Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for George Engelbretsen, Saul A. Kripke and Mencius (Meng K'e)

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158 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 2. Possibility of Metaphysics
Kripke separated semantics from metaphysics, rather than linking them, making the latter independent [Kripke, by Stalnaker]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 4. Conceptual Analysis
Analyses of concepts using entirely different terms are very inclined to fail [Kripke]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 2. Aims of Definition
Some definitions aim to fix a reference rather than give a meaning [Kripke]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / a. What makes truths
If facts are the truthmakers, they are not in the world [Engelbretsen]
There are no 'falsifying' facts, only an absence of truthmakers [Engelbretsen]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 2. Semantic Truth
Kripke's semantic theory has actually inspired promising axiomatic theories [Kripke, by Horsten]
Kripke offers a semantic theory of truth (involving models) [Kripke, by Horsten]
3. Truth / G. Axiomatic Truth / 1. Axiomatic Truth
Certain three-valued languages can contain their own truth predicates [Kripke, by Gupta]
The Tarskian move to a metalanguage may not be essential for truth theories [Kripke, by Gupta]
3. Truth / G. Axiomatic Truth / 3. KF Truth Axioms
Kripke classified fixed points, and illuminated their use for clarifications [Kripke, by Halbach]
4. Formal Logic / A. Syllogistic Logic / 1. Aristotelian Logic
Traditional term logic struggled to express relations [Engelbretsen]
4. Formal Logic / A. Syllogistic Logic / 3. Term Logic
Term logic rests on negated terms or denial, and that propositions are tied pairs [Engelbretsen]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 1. Modal Logic
Propositional modal logic has been proved to be complete [Kripke, by Feferman/Feferman]
Kripke's modal semantics presupposes certain facts about possible worlds [Kripke, by Zalta]
Possible worlds allowed the application of set-theoretic models to modal logic [Kripke]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / a. Systems of modal logic
With possible worlds, S4 and S5 are sound and complete, but S1-S3 are not even sound [Kripke, by Rossberg]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 7. Barcan Formula
The variable domain approach to quantified modal logic invalidates the Barcan Formula [Kripke, by Simchen]
The Barcan formulas fail in models with varying domains [Kripke, by Williamson]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 2. History of Logic
Was logic a branch of mathematics, or mathematics a branch of logic? [Engelbretsen]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
Logical syntax is actually close to surface linguistic form [Engelbretsen]
Propositions can be analysed as pairs of terms glued together by predication [Engelbretsen]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / c. not
Standard logic only negates sentences, even via negated general terms or predicates [Engelbretsen]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / a. Names
Names are rigid, making them unlike definite descriptions [Kripke, by Sainsbury]
Names are rigid designators, which designate the same object in all possible worlds [Kripke]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / b. Names as descriptive
A bundle of qualities is a collection of abstractions, so it can't be a particular [Kripke]
A name can still refer even if it satisfies none of its well-known descriptions [Kripke]
We may fix the reference of 'Cicero' by a description, but thereafter the name is rigid [Kripke]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / c. Names as referential
Some references, such as 'Neptune', have to be fixed by description rather than baptism [Kripke, by Szabó]
Proper names must have referents, because they are not descriptive [Kripke, by Sainsbury]
A name's reference is not fixed by any marks or properties of the referent [Kripke]
The function of names is simply to refer [Kripke]
A man has two names if the historical chains are different - even if they are the same! [Kripke]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 4. Substitutional Quantification
The substitutional quantifier is not in competition with the standard interpretation [Kripke, by Marcus (Barcan)]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
Existence and nonexistence are characteristics of the world, not of objects [Engelbretsen]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 1. Realism
Kripke's metaphysics (essences, kinds, rigidity) blocks the slide into sociology [Kripke, by Ladyman/Ross]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 7. Facts / a. Facts
Facts are not in the world - they are properties of the world [Engelbretsen]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 4. Category Realism
Individuals are arranged in inclusion categories that match our semantics [Engelbretsen]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Simples
We might fix identities for small particulars, but it is utopian to hope for such things [Kripke]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / b. Individuation by properties
