Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Friedrich Schlegel, Boethius and JC Beall / G Restall

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60 ideas

1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 4. Later European Philosophy / c. Eighteenth century philosophy
Irony is consciousness of abundant chaos [Schlegel,F]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 3. Metaphysical Systems
Plato has no system. Philosophy is the progression of a mind and development of thoughts [Schlegel,F]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 1. Truth
Some truths have true negations [Beall/Restall]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / b. Objects make truths
A truthmaker is an object which entails a sentence [Beall/Restall]
4. Formal Logic / A. Syllogistic Logic / 2. Syllogistic Logic
'Equivocation' is when terms do not mean the same thing in premises and conclusion [Beall/Restall]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 2. Intuitionist Logic
(∀x)(A v B) |- (∀x)A v (∃x)B) is valid in classical logic but invalid intuitionistically [Beall/Restall]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 5. Relevant Logic
It's 'relevantly' valid if all those situations make it true [Beall/Restall]
Excluded middle must be true for some situation, not for all situations [Beall/Restall]
Relevant consequence says invalidity is the conclusion not being 'in' the premises [Beall/Restall]
Relevant logic does not abandon classical logic [Beall/Restall]
Relevant logic may reject transitivity [Beall/Restall]
A doesn't imply A - that would be circular [Beall/Restall]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 6. Free Logic
Free logic terms aren't existential; classical is non-empty, with referring names [Beall/Restall]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic
Logic studies consequence; logical truths are consequences of everything, or nothing [Beall/Restall]
Syllogisms are only logic when they use variables, and not concrete terms [Beall/Restall]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 2. History of Logic
The view of logic as knowing a body of truths looks out-of-date [Beall/Restall]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 4. Pure Logic
Formal logic is invariant under permutations, or devoid of content, or gives the norms for thought [Beall/Restall]
Logic studies arguments, not formal languages; this involves interpretations [Beall/Restall]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 8. Logic of Mathematics
The model theory of classical predicate logic is mathematics [Beall/Restall]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 2. Types of Consequence
Logical consequence needs either proofs, or absence of counterexamples [Beall/Restall]
There are several different consequence relations [Beall/Restall]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 4. Semantic Consequence |=
Logical consequence is either necessary truth preservation, or preservation based on interpretation [Beall/Restall]
A sentence follows from others if they always model it [Beall/Restall]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 8. Material Implication
A step is a 'material consequence' if we need contents as well as form [Beall/Restall]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 3. Logical Truth
A 'logical truth' (or 'tautology', or 'theorem') follows from empty premises [Beall/Restall]
Logical truth is much more important if mathematics rests on it, as logicism claims [Beall/Restall]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 1. Logical Models
Models are mathematical structures which interpret the non-logical primitives [Beall/Restall]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 6. Paradoxes in Language / d. The Preface paradox
Preface Paradox affirms and denies the conjunction of propositions in the book [Beall/Restall]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 2. Proof in Mathematics
Hilbert proofs have simple rules and complex axioms, and natural deduction is the opposite [Beall/Restall]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 1. Categories
There are two sorts of category - referring to things, and to circumstances of things [Boethius]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 5. Universals as Concepts
If universals are not separate, we can isolate them by abstraction [Boethius, by Panaccio]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / d. Individuation by haecceity
We can call the quality of Plato 'Platonity', and say it is a quality which only he possesses [Boethius]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 3. Types of Necessity
Relevant necessity is always true for some situation (not all situations) [Beall/Restall]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / b. Transcendental idealism
Poetry is transcendental when it connects the ideal to the real [Schlegel,F]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 1. Nature of Free Will
Knowledge of present events doesn't make them necessary, so future events are no different [Boethius]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 2. Sources of Free Will
Rational natures require free will, in order to have power of judgement [Boethius]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / a. Determinism
God's universal foreknowledge seems opposed to free will [Boethius]
Does foreknowledge cause necessity, or necessity cause foreknowledge? [Boethius]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 6. Judgement / a. Nature of Judgement
Judgement is always predicating a property of a subject [Beall/Restall]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 8. Possible Worlds Semantics
We can rest truth-conditions on situations, rather than on possible worlds [Beall/Restall]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
Propositions commit to content, and not to any way of spelling it out [Beall/Restall]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / b. Intellectualism
The wicked want goodness, so they would not be wicked if they obtained it [Boethius]
21. Aesthetics / B. Nature of Art / 8. The Arts / b. Literature
For poets free choice is supreme [Schlegel,F]
22. Metaethics / A. Value / 2. Values / e. Love
True love is ironic, in the contrast between finite limitations and the infinity of love [Schlegel,F]
22. Metaethics / B. The Good / 2. Happiness / a. Nature of happiness
Happiness is a good which once obtained leaves nothing more to be desired [Boethius]
22. Metaethics / C. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility
Rewards and punishments are not deserved if they don't arise from free movement of the mind [Boethius]
22. Metaethics / C. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
When people fall into wickedness they lose their human nature [Boethius]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / a. Nature of virtue
The bad seek the good through desire, but the good through virtue, which is more natural [Boethius]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / j. Unity of virtue
Varied aims cannot be good because they differ, but only become good when they unify [Boethius]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 3. Angst
Irony is the response to conflicts of involvement and attachment [Schlegel,F, by Pinkard]
25. Society / C. Social Justice / 3. Social Freedom / b. Freedom of belief
You can't control someone's free mind, only their body and possessions [Boethius]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 5. God and Time
Divine eternity is the all-at-once and complete possession of unending life [Boethius]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / a. Divine morality
Where does evil come from if there is a god; where does good come from if there isn't? [Boethius]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / c. God is the good
God is the supreme good, so no source of goodness could take precedence over God [Boethius]
God is the good [Boethius]
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / a. Cosmological Proof
The power through which creation remains in existence and motion I call 'God' [Boethius]
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / b. Teleological Proof
The regular events of this life could never be due to chance [Boethius]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / a. Immortality
The reward of the good is to become gods [Boethius]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 3. Problem of Evil / a. Problem of Evil
God can do anthing, but he cannot do evil, so evil must be nothing [Boethius]
If you could see the plan of Providence, you would not think there was evil anywhere [Boethius]