Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Peter B. Lewis, Saunders MacLane and Hartry Field

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47 ideas

2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 4. Circularity
Maybe reasonableness requires circular justifications - that is one coherentist view [Field,H]
     Full Idea: It is not out of the question to hold that without circular justifications there is no reasonableness at all. That is the view of a certain kind of coherence theorist.
     From: Hartry Field (Apriority as an Evaluative Notion [2000], 2)
     A reaction: This nicely captures a gut feeling I have had for a long time. Being now thoroughly converted to coherentism, I am drawn to the idea - like a moth to a flame. But how do we distinguish cuddly circularity from its cruel and vicious cousin?
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 4. Uses of Truth
The notion of truth is to help us make use of the utterances of others [Field,H]
     Full Idea: I suspect that the original purpose of the notion of truth was to aid us in utilizing the utterances of others in drawing conclusions about the world, we must attend to its social role, and that being in a position to assert something is what counts.
     From: Hartry Field (Tarski's Theory of Truth [1972], §5)
     A reaction: [Last bit compressed] This sounds excellent. Deflationary and redundancy views are based on a highly individualistic view of utterances and truth, but we need to be much more contextual and pragmatic if we are to get the right story.
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 9. Rejecting Truth
In the early 1930s many philosophers thought truth was not scientific [Field,H]
     Full Idea: In the early 1930s many philosophers believed that the notion of truth could not be incorporated into a scientific conception of the world.
     From: Hartry Field (Tarski's Theory of Truth [1972], §3)
     A reaction: This leads on to an account of why Tarski's formal version was so important, and Field emphasises Tarski's physicalist metaphysic.
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / a. Tarski's truth definition
Tarski reduced truth to reference or denotation [Field,H, by Hart,WD]
     Full Idea: Tarski can be viewed as having reduced truth to reference or denotation.
     From: report of Hartry Field (Tarski's Theory of Truth [1972]) by William D. Hart - The Evolution of Logic 4
Tarski really explained truth in terms of denoting, predicating and satisfied functions [Field,H]
     Full Idea: A proper account of Tarski's truth definition explains truth in terms of three other semantic notions: what it is for a name to denote something, and for a predicate to apply to something, and for a function symbol to be fulfilled by a pair of things.
     From: Hartry Field (Tarski's Theory of Truth [1972])
     A reaction: This is Field's 'T1' version, which is meant to spell out what was really going on in Tarski's account.
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / b. Satisfaction and truth
Tarski just reduced truth to some other undefined semantic notions [Field,H]
     Full Idea: It is normally claimed that Tarski defined truth using no undefined semantic terms, but I argue that he reduced the notion of truth to certain other semantic notions, but did not in any way explicate these other notions.
     From: Hartry Field (Tarski's Theory of Truth [1972], §0)
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / a. Axioms for sets
ZFC could contain a contradiction, and it can never prove its own consistency [MacLane]
     Full Idea: We have at hand no proof that the axioms of ZFC for set theory will never yield a contradiction, while Gödel's second theorem tells us that such a consistency proof cannot be conducted within ZFC.
     From: Saunders MacLane (Mathematics: Form and Function [1986], p.406), quoted by Penelope Maddy - Naturalism in Mathematics
     A reaction: Maddy quotes this, while defending set theory as the foundation of mathematics, but it clearly isn't the most secure foundation that could be devised. She says the benefits of set theory do not need guaranteed consistency (p.30).
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 8. Critique of Set Theory
In Field's Platonist view, set theory is false because it asserts existence for non-existent things [Field,H, by Chihara]
     Full Idea: Field commits himself to a Platonic view of mathematics. The theorems of set theory are held to imply or presuppose the existence of things that don't in fact exist. That is why he believes that these theorems are false.
     From: report of Hartry Field (Science without Numbers [1980]) by Charles Chihara - A Structural Account of Mathematics 11.1
     A reaction: I am sympathetic to Field, but this sounds wrong. A response that looks appealing is that maths is hypothetical ('if-thenism') - the truth is in the logical consequences, not in the ontological presuppositions.
