Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Friedrich Schlegel, George Boole and Donald Davidson

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152 ideas

1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 4. Later European Philosophy / c. Eighteenth century philosophy
Irony is consciousness of abundant chaos [Schlegel,F]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 3. Metaphysical Systems
Plato has no system. Philosophy is the progression of a mind and development of thoughts [Schlegel,F]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 5. Linguistic Analysis
The best way to do ontology is to make sense of our normal talk [Davidson]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 5. Objectivity
Objective truth arises from interpersonal communication [Davidson]
There are no ultimate standards of rationality, since we only assess others by our own standard [Davidson]
Truth and objectivity depend on a community of speakers to interpret what they mean [Davidson]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 1. Truth
A sentence is held true because of a combination of meaning and belief [Davidson]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 2. Defining Truth
A comprehensive theory of truth probably includes a theory of predication [Davidson]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 3. Value of Truth
Antirealism about truth prevents its use as an intersubjective standard [Davidson]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 5. Truth Bearers
Davidson takes truth to attach to individual sentences [Davidson, by Dummett]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 8. Subjective Truth
'Epistemic' truth depends what rational creatures can verify [Davidson]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 12. Rejecting Truthmakers
Saying truths fit experience adds nothing to truth; nothing makes sentences true [Davidson]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
Names, descriptions and predicates refer to things; without that, language and thought are baffling [Davidson]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 3. Correspondence Truth critique
Correspondence theories can't tell you what truths correspond to [Davidson]
There is nothng interesting or instructive for truths to correspond to [Davidson]
Two sentences can be rephrased by equivalent substitutions to correspond to the same thing [Davidson]
The Slingshot assumes substitutions give logical equivalence, and thus identical correspondence [Davidson]
3. Truth / D. Coherence Truth / 1. Coherence Truth
Coherence with a set of propositions suggests we can know the proposition corresponds [Davidson, by Donnellan]
Coherence truth says a consistent set of sentences is true - which ties truth to belief [Davidson]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / b. Satisfaction and truth
Satisfaction is a sort of reference, so maybe we can define truth in terms of reference? [Davidson]
Axioms spell out sentence satisfaction. With no free variables, all sequences satisfy the truths [Davidson]
We can explain truth in terms of satisfaction - but also explain satisfaction in terms of truth [Davidson]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 2. Semantic Truth
Many say that Tarski's definitions fail to connect truth to meaning [Davidson]
Tarski does not tell us what his various truth predicates have in common [Davidson]
Truth is the basic concept, because Convention-T is agreed to fix the truths of a language [Davidson]
To define a class of true sentences is to stipulate a possible language [Davidson]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 1. Redundant Truth
Truth is basic and clear, so don't try to replace it with something simpler [Davidson]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 2. Deflationary Truth
Tarski is not a disquotationalist, because you can assign truth to a sentence you can't quote [Davidson]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 1. Propositional Logic
Boole applied normal algebra to logic, aiming at an algebra of thought [Boole, by Devlin]
Boole's notation can represent syllogisms and propositional arguments, but not both at once [Boole, by Weiner]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 2. History of Logic
Boole made logic more mathematical, with algebra, quantifiers and probability [Boole, by Friend]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
There is a huge range of sentences of which we do not know the logical form [Davidson]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 2. Domain of Quantification
Davidson controversially proposed to quantify over events [Davidson, by Engelbretsen]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 4. Satisfaction
'Satisfaction' is a generalised form of reference [Davidson]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / a. Nature of events
We need 'events' to explain adverbs, which are adjectival predicates of events [Davidson, by Lycan]
Language-learning is not good enough evidence for the existence of events [Yablo on Davidson]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / b. Events as primitive
Varied descriptions of an event will explain varied behaviour relating to it [Davidson, by Macdonald,C]
If we don't assume that events exist, we cannot make sense of our common talk [Davidson]
You can't identify events by causes and effects, as the event needs to be known first [Dummett on Davidson]
Events can only be individuated causally [Davidson, by Schaffer,J]
We need events for action statements, causal statements, explanation, mind-and-body, and adverbs [Davidson, by Bourne]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / c. Reduction of events
The claim that events are individuated by their causal relations to other events is circular [Lowe on Davidson]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Ontological Commitment / d. Commitment of theories
If the best theory of adverbs refers to events, then our ontology should include events [Davidson, by Sider]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 11. Properties as Sets
Treating predicates as sets drops the predicate for a new predicate 'is a member of', which is no help [Davidson]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 6. Probability
Probability can be constrained by axioms, but that leaves open its truth nature [Davidson]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / a. Beliefs
Having a belief involves the possibility of being mistaken [Davidson]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / b. Elements of beliefs
The concepts of belief and truth are linked, since beliefs are meant to fit reality [Davidson]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / e. Belief holism
The concept of belief can only derive from relationship to a speech community. [Davidson]