Kripke individuates objects by essential modal properties (and presupposes essentialism) [Kripke, by Putnam]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 6. Constitution of an Object
Given that a table is made of molecules, could it not be molecular and still be this table? [Kripke]
If we imagine this table made of ice or different wood, we are imagining a different table [Kripke]
A different piece of wood could have been used for that table; constitution isn't identity [Wiggins on Kripke]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 2. Types of Essence
For Kripke, essence is origin; for Putnam, essence is properties; for Wiggins, essence is membership of a kind [Kripke, by Mautner]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 5. Essence as Kind
Atomic number 79 is part of the nature of the gold we know [Kripke]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / a. Essence as necessary properties
An essential property is true of an object in any case where it would have existed [Kripke]
De re modality is an object having essential properties [Kripke]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties
Important properties of an object need not be essential to it [Kripke]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 10. Essence as Species
Kripke says internal structure fixes species; I say it is genetic affinity and a common descent [Kripke, by Dummett]
Given that Nixon is indeed a human being, that he might not have been does not concern knowledge [Kripke]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 14. Knowledge of Essences
Kripke claims that some properties, only knowable posteriori, are known a priori to be essential [Kripke, by Soames]
An essence is the necessary properties, derived from an intuitive identity, in origin, type and material [Kripke, by Witt]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 1. Objects over Time
No one seems to know the identity conditions for a material object (or for people) over time [Kripke]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 12. Origin as Essential
If we lose track of origin, how do we show we are maintaining a reference? [Kripke, by Wiggins]
Kripke argues, of the Queen, that parents of an organism are essentially so [Kripke, by Forbes,G]
Could the actual Queen have been born of different parents? [Kripke]
Socrates can't have a necessary origin, because he might have had no 'origin' [Lowe on Kripke]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity
With the necessity of self-identity plus Leibniz's Law, identity has to be an 'internal' relation [Kripke]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 5. Self-Identity
A relation can clearly be reflexive, and identity is the smallest reflexive relation [Kripke]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 6. Identity between Objects
Identity statements can be contingent if they rely on descriptions [Kripke]
If Hesperus and Phosophorus are the same, they can't possibly be different [Kripke]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 8. Leibniz's Law
The indiscernibility of identicals is as self-evident as the law of contradiction [Kripke]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 9. Sameness
A vague identity may seem intransitive, and we might want to talk of 'counterparts' [Kripke]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 2. Nature of Necessity
Kripke says his necessary a posteriori examples are known a priori to be necessary [Kripke, by Mackie,P]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 7. Natural Necessity
Physical necessity may be necessity in the highest degree [Kripke]
What many people consider merely physically necessary I consider completely necessary [Kripke]
What is often held to be mere physical necessity is actually metaphysical necessity [Kripke]
Instead of being regularities, maybe natural laws are the weak a posteriori necessities of Kripke [Kripke, by Psillos]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
Unicorns are vague, so no actual or possible creature could count as a unicorn [Kripke]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 1. Sources of Necessity
I don't think possible worlds reductively reveal the natures of modal operators etc. [Kripke]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 1. A Priori Necessary
Kripke separates necessary and a priori, proposing necessary a posteriori and contingent a priori examples [Kripke, by O'Grady]
A priori = Necessary because we imagine all worlds, and we know without looking at actuality? [Kripke]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 2. A Priori Contingent
The meter is defined necessarily, but the stick being one meter long is contingent a priori [Kripke]
The very act of designating of an object with properties gives knowledge of a contingent truth [Kripke]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 3. A Posteriori Necessary
"'Hesperus' is 'Phosphorus'" is necessarily true, if it is true, but not known a priori [Kripke]
Theoretical identities are between rigid designators, and so are necessary a posteriori [Kripke]
It is necessary that this table is not made of ice, but we don't know it a priori [Kripke]
Kripke has demonstrated that some necessary truths are only knowable a posteriori [Kripke, by Chalmers]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / a. Conceivable as possible