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 1. Logical Consequence
Logical consequence is defined by the impossibility of P and ¬q [Field,H, by Shapiro]
     Full Idea: Field defines logical consequence by taking the notion of 'logical possibility' as primitive. Hence q is a consequence of P if the conjunction of the items in P with the negation of q is not possible.
     From: report of Hartry Field (Science without Numbers [1980]) by Stewart Shapiro - Philosophy of Mathematics 7.2
     A reaction: The question would then be whether it is plausible to take logical possibility as primitive. Presumably only intuition could support it. But then intuition will equally support natural and metaphysical possibilities.
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 2. Formal Truth
Tarski gives us the account of truth needed to build a group of true sentences in a model [Field,H]
     Full Idea: Model theory must choose the denotations of the primitives so that all of a group of sentences come out true, so we need a theory of how the truth value of a sentence depends on the denotation of its primitive nonlogical parts, which Tarski gives us.
     From: Hartry Field (Tarski's Theory of Truth [1972], §1)
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 1. Logical Models
Model theory is unusual in restricting the range of the quantifiers [Field,H]
     Full Idea: In model theory we are interested in allowing a slightly unusual semantics for quantifiers: we are willing to allow that the quantifier not range over everything.
     From: Hartry Field (Tarski's Theory of Truth [1972], n 5)
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 1. Mathematics
If mathematical theories conflict, it may just be that they have different subject matter [Field,H]
     Full Idea: Unlike logic, in the case of mathematics there may be no genuine conflict between alternative theories: it is natural to think that different theories, if both consistent, are simply about different subjects.
     From: Hartry Field (Recent Debates on the A Priori [2005], 7)
     A reaction: For this reason Field places logic at the heart of questions about a priori knowledge, rather than mathematics. My intuitions make me doubt his proposal. Given the very simple basis of, say, arithmetic, I would expect all departments to connect.
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / a. Numbers
In Field's version of science, space-time points replace real numbers [Field,H, by Szabó]
     Full Idea: Field's nominalist version of science develops a version of Newtonian gravitational theory, where no quantifiers range over mathematical entities, and space-time points and regions play the role of surrogates for real numbers.
     From: report of Hartry Field (Science without Numbers [1980]) by Zoltán Gendler Szabó - Nominalism 5.1
     A reaction: This seems to be a very artificial contrivance, but Field has launched a programme for rewriting science so that numbers can be omitted. All of this is Field's rebellion against the Indispensability Argument for mathematics. I sympathise.
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 3. Axioms for Geometry
'Metric' axioms uses functions, points and numbers; 'synthetic' axioms give facts about space [Field,H]
     Full Idea: There are two approaches to axiomatising geometry. The 'metric' approach uses a function which maps a pair of points into the real numbers. The 'synthetic' approach is that of Euclid and Hilbert, which does without real numbers and functions.
     From: Hartry Field (Science without Numbers [1980], 5)
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / a. For mathematical platonism
The Indispensability Argument is the only serious ground for the existence of mathematical entities [Field,H]
     Full Idea: There is one and only one serious argument for the existence of mathematical entities, and that is the Indispensability Argument of Putnam and Quine.
     From: Hartry Field (Science without Numbers [1980], p.5), quoted by Stewart Shapiro - Thinking About Mathematics 9.1
     A reaction: Personally I don't believe (and nor does Field) that this gives a good enough reason to believe in such things. Quine (who likes 'desert landscapes' in ontology) ends up believing that sets are real because of his argument. Not for me.
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 3. Mathematical Nominalism
Nominalists try to only refer to physical objects, or language, or mental constructions [Field,H]
     Full Idea: The most popular approach of nominalistically inclined philosophers is to try to reinterpret mathematics, so that its terms and quantifiers only make reference to, say, physical objects, or linguistic expressions, or mental constructions.
     From: Hartry Field (Science without Numbers [1980], Prelim)
     A reaction: I am keen on naturalism and empiricism, but only referring to physical objects is a non-starter. I think I favour constructions, derived from the experience of patterns, and abstracted, idealised and generalised. Field says application is the problem.
