristotle]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 5. Reason for Existence
Maybe necessity and non-necessity are the first principles of ontology [Aristotle]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 1. Nature of Change
There are six kinds of change: generation, destruction, increase, diminution, alteration, change of place [Aristotle]
Change is the implied actuality of that which exists potentially [Aristotle]
True change is in a thing's logos or its matter, not in its qualities [Aristotle]
A change in qualities is mere alteration, not true change [Aristotle]
If the substratum persists, it is 'alteration'; if it doesn't, it is 'coming-to-be' or 'passing-away' [Aristotle]
Change goes from possession to loss (as in baldness), but not the other way round [Aristotle]
Nature is an active principle of change, like potentiality, but it is intrinsic to things [Aristotle]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 2. Processes
An actuality is usually thought to be a process [Aristotle]
All comings-to-be are passings-away, and vice versa [Aristotle]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / c. Grounding and explanation
Aristotle's formal and material 'becauses' [aitiai] arguably involve grounding [Aristotle, by Correia/Schnieder]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 4. Ontological Dependence
A thing is prior to another if it implies its existence [Aristotle]
Of interdependent things, the prior one causes the other's existence [Aristotle]
Prior things can exist without posterior things, but not vice versa [Aristotle]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Reality
Knowledge of potential is universal and indefinite; of the actual it is definite and of individuals [Aristotle]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 5. Physicalism
Some suggest that materialism is empty, because 'physical' cannot be properly characterized [Mellor/Crane, by Papineau]
Materialists cannot explain change [Aristotle, by Politis]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 3. Proposed Categories
Substance,Quantity,Quality,Relation,Place,Time,Being-in-a-position,Having,Doing,Being affected [Aristotle, by Westerhoff]
The immediate divisions of that which is are genera, each with its science [Aristotle]
There are ten basic categories for thinking about things [Aristotle]
There are ten categories: essence, quantity, quality, relation, place, time, position, state, activity, passivity [Aristotle]
The categories (substance, quality, quantity, relation, action, passion, place, time) peter out inconsequentially [Benardete,JA on Aristotle]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 4. Category Realism
Aristotle derived categories as answers to basic questions about nature, size, quality, location etc. [Aristotle, by Gill,ML]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 1. Nature of Relations
The separation from here to there is not the same as the separation from there to here [Aristotle]
Aristotle said relations are not substances, so (if they exist) they must be accidents [Aristotle, by Heil]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 1. Nature of Properties
There cannot be uninstantiated properties [Aristotle, by Macdonald,C]
An individual property has to exist (in past, present or future) [Aristotle]
Properties are just the ways in which forms are realised at various times [Aristotle, by Frede,M]
The 'propriae' or 'necessary accidents' of a thing are separate, and derived from the essence [Aristotle, by Koslicki]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 2. Need for Properties
Aristotle promoted the importance of properties and objects (rather than general and particular) [Aristotle, by Frede,M]
For two things to differ in some respect, they must both possess that respect [Aristotle]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 3. Types of Properties
An 'accident' is something which may possibly either belong or not belong to a thing [Aristotle]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 4. Intrinsic Properties
To seek truth, study the real connections between subjects and attributes [Aristotle]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 5. Natural Properties
For Aristotle, there are only as many properties as actually exist [Aristotle, by Jacquette]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 6. Categorical Properties
Some things said 'of' a subject are not 'in' the subject [Aristotle]
We call them secondary 'substances' because they reveal the primary substances [Aristotle]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 8. Properties as Modes
The features of a thing (whether quality or quantity) are inseparable from their subjects [Aristotle]
Whiteness can be explained without man, but femaleness cannot be explained without animal [Aristotle]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 9. Qualities
Four species of quality: states, capacities, affects, and forms [Aristotle, by Pasnau]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 10. Properties as Predicates
If we only saw bronze circles, would bronze be part of the concept of a circle? [Aristotle]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 1. Powers
Potentiality is a principle of change, in another thing, or as another thing [Aristotle]
Heavy and light are defined by their tendency to move down or up [Aristotle]
Active 'dunamis' is best translated as 'power' or 'ability' (rather than 'potentiality') [Aristotle, by Gill,ML]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 2. Powers as Basic
The main characteristic of the source of change is activity [energeia] [Aristotle, by Politis]
Actualities are arranged by priority, going back to what initiates process [Aristotle]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 4. Powers as Essence
Sight is the essence of the eye, fitting its definition; the eye itself is just the matter [Aristotle]
Giving the function of a house defines its actuality [Aristotle]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 5. Powers and Properties
Potentiality in geometry is metaphorical [Aristotle]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / d. Dispositions as occurrent
The Megarans say something is only capable of something when it is actually doing it [Aristotle]
Megaran actualism is just scepticism about the qualities of things [Aristotle]
Megaran actualists prevent anything from happening, by denying a capacity for it to happen! [Aristotle]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 1. Universals
Substance is not a universal, as the former is particular but a universal is shared [Aristotle]
Universals are indeterminate and only known in potential, because they are general [Aristotle, by Witt]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 2. Need for Universals
Separate Forms aren't needed for logic, but universals (one holding of many) are essential [Aristotle]
The acquisition of scientific knowledge is impossible without universals [Aristotle]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 3. Instantiated Universals
Colour must be in an individual body, or it is not embodied [Aristotle]
No universals exist separately from particulars [Aristotle]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / a. Platonic Forms
Forms are said to be substances to which nothing is prior [Aristotle]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / b. Partaking
If you accept Forms, you must accept the more powerful principle of 'participating' in them [Aristotle]
There is a confusion because Forms are said to be universal, but also some Forms are separable and particular [Aristotle]
How can the Forms both be the substance of things and exist separately from them? [Aristotle]
If partaking explains unity, what causes participating, and what is participating? [Aristotle]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / c. Self-predication
Forms have to be their own paradigms, which seems to fuse the paradigm and the copy [Aristotle]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / d. Forms critiques
Eternal white is no whiter than temporary white, and it is the same with goodness [Aristotle]
We can forget the Forms, as they are irrelevant, and not needed in giving demonstrations [Aristotle]
Predications only pick out kinds of things, not things in themselves [Aristotle]
There is no point at all in the theory of Forms unless it contains a principle that produces movement [Aristotle]
If two is part of three then numbers aren't Forms, because they would all be intermingled [Aristotle]
All attempts to prove the Forms are either invalid, or prove Forms where there aren't supposed to be any [Aristotle]
It is meaningless to speak of 'man-himself', because it has the same definition as plain 'man' [Aristotle]
If men exist by participating in two forms (Animal and Biped), they are plural, not unities [Aristotle]
Aristotle is not asserting facts about the location of properties, but about their ontological status [Aristotle, by Moreland]
How will a vision of pure goodness make someone a better doctor? [Aristotle]
The Forms have to be potentialities, not actual knowledge or movement [Aristotle]
Are there forms for everything, or for negations, or for destroyed things? [Aristotle]
What possible contribution can the Forms make to perceptible entities? [Aristotle]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / b. Nominalism about universals
The thesis of the Form of the Good (or of anything else) is verbal and vacuous [Aristotle]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects
Aristotle gave up his earlier notion of individuals, because it relied on universals [Aristotle, by Frede,M]
Form and matter may not make up a concrete particular, because there are also accidents like weight [Aristotle, by Frede,M]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / a. Nature of abstracta
Objects lacking matter are intrinsic unities [Aristotle]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 4. Impossible objects
Some philosophers say that in some qualified way non-existent things 'are' [Aristotle]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
To know a thing is to know its primary cause or explanation [Aristotle]
Aristotle's form improves on being non-predicable as a way to identify a 'this' [Aristotle, by Wiggins]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / d. Individuation by haecceity
For Aristotle, things are not made individual by some essential distinguishing mark [Aristotle, by Frede,M]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
Genus and species are substances, because only they reveal the primary substance [Aristotle, by Wedin]
Genus gives the essence better than the differentiae do [Aristotle]
Individuals within a species differ in their matter, form and motivating cause [Aristotle]
Persistence conditions cannot contradict, so there must be a 'dominant sortal' [Burke,M, by Hawley]
The 'dominant' of two coinciding sortals is the one that entails the widest range of properties [Burke,M, by Sider]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 6. Nihilism about Objects
Why are being terrestrial and a biped combined in the definition of man, but being literate and musical aren't? [Aristotle]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / a. Intrinsic unification
A unity may just be a particular, a numerically indivisible thing [Aristotle]
Things may be naturally unified because they involve an indivisible process [Aristotle]
