Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Carneades, Charlotte Witt and Robert Audi

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43 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 3. Philosophy Defined
Carneades' pinnacles of philosophy are the basis of knowledge (the criterion of truth) and the end of appetite (good) [Carneades, by Cicero]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 10. Making Future Truths
Future events are true if one day we will say 'this event is happening now' [Carneades]
We say future things are true that will possess actuality at some following time [Carneades, by Cicero]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 2. Types of Essence
Aristotelian and Kripkean essentialism are very different theories [Witt]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 4. Essence as Definition
An Aristotelian essence is a nonlinguistic correlate of the definition [Witt]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 6. Essence as Unifier
If unity is a matter of degree, then essence may also be a matter of degree [Witt]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 8. Essence as Explanatory
Essences mainly explain the existence of unified substance [Witt]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 12. Origin as Essential
Essential properties of origin are too radically individual for an Aristotelian essence [Witt]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 6. Identity between Objects
Carneades denied the transitivity of identity [Carneades, by Chisholm]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 3. Types of Necessity
Carneades distinguished logical from causal necessity, when talking of future events [Long on Carneades]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 7. Natural Necessity
Because 'gold is malleable' is necessary does not mean that it is analytic [Audi,R]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / d. Cause of beliefs
Beliefs are based on perception, memory, introspection or reason [Audi,R]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / e. Belief holism
Could you have a single belief on its own? [Audi,R]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 1. Certainty
We can make certain of what we know, so knowing does not entail certainty [Audi,R]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 2. Phenomenalism
Sense-data theory is indirect realism, but phenomenalism is direct irrealism [Audi,R]
If you gradually remove a book's sensory properties, what is left at the end? [Audi,R]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 9. A Priori from Concepts
Red and green being exclusive colours seems to be rationally graspable but not analytic [Audi,R]
The concepts needed for a priori thought may come from experience [Audi,R]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 3. Representation
To see something as a field, I obviously need the concept of a field [Audi,R]
How could I see a field and believe nothing regarding it? [Audi,R]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / a. Sense-data theory
Sense-data (and the rival 'adverbial' theory) are to explain illusions and hallucinations [Audi,R]
Sense data imply representative realism, possibly only representing primary qualities [Audi,R]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 5. Interpretation
Perception is first simple, then objectual (with concepts) and then propositional [Audi,R]
12. Knowledge Sources / C. Rationalism / 1. Rationalism
Virtually all rationalists assert that we can have knowledge of synthetic a priori truths [Audi,R]
The principles of justification have to be a priori [Audi,R]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 4. Memory
To remember something is to know it [Audi,R]
I might remember someone I can't recall or image, by recognising them on meeting [Audi,R]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / a. Agrippa's trilemma
Justification is either unanchored (infinite or circular), or anchored (in knowledge or non-knowledge) [Audi,R]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / a. Pro-internalism
Internalism about justification implies that there is a right to believe something [Audi,R]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / c. Coherentism critique
Maths may be consistent with observations, but not coherent [Audi,R]
It is very hard to show how much coherence is needed for justification [Audi,R]
A consistent madman could have a very coherent belief system [Audi,R]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 1. External Justification
Consistent accurate prediction looks like knowledge without justified belief [Audi,R]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / a. Reliable knowledge
A reliability theory of knowledge seems to involve truth as correspondence [Audi,R]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / b. Anti-reliabilism
'Reliable' is a very imprecise term, and may even mean 'justified' [Audi,R]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 4. Errors in Introspection
We can be ignorant about ourselves, for example, our desires and motives [Audi,R]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 2. Sources of Free Will
Voluntary motion is intrinsically within our power, and this power is its cause [Carneades, by Cicero]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / a. Determinism
Some actions are within our power; determinism needs prior causes for everything - so it is false [Carneades, by Cicero]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / b. Fate
Even Apollo can only foretell the future when it is naturally necessary [Carneades, by Cicero]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / c. Reasons as causes
Actions are not mere effects of reasons, but are under their control [Audi,R]
22. Metaethics / A. Value / 2. Values / h. Self interest
Carneades said that after a shipwreck a wise man would seize the only plank by force [Carneades, by Tuck]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 1. Basis of justice
People change laws for advantage; either there is no justice, or it is a form of self-injury [Carneades, by Lactantius]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / a. Scientific essentialism
Reality is directional [Witt]