### All the ideas for Michael Burke, E Conee / R Feldman and Ori Simchen

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16 ideas

###### 4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 7. Barcan Formula
 16186 The Barcan Formulas express how to combine modal operators with classical quantifiers [Simchen]
 16187 The Barcan Formulas are orthodox, but clash with the attractive Actualist view [Simchen]
 16190 BF implies that if W possibly had a child, then something is possibly W's child [Simchen]
###### 9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
 16235 Persistence conditions cannot contradict, so there must be a 'dominant sortal' [Burke,M, by Hawley]
 14753 The 'dominant' of two coinciding sortals is the one that entails the widest range of properties [Burke,M, by Sider]
###### 9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / b. Unifying aggregates
 16072 'The rock' either refers to an object, or to a collection of parts, or to some stuff [Burke,M, by Wasserman]
###### 9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / b. Cat and its tail
 14751 Tib goes out of existence when the tail is lost, because Tib was never the 'cat' [Burke,M, by Sider]
###### 9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
 16071 Sculpting a lump of clay destroys one object, and replaces it with another one [Burke,M, by Wasserman]
 16234 Burke says when two object coincide, one of them is destroyed in the process [Burke,M, by Hawley]
 13278 Maybe the clay becomes a different lump when it becomes a statue [Burke,M, by Koslicki]
###### 9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / d. Coincident objects
 14750 Two entities can coincide as one, but only one of them (the dominant sortal) fixes persistence conditions [Burke,M, by Sider]
###### 10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / d. Possible worlds actualism
 16188 Serious Actualism says there are no facts at all about something which doesn't exist [Simchen]
###### 11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / c. Aim of beliefs
 19525 If the only aim is to believe truths, that justifies recklessly believing what is unsupported (if it is right) [Conee/Feldman]
###### 13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / c. Knowledge closure
 19524 We don't have the capacity to know all the logical consequences of our beliefs [Conee/Feldman]
###### 13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 3. Evidentialism / b. Evidentialism
 19518 Evidentialism says justifications supervene on the available evidence [Conee/Feldman]
###### 20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / c. Reasons as causes
 19519 Rational decisions are either taken to be based on evidence, or to be explained causally [Conee/Feldman]