Kripke's essentialist necessary a posteriori opened the gap between conceivable and really possible [Soames on Kripke]
Kripke gets to the necessary a posteriori by only allowing conceivability when combined with actuality [Kripke, by Soames]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
Instead of talking about possible worlds, we can always say "It is possible that.." [Kripke]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / e. Against possible worlds
Possible worlds are useful in set theory, but can be very misleading elsewhere [Kripke]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
Possible worlds aren't puzzling places to learn about, but places we ourselves describe [Kripke]
Probability with dice uses possible worlds, abstractions which fictionally simplify things [Kripke]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
If we discuss what might have happened to Nixon, we stipulate that it is about Nixon [Kripke]
Transworld identification is unproblematic, because we stipulate that we rigidly refer to something [Kripke]
A table in some possible world should not even be identified by its essential properties [Kripke]
Identification across possible worlds does not need properties, even essential ones [Kripke]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / b. Rigid designation
A 'rigid designator' designates the same object in all possible worlds [Kripke]
Kaplan's 'Dthat' is a useful operator for transforming a description into a rigid designation [Kripke]
Test for rigidity by inserting into the sentence 'N might not have been N' [Kripke, by Lycan]
Kripke avoids difficulties of transworld identity by saying it is a decision, not a discovery [Kripke, by Jacquette]
Saying that natural kinds are 'rigid designators' is the same as saying they are 'indexical' [Kripke, by Putnam]
If Kripke names must still denote a thing in a non-actual situation, the statue isn't its clay [Gibbard on Kripke]
A rigid expression may refer at a world to an object not existing in that world [Kripke, by Sainsbury]
We do not begin with possible worlds and place objects in them; we begin with objects in the real world [Kripke]
It is a necessary truth that Elizabeth II was the child of two particular parents [Kripke]
We cannot say that Nixon might have been a different man from the one he actually was [Kripke]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
Modal statements about this table never refer to counterparts; that confuses epistemology and metaphysics [Kripke]
The best known objection to counterparts is Kripke's, that Humphrey doesn't care if his counterpart wins [Kripke, by Sider]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / e. Possible Objects
That there might have been unicorns is false; we don't know the circumstances for unicorns [Kripke]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 1. Nature of the A Priori
Kripke has breathed new life into the a priori/a posteriori distinction [Kripke, by Lowe]
Rather than 'a priori truth', it is best to stick to whether some person knows it on a priori evidence [Kripke]
A priori truths can be known independently of experience - but they don't have to be [Kripke]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 8. A Priori as Analytic
The a priori analytic truths involving fixing of reference are contingent [Kripke]
Kripke was more successful in illuminating necessity than a priority (and their relations to analyticity) [Kripke, by Soames]
Analytic judgements are a priori, even when their content is empirical [Kripke]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 2. Intuition
Intuition is the strongest possible evidence one can have about anything [Kripke]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 1. Scientific Theory
Identities like 'heat is molecule motion' are necessary (in the highest degree), not contingent [Kripke]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / a. Mind
I regard the mind-body problem as wide open, and extremely confusing [Kripke]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 7. Zombies
It seems logically possible to have the pain brain state without the actual pain [Kripke]
Identity theorists must deny that pains can be imagined without brain states [Kripke]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
Kripke assumes that mind-brain identity designates rigidly, which it doesn't [Armstrong on Kripke]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / e. Modal argument
If consciousness could separate from brain, then it cannot be identical with brain [Kripke, by Papineau]
Kripke says pain is necessarily pain, but a brain state isn't necessarily painful [Kripke, by Rey]
Identity must be necessary, but pain isn't necessarily a brain state, so they aren't identical [Kripke, by Schwartz,SP]
Identity theorists seem committed to no-brain-event-no-pain, and vice versa, which seems wrong [Kripke]
Pain, unlike heat, is picked out by an essential property [Kripke]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 10. Rule Following
'Quus' means the same as 'plus' if the ingredients are less than 57; otherwise it just produces 5 [Kripke]
No rule can be fully explained [Kripke]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 5. Mental Files
