Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Michael Burke, G.E. Moore and Charles Parsons

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37 ideas

1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 5. Modern Philosophy / b. Modern philosophy beginnings
Moore's 'The Nature of Judgement' (1898) marked the rejection (with Russell) of idealism [Moore,GE, by Grayling]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / c. Philosophy as generalisation
The main aim of philosophy is to describe the whole Universe. [Moore,GE]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 1. Nature of Analysis
Analysis for Moore and Russell is carving up the world, not investigating language [Moore,GE, by Monk]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 4. Alethic Modal Logic
Modal logic is not an extensional language [Parsons,C]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / j. Axiom of Choice IX
The old problems with the axiom of choice are probably better ascribed to the law of excluded middle [Parsons,C]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 4. Substitutional Quantification
Substitutional existential quantifier may explain the existence of linguistic entities [Parsons,C]
On the substitutional interpretation, '(∃x) Fx' is true iff a closed term 't' makes Ft true [Parsons,C]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / c. Counting procedure
Parsons says counting is tagging as first, second, third..., and converting the last to a cardinal [Parsons,C, by Heck]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / c. Against mathematical empiricism
General principles can be obvious in mathematics, but bold speculations in empirical science [Parsons,C]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 8. Finitism
If functions are transfinite objects, finitists can have no conception of them [Parsons,C]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Ontological Commitment / e. Ontological commitment problems
If a mathematical structure is rejected from a physical theory, it retains its mathematical status [Parsons,C]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 2. Internal Relations
A relation is internal if two things possessing the relation could not fail to be related [Moore,GE, by Heil]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
Persistence conditions cannot contradict, so there must be a 'dominant sortal' [Burke,M, by Hawley]
The 'dominant' of two coinciding sortals is the one that entails the widest range of properties [Burke,M, by Sider]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / b. Unifying aggregates
'The rock' either refers to an object, or to a collection of parts, or to some stuff [Burke,M, by Wasserman]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / b. Cat and its tail
Tib goes out of existence when the tail is lost, because Tib was never the 'cat' [Burke,M, by Sider]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
Maybe the clay becomes a different lump when it becomes a statue [Burke,M, by Koslicki]
Sculpting a lump of clay destroys one object, and replaces it with another one [Burke,M, by Wasserman]
Burke says when two object coincide, one of them is destroyed in the process [Burke,M, by Hawley]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / d. Coincident objects
Two entities can coincide as one, but only one of them (the dominant sortal) fixes persistence conditions [Burke,M, by Sider]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / c. Aim of beliefs
Moore's Paradox: you can't assert 'I believe that p but p is false', but can assert 'You believe p but p is false' [Moore,GE, by Lowe]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 2. Common Sense Certainty
Arguments that my finger does not exist are less certain than your seeing my finger [Moore,GE]
I can prove a hand exists, by holding one up, pointing to it, and saying 'here is one hand' [Moore,GE]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 5. Unity of Propositions
Hegelians say propositions defy analysis, but Moore says they can be broken down [Moore,GE, by Monk]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 4. Beauty
The beautiful is whatever it is intrinsically good to admire [Moore,GE]
22. Metaethics / A. Value / 1. Nature of Value / c. Objective value
We should ask what we would judge to be good if it existed in absolute isolation [Moore,GE]
22. Metaethics / B. The Good / 1. Goodness / b. Types of good
The three main values are good, right and beauty [Moore,GE, by Ross]
22. Metaethics / B. The Good / 1. Goodness / c. Right and good
'Right' means 'cause of good result' (hence 'useful'), so the end does justify the means [Moore,GE]
For Moore, 'right' is what produces good [Moore,GE, by Ross]
22. Metaethics / C. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / b. Defining ethics
Moore tries to show that 'good' is indefinable, but doesn't understand what a definition is [MacIntyre on Moore,GE]
22. Metaethics / C. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / a. Idealistic ethics
The naturalistic fallacy claims that natural qualties can define 'good' [Moore,GE]
The Open Question argument leads to anti-realism and the fact-value distinction [Boulter on Moore,GE]
Can learning to recognise a good friend help us to recognise a good watch? [MacIntyre on Moore,GE]
Moore cannot show why something being good gives us a reason for action [MacIntyre on Moore,GE]
It is always an open question whether anything that is natural is good [Moore,GE]
22. Metaethics / C. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / c. Ethical intuitionism
Moore's combination of antinaturalism with strong supervenience on the natural is incoherent [Hanna on Moore,GE]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 1. Utilitarianism
Relationships imply duties to people, not merely the obligation to benefit them [Ross on Moore,GE]