Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Michael Burke, Johanna Seibt and Jenny Teichmann

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15 ideas

7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 2. Processes
Process philosophy places the dynamic nature of being at the centre of our theories [Seibt]
Reductionists identify processes by their 'owner', but tornadoes etc. are processes without owners [Seibt]
Traditionally small things add up to processes, but quantum mechanics reverses this [Seibt]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 1. Nature of Properties
Not only substances have attributes; events, actions, states and qualities can have them [Teichmann]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
Persistence conditions cannot contradict, so there must be a 'dominant sortal' [Burke,M, by Hawley]
The 'dominant' of two coinciding sortals is the one that entails the widest range of properties [Burke,M, by Sider]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / b. Unifying aggregates
'The rock' either refers to an object, or to a collection of parts, or to some stuff [Burke,M, by Wasserman]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / b. Cat and its tail
Tib goes out of existence when the tail is lost, because Tib was never the 'cat' [Burke,M, by Sider]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
Sculpting a lump of clay destroys one object, and replaces it with another one [Burke,M, by Wasserman]
Burke says when two object coincide, one of them is destroyed in the process [Burke,M, by Hawley]
Maybe the clay becomes a different lump when it becomes a statue [Burke,M, by Koslicki]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / d. Coincident objects
Two entities can coincide as one, but only one of them (the dominant sortal) fixes persistence conditions [Burke,M, by Sider]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 2. Interactionism
Body-spirit interaction ought to result in losses and increases of energy in the material world [Teichmann]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / b. Soul
No individuating marks distinguish between Souls [Teichmann]
The Soul has no particular capacity (in the way thinking belongs to the mind) [Teichmann]