Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Roger Fry, Dale Jacquette and Pierre Gassendi

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48 ideas

4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / a. Systems of modal logic
Modal logic is multiple systems, shown in the variety of accessibility relations between worlds [Jacquette]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 4. Alethic Modal Logic
The modal logic of C.I.Lewis was only interpreted by Kripke and Hintikka in the 1960s [Jacquette]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic
The two main views in philosophy of logic are extensionalism and intensionalism [Jacquette]
Logic describes inferences between sentences expressing possible properties of objects [Jacquette]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 6. Classical Logic
Classical logic is bivalent, has excluded middle, and only quantifies over existent objects [Jacquette]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 2. Platonism in Logic
Logic is not just about signs, because it relates to states of affairs, objects, properties and truth-values [Jacquette]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / c. Theory of definite descriptions
On Russell's analysis, the sentence "The winged horse has wings" comes out as false [Jacquette]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 4. Substitutional Quantification
Substitutional universal quantification retains truth for substitution of terms of the same type [Jacquette]
Nominalists like substitutional quantification to avoid the metaphysics of objects [Jacquette]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 5. Extensionalism
Extensionalists say that quantifiers presuppose the existence of their objects [Jacquette]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 6. Intensionalism
Intensionalists say meaning is determined by the possession of properties [Jacquette]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 5. Paradoxes in Set Theory / d. Russell's paradox
Can a Barber shave all and only those persons who do not shave themselves? [Jacquette]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 1. Nature of Existence
Ontology is the same as the conceptual foundations of logic [Jacquette]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / a. Nature of Being
To grasp being, we must say why something exists, and why there is one world [Jacquette]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 5. Reason for Existence
Being is maximal consistency [Jacquette]
Existence is completeness and consistency [Jacquette]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Ontological Commitment / a. Ontological commitment
Ontology must include the minimum requirements for our semantics [Jacquette]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 3. Proposed Categories
Logic is based either on separate objects and properties, or objects as combinations of properties [Jacquette]
Reduce states-of-affairs to object-property combinations, and possible worlds to states-of-affairs [Jacquette]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 8. Properties as Modes
Modes of things exist in some way, without being full-blown substances [Gassendi]
If matter is entirely atoms, anything else we notice in it can only be modes [Gassendi]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 11. Properties as Sets
If classes can't be eliminated, and they are property combinations, then properties (universals) can't be either [Jacquette]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects
An object is a predication subject, distinguished by a distinctive combination of properties [Jacquette]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / c. Modern abstracta
Numbers, sets and propositions are abstract particulars; properties, qualities and relations are universals [Jacquette]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
The actual world is a consistent combination of states, made of consistent property combinations [Jacquette]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
The actual world is a maximally consistent combination of actual states of affairs [Jacquette]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / c. Worlds as propositions
Do proposition-structures not associated with the actual world deserve to be called worlds? [Jacquette]
We must experience the 'actual' world, which is defined by maximally consistent propositions [Jacquette]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / j. Explanations by reduction
We observe qualities, and use 'induction' to refer to the substances lying under them [Gassendi]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / c. Explaining qualia
If qualia supervene on intentional states, then intentional states are explanatorily fundamental [Jacquette]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 3. Limits of Introspection
Most of us are too close to our own motives to understand them [Fry]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 2. Interactionism
Things must have parts to intermingle [Gassendi]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 2. Reduction of Mind
Reduction of intentionality involving nonexistent objects is impossible, as reduction must be to what is actual [Jacquette]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 7. Extensional Semantics
Extensionalist semantics forbids reference to nonexistent objects [Jacquette]
Extensionalist semantics is circular, as we must know the extension before assessing 'Fa' [Jacquette]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
The extreme views on propositions are Frege's Platonism and Quine's extreme nominalism [Jacquette]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 2. Aesthetic Attitude
Imaginative life requires no action, so new kinds of perception and values emerge in art [Fry]
Everyone reveals an aesthetic attitude, looking at something which only exists to be seen [Fry]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 4. Beauty
'Beauty' can either mean sensuous charm, or the aesthetic approval of art (which may be ugly) [Fry]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 6. The Sublime
In life we neglect 'cosmic emotion', but it matters, and art brings it to the fore [Fry]
21. Aesthetics / B. Nature of Art / 2. Art as Form
Art needs a mixture of order and variety in its sensations [Fry]
21. Aesthetics / B. Nature of Art / 3. Art as Imitation
If graphic arts only aim at imitation, their works are only trivial ingenious toys [Fry]
Popular opinion favours realism, yet most people never look closely at anything! [Fry]
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 1. Artistic Intentions
When viewing art, rather than flowers, we are aware of purpose, and sympathy with its creator [Fry]
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 4. Emotion in Art
In the cinema the emotions are weaker, but much clearer than in ordinary life [Fry]
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 7. Art and Morality
For pure moralists art must promote right action, and not just be harmless [Fry]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / g. Atomism
Atoms are not points, but hard indivisible things, which no force in nature can divide [Gassendi]
How do mere atoms produce qualities like colour, flavour and odour? [Gassendi]