The formal cause may be what unifies a substance [Aristotle]
Aristotle says that the form is what makes an entity what it is [Aristotle, by Frede,M]
Natural objects include animals and their parts, plants, and the simple elements [Aristotle]
Things are one numerically in matter, formally in their account, generically in predicates, and by analogy in relations [Aristotle]
Primary things just are what-it-is-to-be-that-thing [Aristotle]
How is man a unity of animal and biped, especially if the Forms of animal and of biped exist? [Aristotle]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / b. Unifying aggregates
Things are unified by contact, mixture and position [Aristotle]
'The rock' either refers to an object, or to a collection of parts, or to some stuff [Burke,M, by Wasserman]
Things are one to the extent that they are indivisible [Aristotle]
Indivisibility is the cause of unity, either in movement, or in the account or thought [Aristotle]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / c. Unity as conceptual
Some things are unified by their account, which rests on a unified thought about the thing [Aristotle]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / a. Substance
The Pre-Socratics were studying the principles, elements and causes of substance [Aristotle]
Substance is prior in being separate, in definition, and in knowledge [Aristotle, by Witt]
It is wrong to translate 'ousia' as 'substance' [Aristotle, by Politis]
Substance is not predicated of anything - but it still has something underlying it, that originates it [Aristotle]
We only infer underlying natures by analogy, observing bronze of a statue, or wood of a bed [Aristotle]
Is primary substance just an ultimate subject, or some aspect of a complex body? [Aristotle, by Gill,ML]
Primary being is 'that which lies under', or 'particular substance' [Aristotle, by Politis]
Substances have no opposites, and don't come in degrees (including if the substance is a man) [Aristotle]
A single substance can receive contrary properties [Aristotle]
If substance is the basis of reality, then philosophy aims to understand substance [Aristotle]
The baffling question of what exists is asking about the nature of substance [Aristotle]
'Ousia' is 'primary being' not 'primary substance' [Aristotle, by Politis]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / b. Need for substance
We may have to postulate unobservable and unknowable substances [Aristotle]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / c. Types of substance
Units are positionless substances, and points are substances with position [Aristotle]
Elements and physical objects are substances, but ideas and mathematics are not so clear [Aristotle]
A 'primary' substance is in each subject, with species or genera as 'secondary' substances [Aristotle]
Mature Aristotle sees organisms as the paradigm substances [Aristotle, by Pasnau]
Is a primary substance a foundation of existence, or the last stage of understanding? [Aristotle, by Gill,ML]
Secondary substances do have subjects, so they are not ultimate in the ontology [Aristotle, by Frede,M]
In earlier Aristotle the substances were particulars, not kinds [Aristotle, by Lawson-Tancred]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / d. Substance defined
Earlier Aristotle had objects as primary substances, but later he switched to substantial form [Aristotle, by Lowe]
A substance is what-it-is-to-be, or the universal, or the genus, or the subject of saying [Aristotle]
It is matter that turns out to be substance [ousia] [Aristotle]
Matter is not substance, because substance needs separability and thisness [Aristotle]
Things are called 'substances' because they are subjects for everything else [Aristotle]
Substance [ousia] is the subject of predication and cause [aitia?] of something's existence [Aristotle]
Essence (fixed by definition) is also 'ousia', so 'ousia' is both ultimate subject, and a this-thing [Aristotle]
The substance is the form dwelling in the object [Aristotle]
A thing's substance is its primary cause of being [Aristotle]
Substance is unified and universals are diverse, so universals are not substance [Aristotle, by Witt]
In Aristotle, 'proté ousia' is 'primary being', and 'to hupokeimenon' is 'that which lies under' (or 'substance') [Aristotle, by Politis]
Substance is distinct being because of its unity [Aristotle, by Witt]
None of the universals can be a substance [Aristotle]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / b. Cat and its tail
Tib goes out of existence when the tail is lost, because Tib was never the 'cat' [Burke,M, by Sider]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
The statue is not called 'stone' but 'stoney' [Aristotle]
A nature is related to a substance as shapeless matter is to something which has a shape [Aristotle]
Statues depend on their bronze, but bronze doesn't depend on statues [Aristotle, by Gill,ML]
Sculpting a lump of clay destroys one object, and replaces it with another one [Burke,M, by Wasserman]
Burke says when two object coincide, one of them is destroyed in the process [Burke,M, by Hawley]
Maybe the clay becomes a different lump when it becomes a statue [Burke,M, by Koslicki]
Primary matter and form make a unity, one in potentiality, the other in actuality [Aristotle]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / d. Coincident objects
Two entities can coincide as one, but only one of them (the dominant sortal) fixes persistence conditions [Burke,M, by Sider]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / a. Hylomorphism
Essential form is neither accidental nor necessary to matter, so it appears not to be a property [Aristotle, by Witt]
Aristotle's cosmos is ordered by form, and disordered by matter [Aristotle, by Gill,ML]
Aristotle moved from realism to nominalism about substances [Aristotle, by Frede,M]
A substance is a proper subject because the matter is a property of the form, not vice versa [Aristotle, by Gill,ML]
Aristotle doesn't think essential properties are those which must belong to a thing [Aristotle, by Kung]
Forms of sensible substances include unrealised possibilities, so are not fully actual [Aristotle, by Frede,M]
Form, not matter, is a thing's nature, because it is actual, rather than potential [Aristotle]
The unmoved mover and the soul show Aristotelian form as the ultimate mereological atom [Aristotle, by Koslicki]
In 'Metaphysics' Z substantial primacy (as form) is explanatory rather than ontological [Aristotle, by Wittgenstein]
The form of a thing is its essence and its primary being [Aristotle]
In 'Metaphysics' substantial forms take over from objects as primary [Aristotle, by Frede,M]
Essences are not properties (since those can't cause individual substances) [Aristotle, by Witt]
Plato says changing things have no essence; Aristotle disagrees [Aristotle, by Politis]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / b. Form as principle
Some forms, such as the Prime Mover, are held by Aristotle to exist without matter [Aristotle, by Gill,ML]
A true substance is constituted by some nature, which is a principle [Aristotle]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / c. Form as causal
A thing's form and purpose are often the same, and form can be the initiator of change too [Aristotle]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / d. Form as unifier
The 'form' is the recipe for building wholes of a particular kind [Aristotle, by Koslicki]
Things are a unity because there is no clash between potential matter and actual shape/form [Aristotle]
Aristotle's solution to the problem of unity is that form is an active cause or potentiality or nature [Aristotle, by Gill,ML]
Unity of the form is just unity of the definition [Aristotle]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 3. Matter of an Object
Matter is secondary, because it is potential, determined by the actuality of form [Aristotle, by Witt]
In feature-generation the matter (such as bronze) endures, but in generation it doesn't [Aristotle, by Politis]
Matter is the substratum, which supports both coming-to-be and alteration [Aristotle]
Every distinct thing has matter, as long as it isn't an essence or a Form [Aristotle]
In Aristotle, bronze only becomes 'matter' when it is potentially a statue [Aristotle, by Gill,ML]
Aristotle's conception of matter applies to non-physical objects as well as physical objects [Aristotle, by Fine,K]
Aristotle's matter is something that could be the inner origin of a natural being's behaviour [Aristotle, by Witt]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 5. Composition of an Object
Is there a house over and above its bricks? [Aristotle]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 7. Substratum
If you extract all features of the object, what is left over? [Aristotle]
Something must pre-exist any new production [Aristotle]
It is unclear whether Aristotle believes in a propertyless subject, his 'ultimate matter' [Aristotle, by Lawson-Tancred]
A substrate is either a 'this' supporting qualities, or 'matter' supporting actuality [Aristotle]
A subject can't be nothing, so it must qualify as separate, and as having a distinct identity [Aristotle, by Gill,ML]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / a. Parts of objects
The contents of an explanatory formula are parts of the whole [Aristotle]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / b. Sums of parts
A 'whole' (rather than a mere 'sum') requires an internal order which distinguishes it [Aristotle]
If a syllable is more than its elements, is the extra bit also an element? [Aristotle]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
There is no whole except for the parts [Aristotle]
We first sense whole entities, and then move to particular parts of it [Aristotle]
In the case of a house the parts can exist without the whole, so parts are not the whole [Aristotle]
Wholes are continuous, rigid, uniform, similar, same kind, similar matter [Aristotle, by Simons]
A syllable is something different from its component vowels and consonants [Aristotle]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 1. Essences of Objects
Aristotelian essence underlies behaviour, or underlies definition, or is the source of existence [Aristotle, by Aquinas]
Aristotelian essence is retained with identity through change, and bases our scientific knowledge [Aristotle, by Copi]
Aristotle says changing, material things (and not just universals) have an essence [Aristotle, by Politis]
Are essences actually universals? [Aristotle, by Politis]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 2. Types of Essence
Aristotelian essences are causal, not classificatory [Aristotle, by Witt]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences
A primary substance reveals a 'this', which is an individual unit [Aristotle]
The essence of a single thing is the essence of a particular [Aristotle]
To be a subject a thing must be specifiable, with some essential properties [Aristotle, by Gill,ML]
Essence is the cause of individual substance, and creates its unity [Aristotle, by Witt]
Aristotelian essence is not universal properties, but individual essence [Aristotle, by Witt]
Aristotle does not accept individual essences; essential properties are always general [Aristotle, by Kung]
Aristotle's essence explains the existence of an individual substance, not its properties [Aristotle, by Witt]
Aristotle takes essence and form as a particular, not (as some claim) as a universal, the species [Aristotle, by Politis]
Everything that is has one single essence [Aristotle]
