Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Michael Burke, Paul Audi and Baruch Brody

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33 ideas

7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / a. Nature of grounding
Avoid 'in virtue of' for grounding, since it might imply a reflexive relation such as identity [Audi,P]
Ground relations depend on the properties [Audi,P]
A ball's being spherical non-causally determines its power to roll [Audi,P]
Ground is irreflexive, asymmetric, transitive, non-monotonic etc. [Audi,P]
The best critique of grounding says it is actually either identity or elimination [Audi,P]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / b. Relata of grounding
Grounding is a singular relation between worldly facts [Audi,P]
If grounding relates facts, properties must be included, as well as objects [Audi,P]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / c. Grounding and explanation
We must accept grounding, for our important explanations [Audi,P]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / d. Grounding and reduction
Reduction is just identity, so the two things are the same fact, so reduction isn't grounding [Audi,P]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 7. Facts / b. Types of fact
Worldly facts are obtaining states of affairs, with constituents; conceptual facts also depend on concepts [Audi,P]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
Indiscernibility is a necessary and sufficient condition for identity [Brody]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
Brody bases sortal essentialism on properties required throughout something's existence [Brody, by Mackie,P]
Persistence conditions cannot contradict, so there must be a 'dominant sortal' [Burke,M, by Hawley]
The 'dominant' of two coinciding sortals is the one that entails the widest range of properties [Burke,M, by Sider]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / b. Unifying aggregates
'The rock' either refers to an object, or to a collection of parts, or to some stuff [Burke,M, by Wasserman]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / b. Cat and its tail
Tib goes out of existence when the tail is lost, because Tib was never the 'cat' [Burke,M, by Sider]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
Sculpting a lump of clay destroys one object, and replaces it with another one [Burke,M, by Wasserman]
Burke says when two object coincide, one of them is destroyed in the process [Burke,M, by Hawley]
Maybe the clay becomes a different lump when it becomes a statue [Burke,M, by Koslicki]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / d. Coincident objects
Two entities can coincide as one, but only one of them (the dominant sortal) fixes persistence conditions [Burke,M, by Sider]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / a. Hylomorphism
Modern emphasis is on properties had essentially; traditional emphasis is on sort-defining properties [Brody]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 5. Essence as Kind
A sortal essence is a property which once possessed always possessed [Brody, by Mackie,P]
Maybe essential properties are those which determine a natural kind? [Brody]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 6. Essence as Unifier
De re essentialism standardly says all possible objects identical with a have a's essential properties [Brody]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / a. Essence as necessary properties
Essentially, a has P, always had P, must have had P, and has never had a future without P [Brody]
An object having a property essentially is equivalent to its having it necessarily [Brody]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 8. Essence as Explanatory
Essentialism is justified if the essential properties of things explain their other properties [Brody]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 12. Essential Parts
Mereological essentialism says that every part that ensures the existence is essential [Brody]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 12. Origin as Essential
Interrupted objects have two first moments of existence, which could be two beginnings [Brody]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects
a and b share all properties; so they share being-identical-with-a; so a = b [Brody]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / b. Rigid designation
Identity across possible worlds is prior to rigid designation [Brody]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / a. Types of explanation
Two things being identical (like water and H2O) is not an explanation [Audi,P]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / g. Causal explanations
There are plenty of examples of non-causal explanation [Audi,P]