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / b. Indispensability of mathematics
The application of mathematics only needs its possibility, not its truth [Field,H, by Shapiro]
     Full Idea: Field argues that to account for the applicability of mathematics, we need to assume little more than the possibility of the mathematics, not its truth.
     From: report of Hartry Field (Science without Numbers [1980]) by Stewart Shapiro - Philosophy of Mathematics 7.2
     A reaction: Very persuasive. We can apply chess to real military situations, provided that chess isn't self-contradictory (or even naturally impossible?).
Hilbert explains geometry, by non-numerical facts about space [Field,H]
     Full Idea: Facts about geometric laws receive satisfying explanations, by the intrinsic facts about physical space, i.e. those laid down without reference to numbers in Hilbert's axioms.
     From: Hartry Field (Science without Numbers [1980], 3)
     A reaction: Hilbert's axioms mention points, betweenness, segment-congruence and angle-congruence (Field 25-26). Field cites arithmetic and geometry (as well as Newtonian mechanics) as not being dependent on number.
Field needs a semantical notion of second-order consequence, and that needs sets [Brown,JR on Field,H]
     Full Idea: Field needs the notion of logical consequence in second-order logic, but (since this is not recursively axiomatizable) this is a semantical notion, which involves the idea of 'true in all models', a set-theoretic idea if there ever was one.
     From: comment on Hartry Field (Science without Numbers [1980], Ch.4) by James Robert Brown - Philosophy of Mathematics
     A reaction: Brown here summarises a group of critics. Field was arguing for modern nominalism, that actual numbers could (in principle) be written out of the story, as useful fictions. Popper's attempt to dump induction seemed to need induction.
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / d. Logicism critique
It seems impossible to explain the idea that the conclusion is contained in the premises [Field,H]
     Full Idea: No clear explanation of the idea that the conclusion was 'implicitly contained in' the premises was ever given, and I do not believe that any clear explanation is possible.
     From: Hartry Field (Science without Numbers [1980], 1)
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 9. Fictional Mathematics
Mathematics is only empirical as regards which theory is useful [Field,H]
     Full Idea: Mathematics is in a sense empirical, but only in the rather Pickwickian sense that is an empirical question as to which mathematical theory is useful.
     From: Hartry Field (Science without Numbers [1980], 1)
     A reaction: Field wants mathematics to be fictions, and not to be truths. But can he give an account of 'useful' that does not imply truth? Only in a rather dubiously pragmatist way. A novel is not useful.
Abstractions can form useful counterparts to concrete statements [Field,H]
     Full Idea: Abstract entities are useful because we can use them to formulate abstract counterparts of concrete statements.
     From: Hartry Field (Science without Numbers [1980], 3)
     A reaction: He defends the abstract statements as short cuts. If the concrete statements were 'true', then it seems likely that the abstract counterparts will also be true, which is not what fictionalism claims.
Fictionalists say 2+2=4 is true in the way that 'Oliver Twist lived in London' is true [Field,H]
     Full Idea: The fictionalist can say that the sense in which '2+2=4' is true is pretty much the same as the sense in which 'Oliver Twist lived in London' is true. They are true 'according to a well-known story', or 'according to standard mathematics'.
     From: Hartry Field (Realism, Mathematics and Modality [1989], 1.1.1), quoted by Michčle Friend - Introducing the Philosophy of Mathematics 6.3
     A reaction: The roots of this idea are in Carnap. Fictionalism strikes me as brilliant, but poisonous in large doses. Novels can aspire to artistic truth, or to documentary truth. We invent a fiction, and nudge it slowly towards reality.
Why regard standard mathematics as truths, rather than as interesting fictions? [Field,H]
     Full Idea: Why regard the axioms of standard mathematics as truths, rather than as fictions that for a variety of reasons mathematicians have become interested in?