A belief requires understanding the distinctions of true-and-false, and appearance-and-reality [Davidson]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / b. Transcendental idealism
Poetry is transcendental when it connects the ideal to the real [Schlegel,F]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 1. Empiricism
Davidson believes experience is non-conceptual, and outside the space of reasons [Davidson, by McDowell]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique
Without the dualism of scheme and content, not much is left of empiricism [Davidson]
Davidson says the world influences us causally; I say it influences us rationally [McDowell on Davidson]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / a. Pro-internalism
Reasons for beliefs are not the same as evidence [Davidson]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / f. Foundationalism critique
Sensations lack the content to be logical; they cause beliefs, but they cannot justify them [Davidson]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / a. Coherence as justification
Coherent justification says only beliefs can be reasons for holding other beliefs [Davidson]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
Skepticism is false because our utterances agree, because they are caused by the same objects [Davidson]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 2. Knowledge as Convention
Objectivity is intersubjectivity [Davidson]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 6. Relativism Critique
Different points of view make sense, but they must be plotted on a common background [Davidson]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / a. Explanation
Explanations typically relate statements, not events [Davidson]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / a. Mind
There are no such things as minds, but people have mental properties [Davidson]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / b. Scepticism of other minds
If we know other minds through behaviour, but not our own, we should assume they aren't like me [Davidson]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / c. Knowing other minds
Knowing other minds rests on knowing both one's own mind and the external world [Davidson, by Dummett]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 5. Generalisation by mind
Predicates are a source of generality in sentences [Davidson]
16. Persons / A. Concept of a Person / 1. Existence of Persons
Metaphysics requires the idea of people (speakers) located in space and time [Davidson]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 4. Behaviourism Critique
There are no rules linking thought and behaviour, because endless other thoughts intervene [Davidson]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 1. Reductionism critique
Reduction is impossible because mind is holistic and brain isn't [Davidson, by Maslin]
If the mind is an anomaly, this makes reduction of the mental to the physical impossible [Davidson]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 2. Anomalous Monism
Davidson claims that mental must be physical, to make mental causation possible [Davidson, by Kim]
There are no strict psychophysical laws connecting mental and physical events [Davidson]
Obviously all mental events are causally related to physical events [Davidson]
Mental entities do not add to the physical furniture of the world [Davidson]
Anomalous monism says nothing at all about the relationship between mental and physical [Davidson, by Kim]
Mind is outside science, because it is humanistic and partly normative [Davidson, by Lycan]
Anomalous monism says causes are events, so the mental and physical are identical, without identical properties [Davidson, by Crane]
If rule-following and reason are 'anomalies', does that make reductionism impossible? [Davidson, by Kim]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 3. Property Dualism
If mental causation is lawless, it is only possible if mental events have physical properties [Davidson, by Kim]
The correct conclusion is ontological monism combined with conceptual dualism [Davidson]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 5. Supervenience of mind
Supervenience of the mental means physical changes mental, and mental changes physical [Davidson]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 5. Causal Argument
Davidson sees identity as between events, not states, since they are related in causation [Davidson, by Lowe]
Cause unites our picture of the universe; without it, mental and physical will separate [Davidson]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
Multiple realisability was worse news for physicalism than anomalous monism was [Davidson, by Kim]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 1. Thought
Thought depends on speech [Davidson]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality
Absence of all rationality would be absence of thought [Davidson]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 8. Human Thought
A creature doesn't think unless it interprets another's speech [Davidson]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 1. Psychology
In no important way can psychology be reduced to the physical sciences [Davidson]
18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content
Our meanings are partly fixed by events of which we may be ignorant [Davidson]
External identification doesn't mean external location, as with sunburn [Davidson, by Rowlands]
It is widely supposed that externalism cannot be reconciled with first-person authority [Davidson]
It is hard to interpret a speaker's actions if we take a broad view of the content [Davidson]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 5. Concepts and Language / a. Concepts and language
Concepts are only possible in a language community [Davidson]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
A minimum requirement for a theory of meaning is that it include an account of truth [Davidson]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 2. Meaning as Mental
If we reject corresponding 'facts', we should also give up the linked idea of 'representations' [Davidson]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
Davidson rejected ordinary meaning, and just used truth and reference instead [Davidson, by Soames]
Davidson aimed to show that language is structured by first-order logic [Davidson, by Smart]
Sentences held true determine the meanings of the words they contain [Davidson]
You only understand an order if you know what it is to obey it [Davidson]
Utterances have the truth conditions intended by the speaker [Davidson]
A theory of truth tells us how communication by language is possible [Davidson]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 6. Meaning as Use
An understood sentence can be used for almost anything; it isn't language if it has only one use [Davidson]
Meaning involves use, but a sentence has many uses, while meaning stays fixed [Davidson]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / a. Sentence meaning