Particulars are not definable, because they fluctuate [Aristotle]
Individual essences are not universals, since those can't be substances, or cause them [Aristotle, by Witt]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 4. Essence as Definition
Essence only belongs to things whose account is a definition [Aristotle]
Essence is what is stated in the definition [Aristotle, by Politis]
Definitions recognise essences, so are not themselves essences [Aristotle]
If definition is of universals, many individuals have no definition, and hence no essence [Aristotle, by Witt]
A thing's essence is what is mentioned in its definition [Aristotle, by Lawson-Tancred]
Things have an essence if their explanation is a definition [Aristotle]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 5. Essence as Kind
The Aristotelian view is that the essential properties are those that sort an object [Aristotle, by Marcus (Barcan)]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 6. Essence as Unifier
An essence causes both its own unity and its kind [Aristotle]
A thing's essence is its intrinsic nature [Aristotle]
Having an essence is the criterion of being a substance [Aristotle, by Lawson-Tancred]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / b. Essence not necessities
An 'idion' belongs uniquely to a thing, but is not part of its essence [Aristotle]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / c. Essentials are necessary
The predicates of a thing's nature are necessary to it [Aristotle]
Aristotle doesn't see essential truths or essential properties as necessary [Aristotle, by Koslicki]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 8. Essence as Explanatory
Primary substances are ontological in 'Categories', and explanatory in 'Metaphysics' [Aristotle, by Wedin]
Aristotelian essences are properties mentioned at the starting point of a science [Aristotle, by Kung]
Metaphysics is the science of ultimate explanation, or of pure existence, or of primary existence [Aristotle, by Politis]
The four explanations are the main aspects of a thing's nature [Aristotle, by Moravcsik]
A thing's nature is what causes its changes and stability [Aristotle]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties
It is absurd that a this and a substance should be composed of a quality [Aristotle]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 10. Essence as Species
Genera are not substances, and do not exist apart from the ingredient species [Aristotle]
Generic terms like 'man' are not substances, but qualities, relations, modes or some such thing [Aristotle]
Generalities like man and horse are not substances, but universal composites of account and matter [Aristotle]
In 'Met.' he says genera can't be substances or qualities, so aren't in the ontology [Aristotle, by Frede,M]
'Categories' answers 'what?' with species, genus, differerentia; 'Met.' Z.17 seeks causal essence [Aristotle, by Wedin]
Standardly, Aristotelian essences are taken to be universals of the species [Aristotle, by Witt]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 11. Essence of Artefacts
Things are more unified if the unity comes from their own nature, not from external force [Aristotle]
The hallmark of an artefact is that its active source of maintenance is external [Aristotle, by Gill,ML]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 14. Knowledge of Essences
Aristotle claims that the individual is epistemologically prior to the universal [Aristotle, by Witt]
Actual knowledge is of the individual, and potential knowledge of the universal [Aristotle, by Witt]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 2. Objects that Change
Natural things are their own source of stability through change [Aristotle]
For animate things, only the form, not the matter or properties, must persist through change [Aristotle, by Frede,M]
Coming to be is by shape-change, addition, subtraction, composition or alteration [Aristotle]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 6. Successive Things
A day, or the games, has one thing after another, actually and potentially occurring [Aristotle]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 10. Beginning of an Object
Does the pure 'this' come to be, or the 'this-such', or 'so-great', or 'somewhere'? [Aristotle]
Philosophers have worried about coming-to-be from nothing pre-existing [Aristotle]
The substratum changing to a contrary is the material cause of coming-to-be [Aristotle]
If a perceptible substratum persists, it is 'alteration'; coming-to-be is a complete change [Aristotle]
Coming-to-be may be from nothing in a qualified way, as arising from an absence [Aristotle]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 11. End of an Object
Destruction is dissolution of essence [Aristotle]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 12. Origin as Essential
Aristotle wants definition, not identity, so origin is not essential to him [Aristotle, by Witt]
If two things are the same, they must have the same source and origin [Aristotle]
How a thing is generated does not explain its essence [Aristotle, by Politis]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity
Two things with the same primary being and essence are one thing [Aristotle]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 4. Type Identity
Things such as two different quadrangles are alike but not wholly the same [Aristotle]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 5. Self-Identity
Aristotle denigrates the category of relation, but for modern absolutists self-relation is basic [Benardete,JA on Aristotle]
We can't understand self-identity without a prior grasp of the object [Aristotle]
You are one with yourself in form and matter [Aristotle]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 8. Leibniz's Law
Only if two things are identical do they have the same attributes [Aristotle]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 9. Sameness
'Same' is mainly for names or definitions, but also for propria, and for accidents [Aristotle]
Two identical things have the same accidents, they are the same; if the accidents differ, they're different [Aristotle]
Numerical sameness and generic sameness are not the same [Aristotle]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 2. Nature of Necessity
What is necessary cannot be otherwise [Aristotle]
Necessity makes alternatives impossible [Aristotle]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 3. Types of Necessity
A stone travels upwards by a forced necessity, and downwards by natural necessity [Aristotle]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 4. De re / De dicto modality
A deduction is necessary if the major (but not the minor) premise is also necessary [Aristotle]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
Reasoning is when some results follow necessarily from certain claims [Aristotle]
A thing has a feature necessarily if its denial brings a contradiction [Aristotle]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
Possibility is when the necessity of the contrary is false [Aristotle]
Anything which is possible either exists or will come into existence [Aristotle]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 4. Potentiality
We recognise potentiality from actuality [Aristotle]
Matter is potentiality [Aristotle, by Politis]
Potentialities are always for action, but are conditional on circumstances [Aristotle]
A 'potentiality' is a principle of change or process in a thing [Aristotle]
Things are destroyed not by their powers, but by their lack of them [Aristotle]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 7. Chance
Maybe there is no pure chance; a man's choices cause his chance meetings [Aristotle]
Intrinsic cause is prior to coincidence, so nature and intelligence are primary causes, chance secondary [Aristotle]
Chance is a coincidental cause among events involving purpose and choice [Aristotle]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 6. Necessity from Essence
Some things have external causes of their necessity; others (the simple) generate necessities [Aristotle]
Aristotle's says necessary truths are distinct and derive from essential truths [Aristotle, by Koslicki]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
The reason why is the key to knowledge [Aristotle]
For Aristotle, knowledge is of causes, and is theoretical, practical or productive [Aristotle, by Code]
For Aristotle knowledge is explanatory, involving understanding, and principles or causes [Aristotle, by Witt]
'Episteme' means grasping causes, universal judgments, explanation, and teaching [Aristotle, by Witt]
The ability to teach is a mark of true knowledge [Aristotle]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
We understand a thing when we know its explanation and its necessity [Aristotle]
We only understand something when we know its explanation [Aristotle]
Some understanding, of immediate items, is indemonstrable [Aristotle]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / c. Aim of beliefs
Opinion is praised for being in accordance with truth [Aristotle]
No one has mere belief about something if they think it HAS to be true [Aristotle]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 6. Knowing How
Things are produced from skill if the form of them is in the mind [Aristotle]
Experience knows particulars, but only skill knows universals [Aristotle]
It takes skill to know causes, not experience [Aristotle]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 1. Certainty
Knowledge proceeds from principles, so it is hard to know if we know [Aristotle]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 4. The Cogito
To perceive or think is to be conscious of our existence [Aristotle]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 1. Nature of the A Priori
The notion of a priori truth is absent in Aristotle [Aristotle, by Politis]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 3. Innate Knowledge / c. Tabula rasa
The intellect has potential to think, like a tablet on which nothing has yet been written [Aristotle]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 1. Perception
Perception necessitates pleasure and pain, which necessitates appetite [Aristotle]
Why do we have many senses, and not just one? [Aristotle]
Perception of sensible objects is virtually never wrong [Aristotle]
You cannot understand anything through perception [Aristotle]
Our minds take on the form of what is being perceived [Aristotle, by Mares]
Why can't we sense the senses? And why do senses need stimuli? [Aristotle]
Sense organs aren't the end of sensation, or they would know what does the sensing [Aristotle]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / b. Primary/secondary
Which of the contrary features of a body are basic to it? [Aristotle]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / c. Primary qualities
Many objects of sensation are common to all the senses [Aristotle]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / d. Secondary qualities
Some objects of sensation are unique to one sense, where deception is impossible [Aristotle]
Some knowledge is lost if you lose a sense, and there is no way the knowledge can be replaced [Aristotle]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 3. Representation
In moral thought images are essential, to be pursued or avoided [Aristotle]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 6. Inference in Perception
Particular facts (such as 'is it cooked?') are matters of sense-perception, not deliberation [Aristotle]
