Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Speussipus, M.R. Ayers and Jaegwon Kim

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125 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 3. Metaphysical Systems
Metaphysics is the clarification of the ontological relationships between different areas of thought [Kim]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 6. Ockham's Razor
If one theory is reduced to another, we make fewer independent assumptions about the world [Kim]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / d. Counting via concepts
Counting 'coin in this box' may have coin as the unit, with 'in this box' merely as the scope [Ayers]
If counting needs a sortal, what of things which fall under two sortals? [Ayers]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / a. Nature of events
Events do not have natural boundaries, and we have to set them [Ayers]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / c. Reduction of events
For Kim, events are exemplifications of properties by objects at particular times [Kim, by Psillos]
How fine-grained Kim's events are depends on how finely properties are individuated [Kim, by Schaffer,J]
Events are composed of an object with an attribute at a time [Kim, by Simons]
If events are ordered triples of items, such things seem to be sets, and hence abstract [Simons on Kim]
Events cannot be merely ordered triples, but must specify the link between the elements [Kim, by Simons]
Since properties like self-identity and being 2+2=4 are timeless, Kim must restrict his properties [Simons on Kim]
Kim's theory results in too many events [Simons on Kim]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 2. Reduction
Reductionism is good on light, genes, temperature and transparency [Kim, by PG]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / a. Nature of supervenience
Supervenient properties must have matching base properties [Kim]
Supervenience is linked to dependence [Kim]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / b. Types of supervenience
Mereological supervenience says wholes are fixed by parts [Kim]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / c. Significance of supervenience
Supervenience is just a 'surface' relation of pattern covariation, which still needs deeper explanation [Kim]
Supervenience is not a dependence relation, on the lines of causal, mereological or semantic dependence [Kim]
Supervenience suggest dependence without reduction (e.g. beauty) [Kim]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 3. Reality
Causal power is a good way of distinguishing the real from the unreal [Kim]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 6. Physicalism
'Physical facts determine all the facts' is the physicalists' slogan [Kim]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 4. Intrinsic Properties
Extrinsic properties, unlike intrinsics, imply the existence of a separate object [Kim, by Lewis]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 6. Categorical Properties
Resemblance or similarity is the core of our concept of a property [Kim]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 7. Emergent Properties
Is weight a 'resultant' property of water, but transparency an 'emergent' property? [Kim]
Properties can have causal powers lacked by their constituents [Kim]
Emergent properties are 'brute facts' (inexplicable), but still cause things [Kim]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 5. Powers and Properties
Should properties be individuated by their causal powers? [Kim]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
To express borderline cases of objects, you need the concept of an 'object' [Ayers]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
Recognising continuity is separate from sortals, and must precede their use [Ayers]
Speakers need the very general category of a thing, if they are to think about it [Ayers]
We use sortals to classify physical objects by the nature and origin of their unity [Ayers]
Seeing caterpillar and moth as the same needs continuity, not identity of sortal concepts [Ayers]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / a. Intrinsic unification
Could the same matter have more than one form or principle of unity? [Ayers]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / c. Types of substance
Speusippus suggested underlying principles for every substance, and ended with a huge list [Speussipus, by Aristotle]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
If there are two objects, then 'that marble, man-shaped object' is ambiguous [Ayers]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 5. Essence as Kind
Sortals basically apply to individuals [Ayers]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 5. Temporal Parts
Temporal 'parts' cannot be separated or rearranged [Ayers]
You can't have the concept of a 'stage' if you lack the concept of an object [Ayers]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity
Some say a 'covering concept' completes identity; others place the concept in the reference [Ayers]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 3. Relative Identity
If diachronic identities need covering concepts, why not synchronic identities too? [Ayers]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 9. Counterfactuals
Counterfactuals are either based on laws, or on nearby possible worlds [Kim, by PG]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / f. Foundationalism critique
It seems impossible to logically deduce physical knowledge from indubitable sense data [Kim]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism
There are two contradictory arguments about everything [Kim]
Protagoras says arguments on both sides are always equal [Kim, by Seneca]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 6. Relativism Critique
Not every person is the measure of all things, but only wise people [Plato on Kim]
Why didn't Protagoras begin by saying "a tadpole is the measure of all things"? [Plato on Kim]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / a. Explanation
Explanatory exclusion: there cannot be two separate complete explanations of a single event [Kim]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / c. Features of mind
Mind is basically qualities and intentionality, but how do they connect? [Kim]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 3. Mental Causation
Mind is only interesting if it has causal powers [Kim]
Experiment requires mental causation [Kim]
Beliefs cause other beliefs [Kim]
Agency, knowledge, reason, memory, psychology all need mental causes [Kim, by PG]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / a. Nature of intentionality
Both thought and language have intentionality [Kim]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / b. Intentionality theories
Intentionality involves both reference and content [Kim]
It seems impossible that an exact physical copy of this world could lack intentionality [Kim]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / a. Nature of qualia
Are pains pure qualia, or do they motivate? [Kim]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / b. Qualia and intentionality
Pain has no reference or content [Kim]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 6. Inverted Qualia
Inverted qualia and zombies suggest experience isn't just functional [Kim]
