Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for George Engelbretsen, R Kaplan / E Kaplan and John Duns Scotus

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44 ideas

3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / a. What makes truths
If facts are the truthmakers, they are not in the world [Engelbretsen]
There are no 'falsifying' facts, only an absence of truthmakers [Engelbretsen]
4. Formal Logic / A. Syllogistic Logic / 1. Aristotelian Logic
Traditional term logic struggled to express relations [Engelbretsen]
4. Formal Logic / A. Syllogistic Logic / 3. Term Logic
Term logic rests on negated terms or denial, and that propositions are tied pairs [Engelbretsen]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / j. Axiom of Choice IX
Using Choice, you can cut up a small ball and make an enormous one from the pieces [Kaplan/Kaplan]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 2. History of Logic
Was logic a branch of mathematics, or mathematics a branch of logic? [Engelbretsen]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
Logical syntax is actually close to surface linguistic form [Engelbretsen]
Propositions can be analysed as pairs of terms glued together by predication [Engelbretsen]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / c. not
Standard logic only negates sentences, even via negated general terms or predicates [Engelbretsen]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / b. Types of number
1 and 0, then add for naturals, subtract for negatives, divide for rationals, take roots for irrationals [Kaplan/Kaplan]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / g. Real numbers
The rationals are everywhere - the irrationals are everywhere else [Kaplan/Kaplan]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / f. Arithmetic
'Commutative' laws say order makes no difference; 'associative' laws say groupings make no difference [Kaplan/Kaplan]
'Distributive' laws say if you add then multiply, or multiply then add, you get the same result [Kaplan/Kaplan]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / a. Nature of Being
Being (not sensation or God) is the primary object of the intellect [Duns Scotus, by Dumont]
The concept of being has only one meaning, whether talking of universals or of God [Duns Scotus, by Dumont]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
Are things distinct if they are both separate, or if only one of them can be separate? [Duns Scotus, by Pasnau]
Existence and nonexistence are characteristics of the world, not of objects [Engelbretsen]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 7. Facts / a. Facts
Facts are not in the world - they are properties of the world [Engelbretsen]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 4. Category Realism
Individuals are arranged in inclusion categories that match our semantics [Engelbretsen]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 1. Nature of Properties
Accidents must have formal being, if they are principles of real action, and of mental action and thought [Duns Scotus]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 4. Uninstantiated Universals
Duns Scotus was a realist about universals [Duns Scotus, by Dumont]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / a. Nominalism
If things were singular they would only differ numerically, but horse and tulip differ more than that [Duns Scotus, by Panaccio]
If only the singular exists, science is impossible, as that relies on true generalities [Duns Scotus, by Panaccio]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
We distinguish one thing from another by contradiction, because this is, and that is not [Duns Scotus]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / d. Individuation by haecceity
Scotus said a substantial principle of individuation [haecceitas] was needed for an essence [Duns Scotus, by Dumont]
The haecceity is the featureless thing which gives ultimate individuality to a substance [Duns Scotus, by Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / a. Intrinsic unification
'Unity' is a particularly difficult word, because things can have hidden unity [Duns Scotus]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / b. Unifying aggregates
It is absurd that there is no difference between a genuinely unified thing, and a mere aggregate [Duns Scotus]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / a. Substance
Substance is only grasped under the general heading of 'being' [Duns Scotus]
Substance is an intrinsic thing, so parts of substances can't also be intrinsic things [Duns Scotus]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / d. Form as unifier
Matter and form give true unity; subject and accident is just unity 'per accidens' [Duns Scotus]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
What prevents a stone from being divided into parts which are still the stone? [Duns Scotus]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 2. Types of Essence
Avicenna and Duns Scotus say essences have independent and prior existence [Duns Scotus, by Dumont]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 8. Leibniz's Law
Two things are different if something is true of one and not of the other [Duns Scotus]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 1. Certainty
Certainty comes from the self-evident, from induction, and from self-awareness [Duns Scotus, by Dumont]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 1. Perceptual Realism / b. Direct realism
Scotus defended direct 'intuitive cognition', against the abstractive view [Duns Scotus, by Dumont]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 2. Self-Evidence
Augustine's 'illumination' theory of knowledge leads to nothing but scepticism [Duns Scotus, by Dumont]
14. Science / C. Induction / 3. Limits of Induction
The first million numbers confirm that no number is greater than a million [Kaplan/Kaplan]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 2. Sources of Free Will
The will retains its power for opposites, even when it is acting [Duns Scotus, by Dumont]
19. Language / B. Reference / 2. Denoting
Terms denote objects with properties, and statements denote the world with that property [Engelbretsen]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
'Socrates is wise' denotes a sentence; 'that Socrates is wise' denotes a proposition [Engelbretsen]
19. Language / F. Communication / 3. Denial
Negating a predicate term and denying its unnegated version are quite different [Engelbretsen]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 2. Divine Nature
The concept of God is the unique first efficient cause, final cause, and most eminent being [Duns Scotus, by Dumont]
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / a. Cosmological Proof
We can't infer the infinity of God from creation ex nihilo [Duns Scotus, by Dumont]