Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Eubulides, Carneades and Halbach,V/Leigh,G.E.

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23 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 3. Philosophy Defined
Carneades' pinnacles of philosophy are the basis of knowledge (the criterion of truth) and the end of appetite (good) [Carneades, by Cicero]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 2. Defining Truth
If we define truth, we can eliminate it [Halbach/Leigh]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 10. Making Future Truths
Future events are true if one day we will say 'this event is happening now' [Carneades]
We say future things are true that will possess actuality at some following time [Carneades, by Cicero]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / b. Satisfaction and truth
If a language cannot name all objects, then satisfaction must be used, instead of unary truth [Halbach/Leigh]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / c. Meta-language for truth
Semantic theories need a powerful metalanguage, typically including set theory [Halbach/Leigh]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 2. Semantic Truth
The T-sentences are deductively weak, and also not deductively conservative [Halbach/Leigh]
3. Truth / G. Axiomatic Truth / 1. Axiomatic Truth
A natural theory of truth plays the role of reflection principles, establishing arithmetic's soundness [Halbach/Leigh]
If deflationary truth is not explanatory, truth axioms should be 'conservative', proving nothing new [Halbach/Leigh]
3. Truth / G. Axiomatic Truth / 2. FS Truth Axioms
The FS axioms use classical logical, but are not fully consistent [Halbach/Leigh]
3. Truth / G. Axiomatic Truth / 3. KF Truth Axioms
KF is formulated in classical logic, but describes non-classical truth, which allows truth-value gluts [Halbach/Leigh]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 1. Paradox
If you know your father, but don't recognise your father veiled, you know and don't know the same person [Eubulides, by Dancy,R]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 6. Paradoxes in Language / a. The Liar paradox
If you say truly that you are lying, you are lying [Eubulides, by Dancy,R]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 6. Paradoxes in Language / b. The Heap paradox ('Sorites')
Removing one grain doesn't destroy a heap, so a heap can't be destroyed [Eubulides, by Dancy,R]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 12. Denial of Properties
We can reduce properties to true formulas [Halbach/Leigh]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / c. Nominalism about abstracta
Nominalists can reduce theories of properties or sets to harmless axiomatic truth theories [Halbach/Leigh]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 6. Identity between Objects
Carneades denied the transitivity of identity [Carneades, by Chisholm]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 3. Types of Necessity
Carneades distinguished logical from causal necessity, when talking of future events [Long on Carneades]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 2. Sources of Free Will
Voluntary motion is intrinsically within our power, and this power is its cause [Carneades, by Cicero]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / a. Determinism
Some actions are within our power; determinism needs prior causes for everything - so it is false [Carneades, by Cicero]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / b. Fate
Even Apollo can only foretell the future when it is naturally necessary [Carneades, by Cicero]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / i. Self-interest
Carneades said that after a shipwreck a wise man would seize the only plank by force [Carneades, by Tuck]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 1. Basis of justice
People change laws for advantage; either there is no justice, or it is a form of self-injury [Carneades, by Lactantius]