Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Michael Burke, DH Mellor / T Crane and Paul Ricoeur

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13 ideas

1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 3. Hermeneutics
Hermeneutics of tradition is sympathetic, hermeneutics of suspicion is hostile [Ricoeur, by Mautner]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 5. Physicalism
Some suggest that materialism is empty, because 'physical' cannot be properly characterized [Mellor/Crane, by Papineau]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
Persistence conditions cannot contradict, so there must be a 'dominant sortal' [Burke,M, by Hawley]
The 'dominant' of two coinciding sortals is the one that entails the widest range of properties [Burke,M, by Sider]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / b. Unifying aggregates
'The rock' either refers to an object, or to a collection of parts, or to some stuff [Burke,M, by Wasserman]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / b. Cat and its tail
Tib goes out of existence when the tail is lost, because Tib was never the 'cat' [Burke,M, by Sider]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
Maybe the clay becomes a different lump when it becomes a statue [Burke,M, by Koslicki]
Burke says when two object coincide, one of them is destroyed in the process [Burke,M, by Hawley]
Sculpting a lump of clay destroys one object, and replaces it with another one [Burke,M, by Wasserman]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / d. Coincident objects
Two entities can coincide as one, but only one of them (the dominant sortal) fixes persistence conditions [Burke,M, by Sider]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 3. Mental Causation
Causation depends on intrinsic properties [Mellor/Crane]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 2. Anomalous Monism
There are many psychophysicals laws - about the effects of sweets, colours and soft cushions [Mellor/Crane]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / a. Physicalism critique
No defences of physicalism can deprive psychology of the ontological authority of other sciences [Mellor/Crane]