     From: Hartry Field (Science without Numbers [1980], p.viii)
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Ontological Commitment / a. Ontological commitment
You can reduce ontological commitment by expanding the logic [Field,H]
     Full Idea: One can often reduce one's ontological commitments by expanding one's logic.
     From: Hartry Field (Science without Numbers [1980], p.ix)
     A reaction: I don't actually understand this idea, but that's never stopped me before. Clearly, this sounds like an extremely interesting thought, and hence I should aspire to understand it. So I do aspire to understand it. First, how do you 'expand' a logic?
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 12. Denial of Properties
Field presumes properties can be eliminated from science [Field,H, by Szabó]
     Full Idea: Field regards the eliminability of apparent reference to properties from the language of science as a foregone result.
     From: report of Hartry Field (Science without Numbers [1980]) by Zoltán Gendler Szabó - Nominalism 5.1 n50
     A reaction: Field is a nominalist who also denies the existence of mathematics as part of science. He has a taste for ontological 'desert landscapes'. I have no idea what a property really is, so I think he is on to something.
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / d. Problems with abstracta
Abstract objects are only applicable to the world if they are impure, and connect to the physical [Field,H]
     Full Idea: To be able to apply any postulated abstract entities to the physical world, we need impure abstact entities, e.g. functions that map physical objects into pure abstract objects.
     From: Hartry Field (Science without Numbers [1980], 1)
     A reaction: I am a fan of 'impure metaphysics', and this pinpoints my reason very nicely.
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / d. Absolute idealism
Fichte, Schelling and Hegel rejected transcendental idealism [Lewis,PB]
     Full Idea: Fichte, Schelling and Hegel were united in their opposition to Kant's Transcendental Idealism.
     From: Peter B. Lewis (Schopenhauer [2012], 3)
     A reaction: That is, they preferred genuine idealism, to the mere idealist attitude Kant felt that we are forced to adopt.
Fichte, Hegel and Schelling developed versions of Absolute Idealism [Lewis,PB]
     Full Idea: At the University of Jena, Fichte, Hegel and Schelling critically developed aspects of Kant's philosophy, each in his own way, thereby giving rise to the movement known as Absolute Idealism, see reality as universal God-like self-consciousness.
     From: Peter B. Lewis (Schopenhauer [2012], 2)
     A reaction: Is asking how anyone can possibly have believed such a bizarre and ridiculous idea a) uneducated, b) stupid, c) unimaginative, or d) very sensible? It sounds awfully like Spinoza's concept of God. Also Anaxagoras.
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 6. A Priori from Reason
Lots of propositions are default reasonable, but the a priori ones are empirically indefeasible [Field,H]
     Full Idea: Propositions such as 'People usually tell the truth' seem to count as default reasonable, but it is odd to count them as a priori. Empirical indefeasibility seems the obvious way to distinguish those default reasonable propositions that are a priori.
     From: Hartry Field (Apriority as an Evaluative Notion [2000], 1)
     A reaction: Sounds reasonable, but it would mean that all the uniformities of nature would then count as a priori. 'Every physical object exerts gravity' probably has no counterexamples, but doesn't seem a priori (even if it is necessary). See Idea 9164.
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 7. A Priori from Convention
We treat basic rules as if they were indefeasible and a priori, with no interest in counter-evidence [Field,H]
     Full Idea: I argue not that our most basic rules are a priori or empirically indefeasible, but that we treat them as empirically defeasible and indeed a priori; we don't regard anything as evidence against them.
     From: Hartry Field (Apriority as an Evaluative Notion [2000], 4)
     A reaction: This is the fictionalist view of a priori knowledge (and of most other things, such as mathematics). I can't agree. Most people treat heaps of a posteriori truths (like the sun rising) as a priori. 'Mass involves energy' is indefeasible a posteriori.
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / a. Reliable knowledge
Reliability only makes a rule reasonable if we place a value on the truth produced by reliable processes [Field,H]
     Full Idea: Reliability is not a 'factual property'; in calling a rule reasonable we are evaluating it, and all that makes sense to ask about is what we value. We place a high value on the reliability of our inductive and perceptual rules that lead to truth.