12. Knowledge Sources / C. Rationalism / 1. Rationalism
We may think when we wish, but not perceive, because universals are within the mind [Aristotle]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 4. Pro-Empiricism
All men long to understand, as shown by their delight in the senses [Aristotle]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique
Animals may have some knowledge if they retain perception, but understanding requires reasons to be given [Aristotle]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 1. Common Sense
If everyone believes it, it is true [Aristotle]
It is enough if we refute the objections and leave common opinions undisturbed [Aristotle]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 2. Intuition
Aristotle wants to fit common intuitions, and therefore uses language as a guide [Aristotle, by Gill,ML]
Intuition grasps the definitions that can't be proved [Aristotle]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 4. Memory
Many memories make up a single experience [Aristotle]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / b. Need for justification
To know something we need understanding, which is grasp of the primary cause [Aristotle]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / a. Agrippa's trilemma
Sceptics say justification is an infinite regress, or it stops at the unknowable [Aristotle]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / b. Basic beliefs
When you understand basics, you can't be persuaded to change your mind [Aristotle]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / e. Pro-foundations
The starting point of a proof is not a proof [Aristotle]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 5. Dream Scepticism
Dreams aren't a serious problem. No one starts walking round Athens next morning, having dreamt that they were there! [Aristotle]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 3. Subjectivism
If truth is relative it is relational, and concerns appearances relative to a situation [Aristotle]
If relativism is individual, how can something look sweet and not taste it, or look different to our two eyes? [Aristotle]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 6. Relativism Critique
If the majority had diseased taste, and only a few were healthy, relativists would have to prefer the former [Aristotle]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 2. Demonstration
Premises must be true, primitive and immediate, and prior to and explanatory of conclusions [Aristotle]
Aim to get definitions of the primitive components, thus establishing the kind, and work towards the attributes [Aristotle]
Demonstration starts from a definition of essence, so we can derive (or conjecture about) the properties [Aristotle]
Aristotle gets asymmetric consequence from demonstration, which reflects real causal priority [Aristotle, by Koslicki]
Aristotle doesn't actually apply his theory of demonstration to his practical science [Leroi on Aristotle]
There must be definitions before demonstration is possible [Aristotle]
All demonstration is concerned with existence, axioms and properties [Aristotle]
Universal demonstrations are about thought; particular demonstrations lead to perceptions [Aristotle]
We can know by demonstration, which is a scientific deduction leading to understanding [Aristotle]
Demonstrative understanding rests on necessary features of the thing in itself [Aristotle]
Demonstrations must be necessary, and that depends on the middle term [Aristotle]
Demonstrations are syllogisms which give explanations [Aristotle]
There cannot be a science of accidentals, but only of general truths [Aristotle]
Demonstrations about particulars must be about everything of that type [Aristotle]
A demonstration is a deduction which proceeds from necessities [Aristotle]
Demonstration is better with fewer presuppositions, and it is quicker if these are familiar [Aristotle]
The principles of demonstrations are definitions [Aristotle]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 6. Falsification
A single counterexample is enough to prove that a truth is not necessary [Aristotle]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 1. Scientific Theory
Plato says sciences are unified around Forms; Aristotle says they're unified around substance [Aristotle, by Moravcsik]
14. Science / C. Induction / 1. Induction
Nobody fears a disease which nobody has yet caught [Aristotle]
Induction is the progress from particulars to universals [Aristotle]
14. Science / C. Induction / 2. Aims of Induction
We learn universals from many particulars [Aristotle]
14. Science / C. Induction / 3. Limits of Induction
We say 'so in cases of this kind', but how do you decide what is 'of this kind'? [Aristotle]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / a. Explanation
Aristotelian explanations are facts, while modern explanations depend on human conceptions [Aristotle, by Politis]
What is most universal is furthest away, and the particulars are nearest [Aristotle]
Are particulars explained more by universals, or by other particulars? [Aristotle]
Universal principles are not primary beings, but particular principles are not universally knowable [Aristotle]
Universals are valuable because they make the explanations plain [Aristotle]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / b. Aims of explanation
What we seek and understand are facts, reasons, existence, and identity [Aristotle]
We know a thing if we grasp its first causes, principles and basic elements [Aristotle]
Explanation is of the status of a thing, inferences to it, initiation of change, and purpose [Aristotle]
Understanding moves from the less to the more intelligible [Aristotle]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / a. Types of explanation
Science refers the question Why? to four causes/explanations: matter, form, source, purpose [Aristotle]
Four Explanations: the essence and form; the matter; the source; and the end [Aristotle, by Politis]
Aristotle's four 'causes' are four items which figure in basic explanations of nature [Aristotle, by Annas]
There are as many causes/explanations as there are different types of why-question [Aristotle]
Aristotelian explanations mainly divide things into natural kinds [Aristotle, by Politis]
Aristotle's standard analysis of species and genus involves specifying things in terms of something more general [Aristotle, by Benardete,JA]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / e. Lawlike explanations
Explanation and generality are inseparable [Aristotle, by Wedin]
Chance is inexplicable, because we can only explain what happens always or usually [Aristotle]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / g. Causal explanations
The foundation or source is stronger than the thing it causes [Aristotle]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / k. Explanations by essence
Aristotelian explanation by essence may need to draw on knowledge of other essences [Aristotle, by Koslicki]
Real enquiries seek causes, and causes are essences [Aristotle]
Aristotle regularly says that essential properties explain other significant properties [Aristotle, by Kung]
To understand a triangle summing to two right angles, we need to know the essence of a line [Aristotle]
We know something when we fully know what it is, not just its quality, quantity or location [Aristotle]
We know a thing when we grasp its essence [Aristotle]
The explanation is what gives matter its state, which is the form, which is the substance [Aristotle]
Essential properties explain in conjunction with properties shared by the same kind [Aristotle, by Kung]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 3. Best Explanation / a. Best explanation
Universals give better explanations, because they are self-explanatory and primitive [Aristotle]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / c. Features of mind
Mind involves movement, perception, incorporeality [Aristotle]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 2. Psuche
Everything that receives nourishment has a vegetative soul, with it own distinctive excellence [Aristotle]
In a controlled person the receptive part of the soul is obedient, and it is in harmony in the virtuous [Aristotle]
The irrational psuché is persuadable by reason - shown by our criticism and encouragement of people [Aristotle]
If beings are dominated by appetite, this can increase so much that it drives out reason [Aristotle]
Aristotle led to the view that there are several souls, all somewhat physical [Aristotle, by Martin/Barresi]
Psuché is the form and actuality of a body which potentially has life [Aristotle]
The soul is the cause or source of movement, the essence of body, and its end [Aristotle]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 3. Mental Causation
Causation depends on intrinsic properties [Mellor/Crane]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 5. Unity of Mind
The rational and irrational parts of the soul are either truly separate, or merely described that way [Aristotle]
If the soul is composed of many physical parts, it can't be a true unity [Aristotle]
What unifies the soul would have to be a super-soul, which seems absurd [Aristotle]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 6. Anti-Individualism
In a way the soul is everything which exists, through its perceptions and thoughts [Aristotle]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 1. Faculties
Whether the mind has parts is irrelevant, since it obviously has distinct capacities [Aristotle]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 5. Generalisation by mind
Linguistic terms form a hierarchy, with higher terms predicable of increasing numbers of things [Aristotle, by Engelbretsen]
Perception creates primitive immediate principles by building a series of firm concepts [Aristotle]
A perception lodging in the soul creates a primitive universal, which becomes generalised [Aristotle]
Skill comes from a general assumption obtained from thinking about similar things [Aristotle]
Aristotle distinguishes two different sorts of generality - kinds, and properties [Aristotle, by Frede,M]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 6. Idealisation
Science is more accurate when it is prior and simpler, especially without magnitude or movement [Aristotle]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 7. Seeing Resemblance
Many memories of the same item form a single experience [Aristotle]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 1. Identity and the Self
Is Socrates the same person when standing and when seated? [Aristotle]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 7. Self and Thinking
It would seem that the thinking part is the individual self [Aristotle]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 1. Nature of Free Will
A human being fathers his own actions as he fathers his children [Aristotle]
For an action to be 'free', it must be deliberate as well as unconstrained [Aristotle, by Leibniz]
Aristotle never discusses free will [Aristotle, by MacIntyre]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 5. Against Free Will
Aristotle assesses whether people are responsible, and if they are it was voluntary [Aristotle, by Zagzebski]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 1. Dualism
Emotion involves the body, thinking uses the mind, imagination hovers between them [Aristotle]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 8. Dualism of Mind Critique
