Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Peter B. Lewis, David Papineau and William K. Clifford

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these philosophers

57 ideas

1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 3. Scientism
All worthwhile philosophy is synthetic theorizing, evaluated by experience [Papineau]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Naturalism
Externalism may be the key idea in philosophical naturalism [Papineau]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Ontological Commitment / e. Ontological commitment problems
Our best theories may commit us to mathematical abstracta, but that doesn't justify the commitment [Papineau]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / a. Beliefs
Belief truth-conditions are normal circumstances where the belief is supposed to occur [Papineau]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / d. Absolute idealism
Fichte, Schelling and Hegel rejected transcendental idealism [Lewis,PB]
Fichte, Hegel and Schelling developed versions of Absolute Idealism [Lewis,PB]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 9. A Priori from Concepts
A priori knowledge is analytic - the structure of our concepts - and hence unimportant [Papineau]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 7. Causal Perception
Perceptual concepts can't just refer to what causes classification [Papineau]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 2. Intuition
Intuition and thought-experiments embody substantial information about the world [Papineau]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 3. Evidentialism / b. Evidentialism
It is always wrong to believe things on insufficient evidence [Clifford]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / e. Questions about mind
The only serious mind-brain theories now are identity, token identity, realization and supervenience [Papineau]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 3. Mental Causation
Maybe mind and body do overdetermine acts, but are linked (for some reason) [Papineau]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / c. Knowing other minds
Do we understand other minds by simulation-theory, or by theory-theory? [Papineau]
Young children can see that other individuals sometimes have false beliefs [Papineau]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 8. Brain
Researching phenomenal consciousness is peculiar, because the concepts involved are peculiar [Papineau]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / a. Consciousness
Whether octopuses feel pain is unclear, because our phenomenal concepts are too vague [Papineau]
Our concept of consciousness is crude, and lacks theoretical articulation [Papineau]
We canít decide what 'conscious' means, so it is undecidable whether cats are conscious [Papineau]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / e. Cause of consciousness
Maybe a creature is conscious if its mental states represent things in a distinct way [Papineau]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / f. Higher-order thought
The 'actualist' HOT theory says consciousness comes from actual higher judgements of mental states [Papineau]
Actualist HOT theories imply that a non-conscious mental event could become conscious when remembered [Papineau]
States are conscious if they could be the subject of higher-order mental judgements [Papineau]
Higher-order judgements may be possible where the subject denies having been conscious [Papineau]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 6. Epiphenomenalism
The epiphenomenal relation of mind and brain is a 'causal dangler', unlike anything else [Papineau]
Maybe minds do not cause actions, but do cause us to report our decisions [Papineau]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 8. Dualism of Mind Critique
How does a dualist mind represent, exist outside space, and be transparent to itself? [Papineau]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 8. Functionalism critique
Functionalism needs causation and intentionality to explain actions [Papineau]
Role concepts either name the realising property, or the higher property constituting the role [Papineau]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 2. Anomalous Monism
If causes are basic particulars, this doesn't make conscious and physical properties identical [Papineau]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 5. Supervenience of mind
Epiphenomenalism is supervenience without physicalism [Papineau]
Supervenience can be replaced by identifying mind with higher-order or disjunctional properties [Papineau]
Supervenience requires all mental events to have physical effects [Papineau]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
Knowing what it is like to be something only involves being (physically) that thing [Papineau]
The completeness of physics is needed for mind-brain identity [Papineau]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 2. Reduction of Mind
Mind-brain reduction is less explanatory, because phenomenal concepts lack causal roles [Papineau]
Weak reduction of mind is to physical causes; strong reduction is also to physical laws [Papineau]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 5. Causal Argument
It is absurd to think that physical effects are caused twice, so conscious causes must be physical [Papineau]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 6. Conceptual Dualism
Accept ontological monism, but conceptual dualism; we think in a different way about phenomenal thought [Papineau]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
If a mental state is multiply realisable, why does it lead to similar behaviour? [Papineau]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / c. Knowledge argument
Mary acquires new concepts; she previously thought about the same property using material concepts [Papineau]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 1. Thought
Consciousness affects bodily movement, so thoughts must be material states [Papineau]
Thinking about a thing doesn't require activating it [Papineau]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 5. Mental Files
There is a single file per object, memorised, reactivated, consolidated and expanded [Papineau, by Recanati]
18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content
Most reductive accounts of representation imply broad content [Papineau]
If content hinges on matters outside of you, how can it causally influence your actions? [Papineau]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 5. Meaning as Verification
Verificationists tend to infer indefinite answers from undecidable questions [Papineau]
Verificationism about concepts means you can't deny a theory, because you can't have the concept [Papineau]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 2. Semantics
Teleosemantics equates meaning with the item the concept is intended to track [Papineau]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 8. Possible Worlds Semantics
Thought content is possible worlds that make the thought true; if that includes the actual world, it's true [Papineau]
Truth conditions in possible worlds can't handle statements about impossibilities [Papineau]
19. Language / F. Communication / 4. Private Language
The Private Language argument only means people may misjudge their experiences [Papineau]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata
Causation is based on either events, or facts, or states of affairs [Papineau]
Causes are instantiations of properties by particulars, or they are themselves basic particulars [Papineau]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 10. Closure of Physics
The completeness of physics cannot be proved [Papineau]
Modern biological research, especially into the cell, has revealed no special new natural forces [Papineau]
Determinism is possible without a complete physics, if mental forces play a role [Papineau]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 2. Thermodynamics / c. Conservation of energy
Quantum 'wave collapses' seem to violate conservation of energy [Papineau]