Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Peter B. Lewis, W Kneale / M Kneale and François Recanati

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47 ideas

4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / f. Axiom of Infinity V
The axiom of infinity is not a truth of logic, and its adoption is an abandonment of logicism [Kneale,W and M]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 4. Pure Logic
A train of reasoning must be treated as all happening simultaneously [Recanati]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / d. Singular terms
Mental files are the counterparts of singular terms [Recanati]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 6. Identity between Objects
Identity statements are informative if they link separate mental files [Recanati]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 1. Perceptual Realism / b. Direct realism
There is a continuum from acquaintance to description in knowledge, depending on the link [Recanati]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / d. Absolute idealism
Fichte, Schelling and Hegel rejected transcendental idealism [Lewis,PB]
Fichte, Hegel and Schelling developed versions of Absolute Idealism [Lewis,PB]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 9. Indexical Thought
Indexicals apply to singular thought, and mental files have essentially indexical features [Recanati]
Indexicality is not just a feature of language; examples show it also occurs in thought [Recanati]
How can we communicate indexical thoughts to people not in the right context? [Recanati]
Indexicality is closely related to singularity, exploiting our direct relations with things [Recanati]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 5. Mental Files
Files can be confused, if two files correctly have a single name, or one file has two names [Recanati]
Encylopedic files have further epistemic links, beyond the basic one [Recanati]
Singular thoughts need a mental file, and an acquaintance relation from file to object [Recanati]
Expected acquaintance can create a thought-vehicle file, but without singular content [Recanati]
A mental file treats all of its contents as concerning one object [Recanati]
An 'indexed' file marks a file which simulates the mental file of some other person [Recanati]
Reference by mental files is Millian, in emphasising acquaintance, rather than satisfaction [Recanati]
The reference of a file is fixed by what it relates to, not the information it contains [Recanati]
There are transient 'demonstrative' files, habitual 'recognitional' files, cumulative 'encyclopedic' files [Recanati]
Files are hierarchical: proto-files, then first-order, then higher-order encyclopedic [Recanati]
A file has a 'nucleus' through its relation to the object, and a 'periphery' of links to other files [Recanati]
Mental files are concepts, which are either collections or (better) containers [Recanati]
The Frege case of believing a thing is both F and not-F is explained by separate mental files [Recanati]
18. Thought / C. Content / 1. Content
The content of thought is what is required to understand it (which involves hearers) [Recanati]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 1. Concepts / a. Nature of concepts
Mental files are individual concepts (thought constituents) [Recanati]
19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories
There may be two types of reference in language and thought: descriptive and direct [Recanati]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / a. Direct reference
In super-direct reference, the referent serves as its own vehicle of reference [Recanati]
Direct reference is strong Millian (just a tag) or weak Kaplanian (allowing descriptions as well) [Recanati]
19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / a. Sense and reference
Sense determines reference says same sense/same reference; new reference means new sense [Recanati]
We need sense as well as reference, but in a non-descriptive form, and mental files do that [Recanati]
Sense is a mental file (not its contents); similar files for Cicero and Tully are two senses [Recanati]
19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / b. Reference by description
Problems with descriptivism are reference by perception, by communications and by indexicals [Recanati]
Descriptivism says we mentally relate to objects through their properties [Recanati]
Definite descriptions reveal either a predicate (attributive use) or the file it belongs in (referential) [Recanati]
A rigid definite description can be attributive, not referential: 'the actual F, whoever he is.' [Recanati]
A linguistic expression refers to what its associated mental file refers to [Recanati]
Singularity cannot be described, and it needs actual world relations [Recanati]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 5. Fregean Semantics
Fregean modes of presentation can be understood as mental files [Recanati]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 9. Indexical Semantics
Indexical don't refer; only their tokens do [Recanati]
If two people think 'I am tired', they think the same thing, and they think different things [Recanati]
Indexicals (like mental files) determine their reference relationally, not by satisfaction [Recanati]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 10. Two-Dimensional Semantics
In 2-D semantics, reference is determined, then singularity by the truth of a predication [Recanati]
Two-D semantics is said to help descriptivism of reference deal with singular objects [Recanati]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 3. Concrete Propositions
Russellian propositions are better than Fregean thoughts, by being constant through communication [Recanati]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 4. Mental Propositions
There are speakers' thoughts and hearers' thoughts, but no further thought attached to the utterance [Recanati]
19. Language / F. Communication / 5. Pragmatics / a. Contextual meaning
The Naive view of communication is that hearers acquire exactly the thoughts of the speaker [Recanati]