Early thinkers concentrate on the soul but ignore the body, as if it didn't matter what body received the soul [Aristotle]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 1. Functionalism
Does the mind think or pity, or does the whole man do these things? [Aristotle]
Aristotle has a problem fitting his separate reason into the soul, which is said to be the form of the body [Ackrill on Aristotle]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 2. Anomalous Monism
There are many psychophysicals laws - about the effects of sweets, colours and soft cushions [Mellor/Crane]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
The soul and the body are inseparable, like the imprint in some wax [Aristotle]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / a. Physicalism critique
No defences of physicalism can deprive psychology of the ontological authority of other sciences [Mellor/Crane]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 1. Thought
The attainment of truth is the task of the intellectual part of the soul [Aristotle]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality
Aristotle gives a superior account of rationality, because he allows emotions to participate [Hursthouse on Aristotle]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / h. Conceptual priority
It is unclear whether acute angles are prior to right angles, or fingers to men [Aristotle]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 2. Abstracta by Selection
You can't abstract natural properties to make Forms - objects and attributes are defined together [Aristotle]
We learn primitives and universals by induction from perceptions [Aristotle]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 3. Abstracta by Ignoring
Mathematicians study what is conceptually separable, and doesn't lead to error [Aristotle]
Mathematicians study quantity and continuity, and remove the perceptible features of things [Aristotle]
Mathematicians suppose inseparable aspects to be separable, and study them in isolation [Aristotle]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 8. Abstractionism Critique
If health happened to be white, the science of health would not study whiteness [Aristotle]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 2. Meaning as Mental
For Aristotle meaning and reference are linked to concepts [Aristotle, by Putnam]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 3. Predicates
Predicates are substance, quality, place, relation, quantity and action or affection [Aristotle]
Some predicates signify qualification of a substance, others the substance itself [Aristotle]
Only what can be said of many things is a predicable [Aristotle, by Wedin]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 4. Mental Propositions
Spoken sounds vary between people, but are signs of affections of soul, which are the same for all [Aristotle]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 2. Analytic Truths
The notion of analytic truth is absent in Aristotle [Aristotle, by Politis]
19. Language / F. Communication / 1. Rhetoric
Rhetoric is a political offshoot of dialectic and ethics [Aristotle]
19. Language / F. Communication / 3. Denial
It doesn't have to be the case that in opposed views one is true and the other false [Aristotle]
Negation takes something away from something [Aristotle]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / d. Metaphor
If you shouldn't argue in metaphors, then you shouldn't try to define them either [Aristotle]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / a. Nature of intentions
Not all actions aim at some good; akratic actions, for example, do not [Burnyeat on Aristotle]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / c. Agent causation
An action is voluntary if the limb movements originate in the agent [Aristotle]
Deliberation ends when the starting-point of an action is traced back to the dominant part of the self [Aristotle]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / d. Weakness of will
Aristotle seems not to explain why the better syllogism is overcome in akratic actions [Burnyeat on Aristotle]
The akrates acts from desire not choice, and the enkrates acts from choice not desire [Aristotle]
Virtue is right reason and feeling and action. Akrasia and enkrateia are lower levels of action. [Aristotle, by Cottingham]
Akrasia merely neglects or misunderstands knowledge, rather than opposing it [Achtenberg on Aristotle]
Some people explain akrasia by saying only opinion is present, not knowledge [Aristotle]
A person may act against one part of his knowledge, if he knows both universal and particular [Aristotle]
Licentious people feel no regret, but weak-willed people are capable of repentance [Aristotle]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / a. Practical reason
Practical intellect serves to arrive at the truth which corresponds to right appetite [Aristotle]
Seeing particulars as parts of larger wholes is to perceive their value [Achtenberg on Aristotle]
Prudence is mainly concerned with particulars, which is the sphere of human conduct [Aristotle]
Virtue ensures that we have correct aims, and prudence that we have correct means of achieving them [Aristotle]
One cannot be prudent without being good [Aristotle]
The one virtue of prudence carries with it the possession of all the other virtues [Aristotle]
Practical reason is truth-attaining, and focused on actions good for human beings [Aristotle]
We deliberate about means, not ends [Aristotle]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / b. Intellectualism
Bad people are just ignorant of what they ought to do [Aristotle]
Some people are good at forming opinions, but bad at making moral choices [Aristotle]
For Socrates virtues are principles, involving knowledge, but we say they only imply the principle of practical reason [Aristotle]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / c. Reasons as causes
We assign the cause of someone's walking when we say why they are doing it [Aristotle]
Our reasoned acts are held to be voluntary and our own doing [Aristotle]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 4. Responsibility for Actions
For Aristotle responsibility seems negative, in the absence of force or ignorance [Irwin on Aristotle]
If you repent of an act done through ignorance, you acted involuntarily, not non-voluntarily [Aristotle]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 4. Beauty
We choose things for their fineness, their advantage, or for pleasure [Aristotle]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 5. Natural Beauty
Pentathletes look the most beautiful, because they combine speed and strength [Aristotle]
Nothing contrary to nature is beautiful [Aristotle]
21. Aesthetics / B. Nature of Art / 2. Art as Form
Beauty involves the Forms of order, symmetry and limit, which can be handled mathematically [Aristotle]
21. Aesthetics / B. Nature of Art / 8. The Arts / b. Literature
Poetry is more philosophic than history, as it concerns universals, not particulars [Aristotle]
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 5. Objectivism in Art
The collective judgement of many people on art is better than that of an individual [Aristotle]
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 7. Art and Morality
The good is found in actions, but beauty can exist without movement [Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / A. Value / 1. Nature of Value / a. Nature of value
For Aristotle 'good' means purpose, and value is real but relational [Achtenberg on Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / A. Value / 1. Nature of Value / e. Means and ends
We desire final things just for themselves, and not for the sake of something else [Aristotle]
How can an action be intrinsically good if it is a means to 'eudaimonia'? [Ackrill on Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / A. Value / 1. Nature of Value / f. Ultimate value
No one would choose life just for activities not done for their own sake [Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / A. Value / 2. Values / c. Health
Excess and deficiency are bad for virtue, just as they are for bodily health [Aristotle]
Disreputable pleasures are only pleasant to persons with diseased perception [Aristotle]
Everything seeks, not a single good, but its own separate good [Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / A. Value / 2. Values / d. Altruism
All altruism is an extension of self-love [Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / A. Value / 2. Values / e. Love
Only lovable things are loved, and they must be good, or pleasant, or useful [Aristotle]
Most people want to be loved rather than to love, because they desire honour [Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / A. Value / 2. Values / f. Fine deeds
Slaves can't be happy, because they lack freedom [Aristotle]
Good people enjoy virtuous action, just as musicians enjoy beautiful melodies [Aristotle]
Oxen, horses and children cannot be happy, because they cannot perform fine deeds [Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / A. Value / 2. Values / g. Self interest
For Aristotle, true self-love is love of the higher parts of one's soul [Aristotle, by Annas]
Self-love benefits ourselves, and also helps others [Aristotle]
The best people exercise their virtue towards others, rather than to themselves [Aristotle]
Selfishness is wrong not because it is self-love, but because it is excessive [Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / B. The Good / 1. Goodness / a. Form of the Good
There should be one science of the one Good, but there are many overlapping sciences [Aristotle]
Is the good a purpose, a source of movement, or a pure form? [Aristotle]
The good is 'that at which all things aim' [Aristotle]
Each category of existence has its own good, so one Good cannot unite them [Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / B. The Good / 1. Goodness / b. Types of good
Goodness is when a thing (such as a circle) is complete, and conforms with its nature [Aristotle]
Intelligence and sight, and some pleasures and honours, are candidates for being good in themselves [Aristotle]
Goods are external, of the soul, and of the body; those of the soul (such as action) come first [Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / B. The Good / 1. Goodness / f. Good as pleasure
The masses believe, not unreasonably, that the good is pleasure [Aristotle]
Pleasure is not the Good, and not every pleasure is desirable [Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / B. The Good / 1. Goodness / g. Consequentialism
Clearly perfect conduct will involve both good intention and good action [Aristotle]
We judge people from their deeds because we cannot see their choices (which matter more) [Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / B. The Good / 1. Goodness / h. Good as benefit
Wealth is not the good, because it is only a means [Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / B. The Good / 2. Happiness / a. Nature of happiness
You can be good while asleep, or passive, or in pain [Aristotle]
Happiness seems to involve virtue, or practical reason, or wisdom, or pleasure, or external goods [Aristotle]
Horses, birds and fish are not happy, lacking a divine aspect to their natures [Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / B. The Good / 2. Happiness / b. Eudaimonia
Does Aristotle say eudaimonia is the aim, or that it ought to be? [McDowell on Aristotle]
Some good and evil can happen to the dead, just as the living may be unaware of a disaster [Aristotle]