Crosswiring would show that pain and its function are separate [Kim, by PG]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 1. Introspection
Externalism about content makes introspection depend on external evidence [Kim]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 3. Limits of Introspection
How do we distinguish our anger from embarrassment? [Kim]
We often can't decide what emotion, or even sensation, we are experiencing [Kim]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 2. Interactionism
Mental substance causation makes physics incomplete [Kim]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 6. Epiphenomenalism
If epiphenomenalism were true, we couldn't report consciousness [Kim]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 7. Zombies
Are inverted or absent qualia coherent ideas? [Kim]
What could demonstrate that zombies and inversion are impossible? [Kim]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 8. Dualism of Mind Critique
Cartesian dualism fails because it can't explain mental causation [Kim]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 1. Behaviourism
Logical behaviourism translates mental language to behavioural [Kim]
Behaviourism reduces mind to behaviour via bridging principles [Kim]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 2. Potential Behaviour
Are dispositions real, or just a type of explanation? [Kim]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 4. Behaviourism Critique
What behaviour goes with mathematical beliefs? [Kim]
Snakes have different pain behaviour from us [Kim]
Behaviour depends on lots of mental states together [Kim]
Behaviour is determined by society as well as mental states [Kim]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 1. Functionalism
Machine functionalism requires a Turing machine, causal-theoretical version doesn't [Kim]
Intentionality as function seems possible [Kim]
Neurons seem to be very similar and interchangeable [Kim]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 7. Chinese Room
The person couldn't run Searle's Chinese Room without understanding Chinese [Kim]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 8. Functionalism critique
How do functional states give rise to mental causation? [Kim]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 1. Reductionism critique
Reductionism gets stuck with qualia [Kim]
Reductionism is impossible if there aren't any 'bridge laws' between mental and physical [Kim]
Maybe intentionality is reducible, but qualia aren't [Kim]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 3. Property Dualism
Most modern physicalists are non-reductive property dualists [Kim]
We can't assess evidence about mind without acknowledging phenomenal properties [Kim]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 4. Emergentism
Emergentism says there is no explanation for a supervenient property [Kim]
The only mental property that might be emergent is that of qualia [Kim]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 5. Supervenience of mind
Supervenience says all souls are identical, being physically indiscernible [Kim]
Zombies and inversion suggest non-reducible supervenience [Kim]
Maybe strong supervenience implies reduction [Kim]
Non-Reductive Physicalism relies on supervenience [Kim]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
Token physicalism isn't reductive; it just says all mental events have some physical properties [Kim]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 2. Reduction of Mind
The core of the puzzle is the bridge laws between mind and brain [Kim]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 3. Eliminativism
Elimination can either be by translation or by causal explanation [Kim]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 5. Causal Argument
Reductionists deny new causal powers at the higher level [Kim]
Without reductionism, mental causation is baffling [Kim]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / a. Physicalism critique
Identity theory was overthrown by multiple realisations and causal anomalies [Kim]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
Multiple realisation applies to other species, and even one individual over time [Kim]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / c. Knowledge argument
Knowledge and inversion make functionalism about qualia doubtful [Kim]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / d. Explanatory gap
If an orange image is a brain state, are some parts of the brain orange? [Kim]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 2. Propositional Attitudes
How do we distinguish our attitudes from one another? [Kim]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / a. Nature of emotions
Emotions have both intentionality and qualia [Kim]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 4. Folk Psychology
A culture without our folk psychology would be quite baffling [Kim]
Folk psychology has adapted to Freudianism [Kim]
Folk psychology has been remarkably durable [Kim]
Maybe folk psychology is a simulation, not a theory [Kim]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 6. Artificial Thought / c. Turing Test
A machine with a mind might still fail the Turing Test [Kim]
The Turing Test is too specifically human in its requirements [Kim]
18. Thought / C. Content / 5. Twin Earth
Two identical brain states could have different contents in different worlds [Kim]
Two types of water are irrelevant to accounts of behaviour [Kim]
18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content
Content is best thought of as truth conditions [Kim]
'Arthritis in my thigh' requires a social context for its content to be meaningful [Kim]
Content may match several things in the environment [Kim]
18. Thought / C. Content / 7. Narrow Content
Pain, our own existence, and negative existentials, are not external [Kim]
Content depends on other content as well as the facts [Kim]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / c. Principle of charity
We assume people believe the obvious logical consequences of their known beliefs [Kim]
If someone says "I do and don't like x", we don't assume a contradiction [Kim]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 1. Causation
Causal statements are used to explain, to predict, to control, to attribute responsibility, and in theories [Kim]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / a. Observation of causation
All observable causes are merely epiphenomena [Kim]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / b. Nomological causation
A common view is that causal connections must be instances of a law [Kim]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / c. Counterfactual causation
Many counterfactuals have nothing to do with causation [Kim, by Tooley]
Counterfactuals can express four other relations between events, apart from causation [Kim]
Causation is not the only dependency relation expressed by counterfactuals [Kim]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 2. Types of Laws
Laws are either 'strict', or they involve a 'ceteris paribus' clause [Kim]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 9. Counterfactual Claims
Many counterfactual truths do not imply causation ('if yesterday wasn't Monday, it isn't Tuesday') [Kim, by Psillos]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 5. Atheism
Speusippus said things were governed by some animal force rather than the gods [Speussipus, by Cicero]