23 ideas
| 13451 | The two best understood conceptions of set are the Iterative and the Limitation of Size [Rayo/Uzquiano] |
| Full Idea: The two best understood conceptions of set are the Iterative Conception and the Limitation of Size Conception. | |
| From: Rayo,A/Uzquiasno,G (Introduction to 'Absolute Generality' [2006], 1.2.2) |
| 13452 | Some set theories give up Separation in exchange for a universal set [Rayo/Uzquiano] |
| Full Idea: There are set theories that countenance exceptions to the Principle of Separation in exchange for a universal set. | |
| From: Rayo,A/Uzquiasno,G (Introduction to 'Absolute Generality' [2006], 1.2.2) |
| 13449 | We could have unrestricted quantification without having an all-inclusive domain [Rayo/Uzquiano] |
| Full Idea: The possibility of unrestricted quantification does not immediately presuppose the existence of an all-inclusive domain. One could deny an all-inclusive domain but grant that some quantifications are sometimes unrestricted. | |
| From: Rayo,A/Uzquiasno,G (Introduction to 'Absolute Generality' [2006], 1.1) | |
| A reaction: Thus you can quantify over anything you like, but only from what is available. Eat what you like (in this restaurant). |
| 13450 | Absolute generality is impossible, if there are indefinitely extensible concepts like sets and ordinals [Rayo/Uzquiano] |
| Full Idea: There are doubts about whether absolute generality is possible, if there are certain concepts which are indefinitely extensible, lacking definite extensions, and yielding an ever more inclusive hierarchy. Sets and ordinals are paradigm cases. | |
| From: Rayo,A/Uzquiasno,G (Introduction to 'Absolute Generality' [2006], 1.2.1) |
| 13453 | Perhaps second-order quantifications cover concepts of objects, rather than plain objects [Rayo/Uzquiano] |
| Full Idea: If one thought of second-order quantification as quantification over first-level Fregean concepts [note: one under which only objects fall], talk of domains might be regimented as talk of first-level concepts, which are not objects. | |
| From: Rayo,A/Uzquiasno,G (Introduction to 'Absolute Generality' [2006], 1.2.2) | |
| A reaction: That is (I take it), don't quantify over objects, but quantify over concepts, but only those under which known objects fall. One might thus achieve naïve comprehension without paradoxes. Sound like fun. |
| 21812 | Being is the product of pure intellect [Plotinus] |
| Full Idea: Intellectual-Principle [Nous] by its intellective act establishes Being. | |
| From: Plotinus (The Enneads [c.245], 5.1.04) | |
| A reaction: This is a surprising view - that there is something which is prior to Being - but I take it to be Plotinus giving primacy to Plato's Form of the Good (a pure ideal), ahead of the One of Parmenides (which is Being). |
| 21817 | The One does not exist, but is the source of all existence [Plotinus] |
| Full Idea: The First is no member of existence, but can be the source of all. | |
| From: Plotinus (The Enneads [c.245], 5.1.07) | |
| A reaction: The First is the One, and this explicitly denies that it has Being. This answers the self-predication problem of Forms. Plato thought the Form of the Beautiful was beautiful, but it can't be (because of the regress). The source of existence can't exist. |
| 21824 | The One is a principle which transcends Being [Plotinus] |
| Full Idea: There exists a principle which transcends Being; this the One. | |
| From: Plotinus (The Enneads [c.245], 5.1.10) | |
| A reaction: The idea that the One transcends Being is the distinctive Plotinus doctrine. He defends the view that this was also the view of Anaxagoras, Empedocles and Plato. |
| 21813 | Number determines individual being [Plotinus] |
| Full Idea: Number is the determinant of individual being. | |
| From: Plotinus (The Enneads [c.245], 5.1.05) | |
| A reaction: You might have thought that number was the consequence of the individualities (or units) within being, but not so. You can't get more platonic than saying that the idealised numbers are the source of the particular units. |
| 5506 | If soul was like body, its parts would be separate, without communication [Plotinus] |
| Full Idea: If the soul had the nature of the body, it would have isolated members each unaware of the condition of the other;..there would be a particular soul as a distinct entity to each local experience, so a multiplicity of souls would administer an individual. | |
| From: Plotinus (The Enneads [c.245], 4.2.2), quoted by R Martin / J Barresi - Introduction to 'Personal Identity' p.15 | |
| A reaction: Of course, the modern 'modularity of mind' theory does suggest that we are run by a team, but a central co-ordinator is required, with a full communication network across the modules. |
| 21827 | The movement of Soul is continuous, but we are only aware of the parts of it that are sensed [Plotinus] |
| Full Idea: The Soul maintains its unfailing movement; for not all that passes in the soul is, by that fact, perceptible; we know just as much as impinges on the faculty of the sense. | |
| From: Plotinus (The Enneads [c.245], 5.1.12) | |
| A reaction: This is a straightforward argument in favour of an unconscious aspect to the mind - and a rather good argument too. No one thinks that our minds ever stop working, even in sleep. |
| 21828 | A person is the whole of their soul [Plotinus] |
| Full Idea: Man is not merely a part (the higher part) of the Soul but the total. | |
| From: Plotinus (The Enneads [c.245], 5.1.12) | |
| A reaction: The soul is psuche, which includes the vegetative soul. The higher part is normally taken to be reason. This seems pretty close to John Locke's view of the matter. |
| 21809 | Our soul has the same ideal nature as the oldest god, and is honourable above the body [Plotinus] |
| Full Idea: Our own soul is of that same ideal nature [as the oldest god of them all], so that to consider it, purified, freed from all accruement, is to recognise in ourselves which we have found soul to be, honourable above the body. For what is body but earth? | |