We recognise sentences at once as linguistic units; we then figure out their parts [Davidson]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / b. Language holism
The pattern of sentences held true gives sentences their meaning [Davidson]
19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories
Is reference the key place where language and the world meet? [Davidson]
With a holistic approach, we can give up reference in empirical theories of language [Davidson]
19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / b. Reference by description
To explain the reference of a name, you must explain its sentence-role, so reference can't be defined nonlinguistically [Davidson]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 3. Predicates
Modern predicates have 'places', and are sentences with singular terms deleted from the places [Davidson]
The concept of truth can explain predication [Davidson]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 4. Compositionality
Compositionality explains how long sentences work, and truth conditions are the main compositional feature [Davidson, by Lycan]
If you assign semantics to sentence parts, the sentence fails to compose a whole [Davidson]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 5. Fregean Semantics
Davidson thinks Frege lacks an account of how words create sentence-meaning [Davidson, by Miller,A]
A theory of meaning comes down to translating sentences into Fregean symbolic logic [Davidson, by Macey]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 6. Truth-Conditions Semantics
Top-down semantic analysis must begin with truth, as it is obvious, and explains linguistic usage [Davidson]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 9. Indexical Semantics
You can state truth-conditions for "I am sick now" by relativising it to a speaker at a time [Davidson, by Lycan]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
'Humanity belongs to Socrates' is about humanity, so it's a different proposition from 'Socrates is human' [Davidson]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 6. Propositions Critique
Propositions explain nothing without an explanation of how sentences manage to name them [Davidson]
19. Language / F. Communication / 4. Private Language
Thought is only fully developed if we communicate with others [Davidson]
Content of thought is established through communication, so knowledge needs other minds [Davidson]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / b. Indeterminate translation
Should we assume translation to define truth, or the other way around? [Blackburn on Davidson]
Criteria of translation give us the identity of conceptual schemes [Davidson]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / c. Principle of charity
Davidson's Cogito: 'I think, therefore I am generally right' [Davidson, by Button]
The principle of charity attributes largely consistent logic and largely true beliefs to speakers [Davidson]
There is simply no alternative to the 'principle of charity' in interpreting what others do [Davidson]
The principle of charity says an interpreter must assume the logical constants [Davidson]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / d. Metaphor
We indicate use of a metaphor by its obvious falseness, or trivial truth [Davidson]
Understanding a metaphor is a creative act, with no rules [Davidson]
Metaphors just mean what their words literally mean [Davidson]
We accept a metaphor when we see the sentence is false [Davidson]
20. Action / A. Definition of Action / 2. Duration of an Action
If one action leads directly to another, they are all one action [Davidson, by Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / a. Nature of intentions
We explain an intention by giving an account of acting with an intention [Davidson, by Stout,R]
An intending is a judgement that the action is desirable [Davidson]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / b. Types of intention
We can keep Davidson's account of intentions in action, by further explaining prior intentions [Davidson, by Stout,R]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / c. Reducing intentions
Davidson gave up reductive accounts of intention, and said it was a primitive [Davidson, by Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / d. Weakness of will
The causally strongest reason may not be the reason the actor judges to be best [Davidson]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 2. Acting on Beliefs / a. Acting on beliefs
Acting for a reason is a combination of a pro attitude, and a belief that the action is appropriate [Davidson]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / a. Practical reason
The notion of cause is essential to acting for reasons, intentions, agency, akrasia, and free will [Davidson]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / c. Reasons as causes
Early Davidson says intentional action is caused by reasons [Davidson, by Stout,R]
Reasons must be causes when agents act 'for' reasons [Davidson, by Lowe]
Deviant causal chain: a reason causes an action, but isn't the reason for which it was performed [Davidson, by Neta]
Davidson claims that what causes an action is the reason for doing it [Davidson, by Kim]
21. Aesthetics / B. Nature of Art / 8. The Arts / b. Literature
For poets free choice is supreme [Schlegel,F]
22. Metaethics / A. Value / 2. Values / e. Love
True love is ironic, in the contrast between finite limitations and the infinity of love [Schlegel,F]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 3. Angst
Irony is the response to conflicts of involvement and attachment [Schlegel,F, by Pinkard]
25. Society / E. State Functions / 4. Education / c. Teaching
Without a teacher, the concept of 'getting things right or wrong' is meaningless [Davidson]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 5. Reference to Natural Kinds
The cause of a usage determines meaning, but why is the microstructure of water relevant? [Davidson]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 1. Causation
Distinguish causation, which is in the world, from explanations, which depend on descriptions [Davidson, by Schaffer,J]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata
Either facts, or highly unspecific events, serve better as causes than concrete events [Field,H on Davidson]
Causation is either between events, or between descriptions of events [Davidson, by Maslin]
Whether an event is a causal explanation depends on how it is described [Davidson, by Maslin]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / c. Conditions of causation
Full descriptions can demonstrate sufficiency of cause, but not necessity [Davidson]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / b. Nomological causation
A singular causal statement is true if it is held to fall under a law [Davidson, by Psillos]
Cause and effect relations between events must follow strict laws [Davidson]