Puzzled Pierre has two mental files about the same object [Recanati on Kripke]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 10. Denial of Meanings
Kripke's Wittgenstein says meaning 'vanishes into thin air' [Kripke, by Miller,A]
If you ask what is in your mind for following the addition rule, meaning just seems to vanish [Kripke]
19. Language / B. Reference / 2. Denoting
Terms denote objects with properties, and statements denote the world with that property [Engelbretsen]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / a. Direct reference
Kripke derives accounts of reference and proper names from assumptions about worlds and essences [Stalnaker on Kripke]
Kripke has a definitional account of kinds, but not of naming [Almog on Kripke]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference
The important cause is not between dubbing and current use, but between the item and the speaker's information [Evans on Kripke]
We may refer through a causal chain, but still change what is referred to [Kripke]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / c. Social reference
Kripke makes reference a largely social matter, external to the mind of the speaker [Kripke, by McGinn]
Kripke's theory is important because it gives a collective account of reference [Kripke, by Putnam]
We refer through the community, going back to the original referent [Kripke]
A description may fix a reference even when it is not true of its object [Kripke]
19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / b. Reference by description
Descriptive reference shows how to refer, how to identify two things, and how to challenge existence [Kripke, by PG]
It can't be necessary that Aristotle had the properties commonly attributed to him [Kripke]
Even if Gödel didn't produce his theorems, he's still called 'Gödel' [Kripke]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 6. Truth-Conditions Semantics
Community implies assertability-conditions rather than truth-conditions semantics [Kripke, by Hanna]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 10. Two-Dimensional Semantics
Rigid designation creates a puzzle - why do some necessary truths appear to be contingent? [Kripke, by Maciŕ/Garcia-Carpentiro]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
'Socrates is wise' denotes a sentence; 'that Socrates is wise' denotes a proposition [Engelbretsen]
19. Language / F. Communication / 3. Denial
Negating a predicate term and denying its unnegated version are quite different [Engelbretsen]
19. Language / F. Communication / 4. Private Language
The sceptical rule-following paradox is the basis of the private language argument [Kripke, by Hanna]
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 7. Art and Morality
If the King likes music then there is hope for the state [Mencius (Meng K'e)]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / e. Honour
Should a coward who ran fifty paces from a battle laugh at another who ran a hundred? [Mencius (Meng K'e)]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 2. Leaders / b. Monarchy
A true king shares his pleasure with the people [Mencius (Meng K'e)]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 7. Communitarianism / a. Communitarianism
Extend the treatment of the old and young in your family to the rest of society [Mencius (Meng K'e)]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 3. Punishment / b. Retribution for crime
Only put someone to death if the whole population believes it is deserved [Mencius (Meng K'e)]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 1. War
Seeking peace through war is like looking for fish up a tree [Mencius (Meng K'e)]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 6. Animal Rights
Avoid the animals you are going to eat, as it is hard once you have got to know them [Mencius (Meng K'e)]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 5. Reference to Natural Kinds
The properties that fix reference are contingent, the properties involving meaning are necessary [Kripke]
Terms for natural kinds are very close to proper names [Kripke]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 6. Necessity of Kinds
Gold's atomic number might not be 79, but if it is, could non-79 stuff be gold? [Kripke]
'Cats are animals' has turned out to be a necessary truth [Kripke]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 7. Critique of Kinds
Nominal essence may well be neither necessary nor sufficient for a natural kind [Kripke, by Bird]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / b. Scientific necessity
The scientific discovery (if correct) that gold has atomic number 79 is a necessary truth [Kripke]
Scientific discoveries about gold are necessary truths [Kripke]
Once we've found that heat is molecular motion, then that's what it is, in all possible worlds [Kripke]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / d. Knowing essences
Science searches basic structures in search of essences [Kripke]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 5. Species
Tigers may lack all the properties we originally used to identify them [Kripke]
The original concept of 'cat' comes from paradigmatic instances [Kripke]
'Tiger' designates a species, and merely looking like the species is not enough [Kripke]