### All the ideas for Michael Burke, Mark Steiner and J Pollock / J Cruz

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33 ideas

###### 9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
 16235 Persistence conditions cannot contradict, so there must be a 'dominant sortal' [Burke,M, by Hawley]
 14753 The 'dominant' of two coinciding sortals is the one that entails the widest range of properties [Burke,M, by Sider]
###### 9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / b. Unifying aggregates
 16072 'The rock' either refers to an object, or to a collection of parts, or to some stuff [Burke,M, by Wasserman]
###### 9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / b. Cat and its tail
 14751 Tib goes out of existence when the tail is lost, because Tib was never the 'cat' [Burke,M, by Sider]
###### 9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
 16071 Sculpting a lump of clay destroys one object, and replaces it with another one [Burke,M, by Wasserman]
 16234 Burke says when two object coincide, one of them is destroyed in the process [Burke,M, by Hawley]
 13278 Maybe the clay becomes a different lump when it becomes a statue [Burke,M, by Koslicki]
###### 9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / d. Coincident objects
 14750 Two entities can coincide as one, but only one of them (the dominant sortal) fixes persistence conditions [Burke,M, by Sider]
###### 9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences
 13230 Particular essence is often captured by generality [Steiner,M]
###### 11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
 6346 The main epistemological theories are foundationalist, coherence, probabilistic and reliabilist [Pollock/Cruz]
###### 11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 1. Certainty
 6351 Most people now agree that our reasoning proceeds defeasibly, rather than deductively [Pollock/Cruz]
 6374 To believe maximum truths, believe everything; to have infallible beliefs, believe nothing [Pollock/Cruz]
###### 11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 1. Perceptual Realism / b. Direct realism
 6355 Direct realism says justification is partly a function of pure perceptual states, not of beliefs [Pollock/Cruz]
###### 11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 2. Phenomenalism
 6359 Phenomenalism offered conclusive perceptual knowledge, but conclusive reasons no longer seem essential [Pollock/Cruz]
###### 12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 1. Perception
 6366 Perception causes beliefs in us, without inference or justification [Pollock/Cruz]
###### 12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 6. Inference in Perception
 6362 Sense evidence is not beliefs, because they are about objective properties, not about appearances [Pollock/Cruz]
###### 13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / a. Justification issues
 6371 Bayesian epistemology is Bayes' Theorem plus the 'simple rule' (believe P if it is probable) [Pollock/Cruz]
###### 13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / a. Pro-internalism
 6373 Internalism says if anything external varies, the justifiability of the belief does not vary [Pollock/Cruz]
###### 13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / b. Basic beliefs
 6353 People rarely have any basic beliefs, and never enough for good foundations [Pollock/Cruz]
 6361 Foundationalism requires self-justification, not incorrigibility [Pollock/Cruz]
###### 13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / d. Rational foundations
 6357 Reason cannot be an ultimate foundation, because rational justification requires prior beliefs [Pollock/Cruz]
###### 13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / f. Foundationalism critique
 6363 Foundationalism is wrong, because either all beliefs are prima facie justified, or none are [Pollock/Cruz]
###### 13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / a. Coherence as justification
 6365 Negative coherence theories do not require reasons, so have no regress problem [Pollock/Cruz]
###### 13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / c. Coherentism critique
 6354 Coherence theories fail, because they can't accommodate perception as the basis of knowledge [Pollock/Cruz]
 6367 Coherence theories isolate justification from the world [Pollock/Cruz]
###### 13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 1. External Justification
 6370 Externalism comes as 'probabilism' (probability of truth) and 'reliabilism' (probability of good cognitive process) [Pollock/Cruz]
###### 13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 2. Causal Justification
 6358 One belief may cause another, without being the basis for the second belief [Pollock/Cruz]
###### 13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
 6364 We can't start our beliefs from scratch, because we wouldn't know where to start [Pollock/Cruz]
###### 14. Science / C. Induction / 1. Induction
 6352 Enumerative induction gives a universal judgement, while statistical induction gives a proportion [Pollock/Cruz]
###### 14. Science / C. Induction / 6. Bayes's Theorem
 6372 Since every tautology has a probability of 1, should we believe all tautologies? [Pollock/Cruz]
###### 14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / e. Lawlike explanations
 13229 Maybe an instance of a generalisation is more explanatory than the particular case [Steiner,M]
###### 14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / m. Explanation by proof
 13231 Explanatory proofs rest on 'characterizing properties' of entities or structure [Steiner,M]
###### 14. Science / D. Explanation / 3. Best Explanation / a. Best explanation
 6360 Scientific confirmation is best viewed as inference to the best explanation [Pollock/Cruz]