Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Samuel Scheffler, Friedrich Schelling and Francis Hutcheson

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32 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 1. On Reason
Reason is our power of finding out true propositions [Hutcheson]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / c. Becoming
Being is only perceptible to itself as becoming [Schelling]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / d. Absolute idealism
Schelling always affirmed the absolute status of freedom [Schelling, by Courtine]
For Schelling the Absolute spirit manifests as nature in which self-consciousness evolves [Schelling, by Lewis,PB]
Metaphysics aims at the Absolute, which goes beyond subjective and objective viewpoints [Schelling, by Pinkard]
We must show that the whole of nature, because it is effective, is grounded in freedom [Schelling]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 4. Presupposition of Self
The basis of philosophy is the Self prior to experience, where it is the essence of freedom [Schelling]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 2. Sources of Free Will
Only idealism has given us the genuine concept of freedom [Schelling]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / b. Intellectualism
Reason is too slow and doubtful to guide all actions, which need external and moral senses [Hutcheson]
22. Metaethics / A. Value / 2. Values / e. Altruism
Human nature seems incapable of universal malice, except what results from self-love [Hutcheson]
22. Metaethics / A. Value / 2. Values / h. Self interest
As death approaches, why do we still care about family, friends or country? [Hutcheson]
22. Metaethics / B. The Good / 1. Goodness / g. Consequentialism
My action is not made good by a good effect, if I did not foresee and intend it [Hutcheson]
If the aim is good outcomes, why are killings worse than deaths? [Scheffler, by Foot]
22. Metaethics / B. The Good / 2. Happiness / a. Nature of happiness
Happiness is a pleasant sensation, or continued state of such sensations [Hutcheson]
22. Metaethics / C. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / c. Ethical intuitionism
We approve of actions by a superior moral sense [Hutcheson]
We dislike a traitor, even if they give us great benefit [Hutcheson]
The moral sense is not an innate idea, but an ability to approve or disapprove in a disinterested way [Hutcheson]
We cannot choose our moral feelings, otherwise bribery could affect them [Hutcheson]
Everyone feels uneasy when seeing others in pain, unless the others are evil [Hutcheson]
Can't the moral sense make mistakes, as the other senses do? [Hutcheson]
22. Metaethics / C. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / g. Will to power
Ultimately, all being is willing. The nature of primal being is the same as the nature of willing [Schelling]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / e. Character
We don't choose our characters, yet we still claim credit for the actions our characters perform [Schelling]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / d. Courage
Contempt of danger is just madness if it is not in some worthy cause [Hutcheson]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 1. Deontology
You can't form moral rules without an end, which needs feelings and a moral sense [Hutcheson]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 1. Utilitarianism
That action is best, which procures the greatest happiness for the greatest number [Hutcheson]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 1. Basis of Rights
The loss of perfect rights causes misery, but the loss of imperfect rights reduces social good [Hutcheson]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 1. Nature
Schelling sought a union between the productivities of nature and of the mind [Schelling, by Bowie]
Schelling made organisms central to nature, because mere mechanism could never produce them [Schelling, by Pinkard]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / a. Divine morality
We are asked to follow God's ends because he is our benefactor, but why must we do that? [Hutcheson]
Why may God not have a superior moral sense very similar to ours? [Hutcheson]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / c. God is the good
We say God is good if we think everything he does aims at the happiness of his creatures [Hutcheson]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / d. God decrees morality
If goodness is constituted by God's will, it is a tautology to say God's will is good [Hutcheson]