Eudaimonia is said to only have final value, where reason and virtue are also useful [Aristotle, by Orsi]
22. Metaethics / B. The Good / 2. Happiness / c. Value of happiness
Aristotle is unsure about eudaimonia because he is unsure what people are [Nagel on Aristotle]
Goods like pleasure are chosen partly for happiness, but happiness is chosen just for itself [Aristotle]
Happiness is perfect and self-sufficient, the end of all action [Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / B. The Good / 2. Happiness / d. Routes to happiness
The happy life is in accordance with goodness, which implies seriousness [Aristotle]
Happiness is activity in accordance with complete virtue, for a whole life, with adequate external goods [Aristotle]
Happiness involves three things, of which the greatest is either wisdom, virtue, or pleasure [Aristotle]
Happiness is composed of a catalogue of internal and external benefits [Aristotle]
If happiness can be achieved by study and effort, then it is open to anyone who is not corrupt [Aristotle]
Happiness needs total goodness and a complete life [Aristotle]
The best life is that of the intellect, since that is in the fullest sense the man [Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / B. The Good / 3. Pleasure / a. Nature of pleasure
Pleasure and pain are perceptions of things as good or bad [Aristotle]
For Aristotle, pleasure is the perception of particulars as valuable [Achtenberg on Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / B. The Good / 3. Pleasure / b. Types of pleasure
God feels one simple pleasure forever [Aristotle]
Intellectual pleasures are superior to sensuous ones [Aristotle]
There are pleasures of the soul (e.g. civic honour, and learning) and of the body [Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / B. The Good / 3. Pleasure / c. Value of pleasure
If we criticise bodily pleasures as licentious and bad, why do we consider their opposite, pain, to be bad? [Aristotle]
Nobody would choose the mentality of a child, even if they had the greatest childish pleasures [Aristotle]
There are many things we would want even if they brought no pleasure [Aristotle]
It is right to pursue pleasure, because it enhances life, and life is a thing to choose [Aristotle]
If happiness were mere amusement it wouldn't be worth a lifetime's effort [Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / B. The Good / 3. Pleasure / d. Sources of pleasure
Some things are not naturally pleasant, but become so through disease or depravity [Aristotle]
While replenishing we even enjoy unpleasant things, but only absolute pleasures when we are replenished [Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / B. The Good / 3. Pleasure / e. Role of pleasure
Feeling inappropriate pleasure or pain affects conduct, and is central to morality [Aristotle]
Character is revealed by the pleasures and pains people feel [Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / B. The Good / 3. Pleasure / f. Dangers of pleasure
The greater the pleasure, the greater the hindrance to thought [Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / C. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / d. Ethical theory
There is no fixed art of good conduct, and each situation is different, as in navigation [Aristotle]
We aim not to identify goodness, but to be good [Aristotle]
We must take for granted that we should act according to right principle [Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / C. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
Men are physically prime at thirty-five, and mentally prime at forty-nine [Aristotle]
Perhaps we get a better account of happiness as the good for man if we know his function [Aristotle]
If bodily organs have functions, presumably the whole person has one [Aristotle]
To eat vast amounts is unnatural, since natural desire is to replenish the deficiency [Aristotle]
Aristotle never actually says that man is a rational animal [Aristotle, by Fogelin]
22. Metaethics / C. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / j. Ethics by convention
Moral acts are so varied that they must be convention, not nature [Aristotle]
We all feel universal right and wrong, independent of any community or contracts [Aristotle]
Aristotle said there are two levels of virtue - the conventional and the intellectual [Taylor,R on Aristotle]
Some say slavery is unnatural and created by convention, and is therefore forced, and unjust [Aristotle]
23. Ethics / A. Egoism / 1. Ethical Egoism
Self-interest is a relative good, but nobility an absolute good [Aristotle]
Nobody would choose all the good things in world, if the price was loss of identity [Aristotle]
A man is his own best friend; therefore he ought to love himself best [Aristotle]
23. Ethics / A. Egoism / 2. Hedonism
Licentiousness concerns the animal-like pleasures of touch and taste [Aristotle]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / a. Nature of virtue
Virtue is a purposive mean disposition, which follows a rational principle and prudent judgment [Aristotle]
Acts may be forgivable if particular facts (rather than principles) are unknown [Aristotle]
If virtues are not feelings or faculties, then they must be dispositions [Aristotle]
All good things can be misused, except virtue [Aristotle]
The best virtues are the most useful to others [Aristotle]
All moral virtue is concerned with bodily pleasure and pain [Aristotle]
The good for man is an activity of soul in accordance with virtue [Aristotle]
Many pleasures are relative to a person, but some love what is pleasant by nature, and virtue is like that [Aristotle]
Aristotle must hold that virtuous King Priam's life can be marred, but not ruined [Hursthouse on Aristotle]
Feelings are vital to virtue, but virtue requires choice, which feelings lack [Kosman on Aristotle]
Actions are not virtuous because of their quality, but because of the way they are done [Aristotle]
Virtue is the feeling of emotions that accord with one's perception of value [Achtenberg on Aristotle]
Excellence is a sort of completion [Aristotle]
People who perform just acts unwillingly or ignorantly are still not just [Aristotle]
There are six categories of particular cirumstance affecting an action [Aristotle]
An act is involuntary if the particular facts (esp. circumstances and effect) are unknown [Aristotle]
Virtue is different from continence [Aristotle]
A life of moral virtue brings human happiness, but not divine happiness [Aristotle]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / b. Basis of virtue
Is excellence separate from things, or part of them, or both? [Aristotle]
Excellence is the best state of anything (like a cloak) which has an employment or function [Aristotle]
Each named function has a distinctive excellence attached to it [Aristotle]
The two main parts of the soul give rise to two groups of virtues - intellectual, and moral [Aristotle]
How can good actions breed virtues, if you need to be virtuous to perform good actions? [Aristotle]
If a thing has excellence, this makes the thing good, and means it functions well [Aristotle]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / c. Particularism
It is not universals we must perceive for virtue, but particulars, seen as intrinsically good [Aristotle, by Achtenberg]
Actions concern particular cases, and rules must fit the cases, not the other way round [Aristotle]
We cannot properly judge by rules, because blame depends on perception of particulars [Aristotle]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / d. Virtue theory critique
Aristotle neglects the place of rules in the mature virtuous person [Annas on Aristotle]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / a. Natural virtue
Moral virtue is not natural, because its behaviour can be changed, unlike a falling stone [Aristotle]
We are partly responsible for our own dispositions and virtues [Aristotle]
Dispositions to virtue are born in us, but without intelligence they can be harmful [Aristotle]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / c. Motivation for virtue
A person is good if they act from choice, and for the sake of the actions in themselves [Aristotle]
Existence is desirable if one is conscious of one's own goodness [Aristotle]
People become good because of nature, habit and reason [Aristotle]
The end of virtue is what is right and honourable or fine [Aristotle]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / d. Teaching virtue
Nature enables us to be virtuous, but habit develops virtue in us [Aristotle]
Like activities produce like dispositions, so we must give the right quality to the activity [Aristotle]
We must practise virtuous acts because practice actually teaches us the nature of virtue [Burnyeat on Aristotle]
True education is training from infancy to have correct feelings [Aristotle]
People can break into the circle of virtue and good action, by chance, or with help [Aristotle]
We acquire virtue by the repeated performance of just and temperate acts [Aristotle]
Associating with good people can be a training in virtue [Aristotle]
Music can mould the character to be virtuous (just as gymnastics trains the body) [Aristotle]
We acquire virtues by habitually performing good deeds [Aristotle]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / e. Character
When people speak of justice they mean a disposition of character to behave justly [Aristotle]
Character can be heroic, excellent, controlled, uncontrolled, bad, or brutish [Aristotle, by Urmson]
The three states of character to avoid are vice, 'akrasia' and brutishness [Aristotle]
It is very hard to change a person's character traits by argument [Aristotle]
Character virtues (such as courage) are of the non-rational part, which follows the rational part [Aristotle]
Character (éthos) is developed from habit (ethos) [Aristotle]
A person of good character sees the truth about what is actually fine and pleasant [Aristotle]
People develop their characters through the activities they pursue [Aristotle]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / f. The Mean
Aristotle aims at happiness by depressing emotions to a harmless mean [Nietzsche on Aristotle]
The mean is relative to the individual (diet, for example) [Aristotle]
Skills are only well performed if they observe the mean [Aristotle]
We must tune our feelings to be right in every way [Aristotle]
The vices to which we are most strongly pulled are most opposed to the mean [Aristotle]
One drink a day is moderation, but very drunk once a week could exhibit the mean [Urmson on Aristotle]
In most normal situations it is not appropriate to have any feelings at all [Urmson on Aristotle]
The mean is always right, and the extremes are always wrong [Aristotle]
There is a mean of feelings, as in our responses to the good or bad fortune of others [Aristotle]
To make one's anger exactly appropriate to a situation is very difficult [Aristotle]
Patient people are indignant, but only appropriately, as their reason prescribes [Aristotle]
The sincere man is praiseworthy, because truth is the mean between boasting and irony [Aristotle]
Virtues are destroyed by the excess and preserved by the mean [Aristotle]
The law is the mean [Aristotle]
The mean implies that vices are opposed to one another, not to virtue [Aristotle, by Annas]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / h. Right feelings
It is foolish not to be angry when it is appropriate [Aristotle]
