Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Michael V. Wedin, Daniel Garber and Tom Milsted

unexpand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these philosophers

6 ideas

7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 6. Fundamentals / c. Monads
Epicurean atomists say body is sensible, to distinguish it from space. [Garber]
     Full Idea: The Epicurean atomists also defined body in terms of the property of being sensible, in order to distinguish it from empty space, which is not sensible.
     From: Daniel Garber (Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad [2009], 1)
     A reaction: This is a very illuminating bit of background, for those of us who have the knee-jerk reaction that monadology is barking mad.
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 3. Types of Properties
A 'categorial' property is had by virtue of being or having an item from a category [Wedin]
     Full Idea: A 'categorial' property is a property something has by virtue of being or having an item from one of the categories.
     From: Michael V. Wedin (Aristotle's Theory of Substance [2000], V.5)
     A reaction: I deny that these are 'properties'. A thing is categorised according to its properties. To denote the category as a further property is the route to madness (well, to a regress).
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / d. Substance defined
Substance is a principle and a kind of cause [Wedin]
     Full Idea: Substance [ousia] is a principle [arché] and a kind of cause [aitia].
     From: Michael V. Wedin (Aristotle's Theory of Substance [2000], 1041a09)
     A reaction: The fact that substance is a cause is also the reason why substance is the ultimate explanation. It is here that I take the word 'power' to capture best what Aristotle has in mind.
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / a. Hylomorphism
Form explains why some matter is of a certain kind, and that is explanatory bedrock [Wedin]
     Full Idea: The form of a thing (of a given kind) explains why certain matter constitutes a thing of that kind, and with this, Aristotle holds, we have reached explanatory bedrock.
     From: Michael V. Wedin (Aristotle's Theory of Substance [2000], Intro)
     A reaction: We must explain an individual tiger which is unusually docile. It must have an individual form which makes it a tiger, but also an individual form which makes it docile.
14. Science / C. Induction / 5. Paradoxes of Induction / a. Grue problem
'Grue' is not a colour [Milsted]
     Full Idea: 'Grue' is not a colour.
     From: Tom Milsted (talk [2006]), quoted by PG - Db (ideas)
     A reaction: This simple observation strikes me as rather crucial in assessing Goodman's paradox. Blue is a colour, but grue is some sort of behaviour. Blue is a secondary quality, but grue seems to be a primary quality.
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / g. Atomism
Epicurean atoms are distinguished by their extreme hardness [Garber]
     Full Idea: In Epicurean atomism (of Cordemoy, for example) there is a world of basic things distinguished by virtue of their extreme hardness.
     From: Daniel Garber (Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad [2009], 2)
     A reaction: Garber says that Leibniz espouses 'substantial atomism', which is different from this. Leibniz's atoms have active power, where these atoms just embody total resistance.