| From: Plotinus (The Enneads [c.245], 5.1.02) | |
| A reaction: The strongest versions of substance dualism are religious in character, because the separateness of the mind elevates us above the grubby physical character of the world. I'm with Nietzsche on this one - this view is actually harmful to us. |
| 21825 | The soul is outside of all of space, and has no connection to the bodily order [Plotinus] |
| Full Idea: We may not seek any point in space in which to seat the soul; it must be set outside of all space; its distinct quality, its separateness, its immateriality, demand that it be a thing alone, untouched by all of the bodily order. | |
| From: Plotinus (The Enneads [c.245], 5.1.10) | |
| A reaction: You can't get more dualist than that. He doesn't seem bothered about the interaction problem. He likens such influence to the radiation of the sun, rather than to physical movement. |
| 13448 | The domain of an assertion is restricted by context, either semantically or pragmatically [Rayo/Uzquiano] |
| Full Idea: We generally take an assertion's domain of discourse to be implicitly restricted by context. [Note: the standard approach is that this restriction is a semantic phenomenon, but Kent Bach (2000) argues that it is a pragmatic phenomenon] | |
| From: Rayo,A/Uzquiasno,G (Introduction to 'Absolute Generality' [2006], 1.1) | |
| A reaction: I think Kent Bach is very very right about this. Follow any conversation, and ask what the domain is at any moment. The reference of a word like 'they' can drift across things, with no semantics to guide us, but only clues from context and common sense. |
| 21826 | The Soul reasons about the Right, so there must be some permanent Right about which it reasons [Plotinus] |
| Full Idea: Since there is a Soul which reasons upon the right and good - for reasoning is an enquiry into the rightness and goodness of this rather than that - there must exist some pemanent Right, the source and foundation of this reasoning in our soul. | |
| From: Plotinus (The Enneads [c.245], 5.1.11) | |
| A reaction: This is pretty close the Kant's concept of 'the moral order within me', and Plotinus even sees it as rational. Presumably this right is 'permanent' because the revelatlons of reason about it are necessary truths. |
| 6922 | Ecstasy is for the neo-Platonist the highest psychological state of man [Plotinus, by Feuerbach] |
| Full Idea: Ecstasy or rapture is for the neo-Platonist the highest psychological state of man. | |
| From: report of Plotinus (The Enneads [c.245]) by Ludwig Feuerbach - Principles of Philosophy of the Future §29 | |
| A reaction: See Bernini's statue of St Theresa. Personally I find this very unappealing because of its utter irrationality, but what is the 'highest' human psychological state? Doing mental arithmetic? Doing what is morally right? Dignity under pressure? |
| 7907 | Human killing is worse if the victim is virtuous [Buddhaghosa] |
| Full Idea: In the case of humans killing is the more blameworthy the more virtuous the victim is. | |
| From: Buddhaghosa (Papancasudani [c.400], 9.7-10) | |
| A reaction: This sentiment has almost become a taboo in western society, and yet it is present all the time. The greatest outcry is about murders of really good citizens. Occasionally the murder of a villain causes little regret. |
| 21815 | Because the One is immobile, it must create by radiation, light the sun producing light [Plotinus] |
| Full Idea: Given this immobility of the Supreme ...what happened then? It must be a circumradiation, which may be compared to the brilliant light encircling the sun and ceaselessly generating from that unchanging substance, | |
| From: Plotinus (The Enneads [c.245], 5.1.06) | |
| A reaction: This is the answer given to the problem raised in Idea 21814. The sun produces energy, without apparent movement. Not an answer that will satisfy a physicist, but an interesting answer. |
| 21814 | How can multiple existence arise from the unified One? [Plotinus] |
| Full Idea: The problem endlessly debated is how, from such a unity as we have declared the One to be, does anything at all come into substantial existence, any multiplicity, dyad or number? | |
| From: Plotinus (The Enneads [c.245], 5.1.06) | |
| A reaction: This was precisely Aristotle's objection to the One of Parmenides, and especially the problem of the source of movement (which Plotinus also notices). |
| 21816 | Soul is the logos of Nous, just as Nous is the logos of the One [Plotinus] |
| Full Idea: The soul is an utterance [logos] and act of the Intellectual-Principle [Nous], as that is an utterance and act of the One. | |
| From: Plotinus (The Enneads [c.245], 5.1.06) | |
| A reaction: Being only comes into the picture at the secondary Nous stage. Nous is the closest to the modern concept of God. |
| 21808 | Soul is author of all of life, and of the stars, and it gives them law and movement [Plotinus] |
| Full Idea: Soul is the author of all living things, ...it has breathed life into them all, whatever is nourished by earth and sea, the divine stars in the sky; ...it is the principle distinct from all of these to which it gives law and movement and life. | |
| From: Plotinus (The Enneads [c.245], 5.1.02) | |
| A reaction: This seems to derive from Anaxagoras, who is mentioned by Plotinus. The soul he refers to his not the same as our concept of God. Note the word 'law', which I am guessing is nomos. Not, I think, modern laws of nature, but closer to guidelines. |
| 21811 | Even the soul is secondary to the Intellectual-Principle [Nous], of which soul is an utterance [Plotinus] |
| Full Idea: Soul, for all the worth we have shown to belong to it, is yet a secondary, an image of the Intellectual-Principle [Nous]; reason uttered is an image of reason stored within the soul, and similarly soul is an utterance of the Intellectual-Principle. | |
| From: Plotinus (The Enneads [c.245], 5.1.03) | |
| A reaction: It then turns out that Nous is secondary to the One, so there is a hierarchy of Being (which only enters at the Nous stage). |