At times we ought to feel angry, and we ought to desire health and learning [Aristotle]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / i. Absolute virtues
There is no right time or place or way or person for the committing of adultery; it is just wrong [Aristotle]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / j. Unity of virtue
Nowadays we (unlike Aristotle) seem agreed that someone can have one virtue but lack others [Williams,B on Aristotle]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
Justice and self-control are better than courage, because they are always useful [Aristotle]
Gods exist in a state which is morally superior to virtue [Aristotle]
Friendship is preferable to money, since its excess is preferable [Aristotle]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / b. Temperance
It is quite possible to live a moderate life and yet be miserable [Aristotle]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / c. Justice
Justice concerns our behaviour in dealing with other people [Aristotle]
Justice is whatever creates or preserves social happiness [Aristotle]
Between friends there is no need for justice [Aristotle]
What emotion is displayed in justice, and what are its deficiency and excess? [Urmson on Aristotle]
The word 'unjust' describes law-breaking and exploitation [Aristotle]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / d. Courage
True courage is an appropriate response to a dangerous situation [Aristotle]
Strictly speaking, a courageous person is one who does not fear an honourable death [Aristotle]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / e. Honour
Honour depends too much on the person who awards it [Aristotle]
Honour is clearly the greatest external good [Aristotle]
If you aim at honour, you make yourself dependent on the people to whom you wish to be superior [Aristotle, by Williams,B]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / f. Compassion
The young feel pity from philanthropy, but the old from self-concern [Aristotle]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / g. Contemplation
Contemplation (with the means to achieve it) is the perfect happiness for man [Aristotle]
The intellectual life is divine in comparison with ordinary human life [Aristotle]
We should aspire to immortality, and live by what is highest in us [Aristotle]
The gods live, but action is unworthy of them, so that only leaves contemplation? [Aristotle]
Lower animals cannot be happy, because they cannot contemplate [Aristotle]
The more people contemplate, the happier they are [Aristotle]
Only contemplation is sought for its own sake; practical activity always offers some gain [Aristotle]
Contemplation is a supreme pleasure and excellence [Aristotle]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 4. External Goods / a. External goods
It is nonsense to say a good person is happy even if they are being tortured or suffering disaster [Aristotle]
A man can't be happy if he is ugly, or of low birth, or alone and childless [Aristotle]
The fine deeds required for happiness need external resources, like friends or wealth [Aristotle]
Goods in the soul are more worthy than those outside it, as everybody wants them [Aristotle]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 4. External Goods / c. Wealth
Rich people are mindlessly happy [Aristotle]
The virtue of generosity requires money [Aristotle]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 4. External Goods / d. Friendship
Bad men can have friendships of utility or pleasure, but only good men can be true friends [Aristotle]
For Aristotle in the best friendships the binding force is some excellence of character [Cooper,JM on Aristotle]
We value friendship just for its own sake [Aristotle]
Aristotle does not confine supreme friendship to moral heroes [Cooper,JM on Aristotle]
Master and slave can have friendship through common interests [Aristotle]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 1. Deontology
'Enkrateia' (control) means abiding by one's own calculations [Aristotle]
24. Applied Ethics / A. Decision Conflicts / 2. Dilemmas
A man should sooner die than do some dreadful things, no matter how cruel the death [Aristotle]
24. Applied Ethics / C. Death Issues / 1. Death
For the great-souled man it is sometimes better to be dead [Aristotle]
The more virtuous and happy a person is, the worse the prospect becomes of ending life [Aristotle]
24. Applied Ethics / C. Death Issues / 3. Abortion
Abortions should be procured before the embryo has acquired life and sensation [Aristotle]
24. Applied Ethics / C. Death Issues / 4. Suicide
A suicide embraces death to run away from hardships, rather than because it is a fine deed [Aristotle]
25. Society / A. State of Nature / 1. A People / a. Human distinctiveness
Man is by nature a political animal [Aristotle]
People want to live together, even when they don't want mutual help [Aristotle]
Society collapses if people cannot rely on exchanging good for good and evil for evil [Aristotle]
Even more than a social being, man is a pairing and family being [Aristotle]
Man is intrinsically a civilized animal [Aristotle]
25. Society / A. State of Nature / 1. A People / b. The natural life
Man is by nature a social being [Aristotle]
25. Society / A. State of Nature / 1. A People / c. A unified people
A community must share a common view of good and justice [Aristotle]
25. Society / B. The State / 1. Purpose of a State
A bad political constitution (especially a tyranny) makes friendship almost impossible [Aristotle]
Political science aims at the highest good, which involves creating virtue in citizens [Aristotle]
The state exists not for community, but for noble actions [Aristotle]
Aristotle says the state is natural, not conventional or contractual [Aristotle, by Annas]
Every state is an association formed for some good purpose [Aristotle]
25. Society / B. The State / 2. State Legitimacy / e. General will
The state aims to consist as far as possible of those who are like and equal [Aristotle]
25. Society / B. The State / 3. Constitutions
Any constitution can be made to last for a day or two [Aristotle]
We must decide the most desirable human life before designing a constitution [Aristotle]
The six constitutions are monarchy/tyranny, aristocracy/oligarchy, and polity/democracy [Aristotle]
The four constitutions are democracy (freedom), oligarchy (wealth), aristocracy (custom), tyranny (security) [Aristotle]
The aim of legislators, and of a good constitution, is to create good citizens [Aristotle]
25. Society / B. The State / 4. Citizenship
The virtues of a good citizen are relative to a particular constitution [Aristotle]
25. Society / B. The State / 5. Leaders / d. Elites
The only virtue special to a ruler is practical wisdom [Aristotle]
25. Society / B. The State / 6. Government / b. Legislature
We hold that every piece of legislation is just [Aristotle]
25. Society / B. The State / 8. Religion in Society
The whole state should pay for the worship of the gods [Aristotle]
25. Society / C. Social Justice / 1. Social Justice
For Aristotle, debates about justice are debates about the good life [Aristotle, by Sandel]
The good is obviously justice, which benefits the whole community, and involves equality in some sense [Aristotle]
25. Society / C. Social Justice / 2. Social Freedom / a. Slavery
Natural slaves are those naturally belonging to another, or who can manage no more than labouring [Aristotle]
To be just, Aristotle thought slavery must be both necessary and natural [Aristotle, by Sandel]
25. Society / C. Social Justice / 2. Social Freedom / e. Freedom of lifestyle
One principle of liberty is to take turns ruling and being ruled [Aristotle]
25. Society / C. Social Justice / 3. Social Equality / a. Grounds of equality
Treat equal people equally, and unequal people unequally [Aristotle, by Tuckness/Wolf]
We can claim an equal right to aristocratic virtue, as well as to wealth or freedom [Aristotle]
Equality is obviously there to help people who do not get priority in the constitution [Aristotle]
It is always the weak who want justice and equality, not the strong [Aristotle]
25. Society / C. Social Justice / 3. Social Equality / d. Economic equality
Phaleas proposed equality of property, provided there is equality of education [Aristotle]
25. Society / C. Social Justice / 4. Legal Rights / a. Basis of rights
Law is intelligence without appetite [Aristotle]
25. Society / C. Social Justice / 5. Right to Punish / b. Retribution for crime
It is noble to avenge oneself on one's enemies, and not come to terms with them [Aristotle]
25. Society / D. Political Doctrines / 5. Democracy / a. Nature of democracy
Democracy is the best constitution for friendship, because it encourages equality [Aristotle]
Like water, large numbers of people are harder to corrupt than a few [Aristotle]
The many may add up to something good, even if they are inferior as individuals [Aristotle]
25. Society / D. Political Doctrines / 5. Democracy / d. Representative democracy
It is wrong that a worthy officer of state should seek the office [Aristotle]
25. Society / D. Political Doctrines / 7. Communitarianism
Friendship is based on a community of sharing [Aristotle]
Friendship holds communities together, and lawgivers value it more than justice [Aristotle]
25. Society / E. State Functions / 1. The Law / a. Legal system
Man is the worst of all animals when divorced from law and justice [Aristotle]
If it is easy to change the laws, that makes them weaker [Aristotle]
It is preferable that law should rule rather than any single citizen [Aristotle]
25. Society / E. State Functions / 1. The Law / b. Natural law
Natural justice is the same everywhere, and does not (unlike legal justice) depend on acceptance [Aristotle]
25. Society / E. State Functions / 4. Education / a. Education principles
Aristotle said the educated were superior to the uneducated as the living are to the dead [Aristotle, by Diog. Laertius]
25. Society / E. State Functions / 4. Education / b. Aims of education
The aim of serious childhood play is the amusement of the complete adult [Aristotle]
It is the mark of an educated mind to be able to entertain an idea without accepting it [Aristotle]
A state is plural, and needs education to make it a community [Aristotle]
25. Society / E. State Functions / 4. Education / c. Teaching
Intellectual virtue arises from instruction (and takes time), whereas moral virtue result from habit [Aristotle]
Men learn partly by habit, and partly by listening [Aristotle]
Wise men aren't instructed; they instruct [Aristotle]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 1. Nature
Nature does nothing in vain [Aristotle]
'Nature' refers to two things - form and matter [Aristotle]
Nothing natural is disorderly, because nature is responsible for all order [Aristotle]
Nature is a principle of change, so we must understand change first [Aristotle]
Why are some things destructible and others not? [Aristotle]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 2. Natural Purpose / a. Final purpose
Nature has purpose, and aims at what is better. Is it coincidence that crops grow when it rains? [Aristotle]
An unworn sandal is in vain, but nothing in nature is in vain [Aristotle]
There has to be some goal, and not just movement to infinity [Aristotle]
If nature makes everything for a purpose, then plants and animals must have been made for man [Aristotle]
Everything is arranged around a single purpose [Aristotle]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 2. Natural Purpose / b. Limited purposes
The nature of any given thing is determined by its end [Aristotle]
Aristotle needed to distinguish teleological description from teleological explanation [Irwin on Aristotle]
Teeth and crops are predictable, so they cannot be mere chance, but must have a purpose [Aristotle]
It is folly not to order one's life around some end [Aristotle]
The best instruments have one purpose, not many [Aristotle]
A thing's purpose is ambiguous, and from one point of view we ourselves are ends [Aristotle]
The nature of a thing is its end and purpose [Aristotle]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 2. Natural Purpose / c. Purpose denied
Eyes could be used for a natural purpose, or for unnatural seeing, or for a non-seeing activity [Aristotle]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 3. Natural Function
Is ceasing-to-be unnatural if it happens by force, and natural otherwise? [Aristotle]
A thing's active function is its end [Aristotle]
Each thing's function is its end [Aristotle]
Each thing that has a function is for the sake of that function [Aristotle]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 4. Mathematical Nature
Pythagoreans say the whole universe is made of numbers [Aristotle]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 5. Infinite in Nature
Continuity depends on infinity, because the continuous is infinitely divisible [Aristotle]
There are potential infinities (never running out), but actual infinity is incoherent [Aristotle, by Friend]
The heavens seem to be infinite, because we cannot imagine their end [Aristotle]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / a. Greek matter
Substance must exist, because something must endure during change between opposites [Aristotle]
Matter desires form, as female desires male, and ugliness desires beauty [Aristotle]
Matter is perceptible (like bronze) or intelligible (like mathematical objects) [Aristotle]
Matter is neither a particular thing nor a member of a determinate category [Aristotle]
Matter is the limit of points and lines, and must always have quality and form [Aristotle]
The primary matter is the substratum for the contraries like hot and cold [Aristotle]
Aristotle's matter can become any other kind of matter [Aristotle, by Wiggins]
Aristotle says matter is a lesser substance, rather than wholly denying that it is a substance [Aristotle, by Kung]
Aristotle had a hierarchical conception of matter [Aristotle, by Fine,K]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / b. Prime matter
Primary matter is what characterises other stuffs, and it has no distinct identity [Aristotle]
Ultimate matter is discredited, as Aristotle merged substratum of change with bearer of properties [Simons on Aristotle]
The traditional view of Aristotle is God (actual form) at top and prime matter (potential matter) at bottom [Aristotle, by Gill,ML]
Aristotle may only have believed in prime matter because his elements were immutable [Aristotle, by Alexander,P]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / c. Ultimate substances
There couldn't be just one element, which was both water and air at the same time [Aristotle]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / e. The One
It doesn't explain the world to say it was originally all one. How did it acquire diversity? [Aristotle]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / f. Ancient elements
When Aristotle's elements compound they are stable, so why would they ever separate? [Weisberg/Needham/Hendry on Aristotle]
Aether moves in circles and is imperishable; the four elements perish, and move in straight lines [Aristotle, by Gill,ML]
An element is what bodies are analysed into, and won't itself divide into something else [Aristotle]
The Four Elements must change into one another, or else alteration is impossible [Aristotle]
Fire is hot and dry; Air is hot and moist; Water is cold and moist; Earth is cold and dry [Aristotle]
I claim that Aristotle's foundation is the four elements, and not wholly potential prime matter [Aristotle, by Gill,ML]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / g. Atomism
Bodies are endlessly divisible [Aristotle]
Wood is potentially divided through and through, so what is there in the wood besides the division? [Aristotle]
If a body is endlessly divided, is it reduced to nothing - then reassembled from nothing? [Aristotle]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 1. Natural Kinds
Unusual kinds like mule are just a combination of two kinds [Aristotle]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 2. Defining Kinds
All water is the same, because of a certain similarity [Aristotle]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 6. Necessity of Kinds
Whatever holds of a kind intrinsically holds of it necessarily [Aristotle]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 2. Types of cause
A 'material' cause/explanation is the form of whatever is the source [Aristotle, by Politis]
Causes produce a few things in their own right, and innumerable things coincidentally [Aristotle]
Types of cause are nature, necessity and chance, and mind and human agency [Aristotle]
The 'form' of a thing explains why the matter constitutes that particular thing [Aristotle, by Politis]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 3. Final causes
The four causes are the material, the form, the source, and the end [Aristotle]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 4. Naturalised causation
Is there cause outside matter, and can it be separated, and is it one or many? [Aristotle]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 5. Direction of causation
People assume events cause what follows them [Aristotle]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / c. Conditions of causation
We exercise to be fit, but need fitness to exercise [Aristotle]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / b. Nomological causation
Pure Forms and numbers can't cause anything, and especially not movement [Aristotle]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / d. Causal necessity
When a power and its object meet in the right conditions, an action necessarily follows [Aristotle]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / b. Scientific necessity
It is not possible for fire to be cold or snow black [Aristotle]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / d. Knowing essences
Scientists must know the essential attributes of the things they study [Aristotle]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / a. Explaining movement
If movement can arise within an animal, why can't it also arise in the universe? [Aristotle]
When there is unnatural movement (e.g. fire going downwards) the cause is obvious [Aristotle]
Practical reason is based on desire, so desire must be the ultimate producer of movement [Aristotle]
Motion fulfils potentiality [Aristotle]
If all movement is either pushing or pulling, there must be a still point in between where it all starts [Aristotle]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space-Time / 1. Space / a. Void
Void is a kind of place, so it can't explain place [Aristotle]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space-Time / 1. Space / d. Substantival space
The universe as a whole is not anywhere [Aristotle]
If everything has a place, this causes an infinite regress, because each place must have place [Aristotle]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space-Time / 1. Space / e. Relational space
Place is not shape, or matter, or extension between limits; it is the limits of a body [Aristotle]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space-Time / 2. Time / a. Time
Time has parts, but the now is not one of them, and time is not composed of nows [Aristotle]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space-Time / 2. Time / d. Beginning of time
It is hard to see how either time or movement could come into existence or be destroyed [Aristotle]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space-Time / 2. Time / e. Existence of time
If there were many cosmoses, each would have its own time, giving many times [Aristotle]
If all of time has either ceased to exist, or has not yet happened, maybe time does not exist [Aristotle]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space-Time / 2. Time / h. Growing block of time
Things may be necessary once they occur, but not be unconditionally necessary [Aristotle]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space-Time / 2. Time / i. Time and change
Time is not change, but requires change in our minds to be noticed [Aristotle]
Time does not exist without change [Aristotle]
Time is an aspect of change [Aristotle]
There is no time without movement [Aristotle]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space-Time / 2. Time / j. Time as subjective
Would there be time if there were no mind? [Aristotle]
27. Natural Reality / D. Cosmology / 1. Cosmology
The Earth must be spherical, because it casts a convex shadow on the moon [Aristotle]
The earth must be round and of limited size, because moving north or south makes different stars visible [Aristotle]
27. Natural Reality / D. Cosmology / 2. Eternal Universe
Do things come to be from what is, or from what is not? Both seem problematical. [Aristotle]
If each thing can cease to be, why hasn't absolutely everything ceased to be long ago? [Aristotle]
27. Natural Reality / D. Cosmology / 3. The Beginning
The first mover is necessary, and because it is necessary it is good [Aristotle]
Even if the world is caused by fate, mind and nature are still prior causes [Aristotle]
Something which both moves and is moved is intermediate, so it follows that there must be an unmoved mover [Aristotle]
Everyone agrees that the world had a beginning, but thinkers disagree over whether it will end [Aristotle]
27. Natural Reality / D. Cosmology / 10. Multiverse
It seems possible that there exists a limited number of other worlds apart from this one [Aristotle]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 2. Divine Nature
The source of all movement must be indivisible and have no magnitude [Aristotle]
God is not blessed and happy because of internal goods, but because of his own nature [Aristotle]
There must a source of movement which is eternal, indivisible and without magnitude [Aristotle]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 5. God and Time
God is not a creator (involving time and change) and is not concerned with the inferior universe [Aristotle, by Armstrong,K]
28. God / B. Proving God / 1. Proof of God
For Aristotle God is defined in an axiom, for which there is no proof [Aristotle, by Frede,M]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / a. Ontological Proof
Being is better than not-being [Aristotle]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / b. Ontological Proof critique
'Being' and 'oneness' are predicated of everything which exists [Aristotle]
Properties must be proved, but not essence; but existents are not a kind, so existence isn't part of essence [Aristotle]
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / b. Teleological Proof
The world can't be arranged at all if there is nothing eternal and separate [Aristotle]
An Order controls all things [Aristotle]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 4. God Reflects Humanity
Men imagine gods to be of human shape, with a human lifestyle [Aristotle]
29. Religion / A. Polytheistic Religion / 2. Greek Polytheism
There are as many eternal unmovable substances as there are movements of the stars [Aristotle]