     From: Hartry Field (Apriority as an Evaluative Notion [2000], 5)
     A reaction: This doesn't seem to be a contradiction of reliabilism, since truth is a pretty widespread epistemological value. If you do value truth, then eyes are pretty reliable organs for attaining it. Reliabilism is still wrong, but not for this reason.
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / b. Anti-reliabilism
Believing nothing, or only logical truths, is very reliable, but we want a lot more than that [Field,H]
     Full Idea: Reliability is not all we want in an inductive rule. Completely reliable methods are available, such as believing nothing, or only believing logical truths. But we don't value them, but value less reliable methods with other characteristics.
     From: Hartry Field (Apriority as an Evaluative Notion [2000], 3)
     A reaction: I would take this excellent point to be an advertisement for inference to the best explanation, which requires not only reliable inputs of information, but also a presiding rational judge to assess the mass of evidence.
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 6. Contextual Justification / a. Contextualism
People vary in their epistemological standards, and none of them is 'correct' [Field,H]
     Full Idea: We should concede that different people have slightly different basic epistemological standards. ..I doubt that any clear sense could be given to the notion of 'correctness' here.
     From: Hartry Field (Apriority as an Evaluative Notion [2000], 5)
     A reaction: I think this is dead right. There is a real relativism about knowledge, which exists at the level of justification, rather than of truth. The scientific revolution just consisted of making the standards tougher, and that seems to have been a good idea.
14. Science / C. Induction / 1. Induction
If we only use induction to assess induction, it is empirically indefeasible, and hence a priori [Field,H]
     Full Idea: If some inductive rule is basic for us, in the sense that we never assess it using any rules other than itself, then it must be one that we treat as empirically indefeasible (hence as fully a priori, given that it will surely have default status).
     From: Hartry Field (Apriority as an Evaluative Notion [2000], 4)
     A reaction: This follows on from Field's account of a priori knowledge. See Ideas 9160 and 9164. I think of induction as simply learning from experience, but if experience goes mad I will cease to trust it. (A rationalist view).
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / a. Types of explanation
Beneath every extrinsic explanation there is an intrinsic explanation [Field,H]
     Full Idea: A plausible methodological principle is that underlying every good extrinsic explanation there is an intrinsic explanation.
     From: Hartry Field (Science without Numbers [1980], 5)
     A reaction: I'm thinking that Hartry Field is an Aristotelian essentialist, though I bet he would never admit it.
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 2. Reduction of Mind
'Valence' and 'gene' had to be reduced to show their compatibility with physicalism [Field,H]
     Full Idea: 'Valence' and 'gene' were perfectly clear long before anyone succeeded in reducing them, but it was their reducibility and not their clarity before reduction that showed them to be compatible with physicalism.
     From: Hartry Field (Tarski's Theory of Truth [1972], §5)
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 4. Abstracta by Example
'Abstract' is unclear, but numbers, functions and sets are clearly abstract [Field,H]
     Full Idea: The term 'abstract entities' may not be entirely clear, but one thing that does seem clear is that such alleged entities as numbers, functions and sets are abstract.
     From: Hartry Field (Science without Numbers [1980], p.1), quoted by JP Burgess / G Rosen - A Subject with No Object I.A.1.a
     A reaction: Field firmly denies the existence of such things. Sets don't seem a great problem, if the set is a herd of elephants, but the null and singleton sets show up the difficulties.
19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories
'Partial reference' is when the subject thinks two objects are one object [Field,H, by Recanati]
     Full Idea: A subject's thought is about A, but, unbeknownst to the subject, B is substituted for A. Then there is Field's 'partial reference', because the subject's thought is still partially about A, even though they are following B.
     From: report of Hartry Field (Theory Change and the Indeterminacy of Reference [1973]) by François Recanati - Mental Files in Flux 2
     A reaction: Used to interpret a well-known case: Wally says of Udo 'he needs a haircut'; Zach looks at someone else and says 'he sure does'. Recanati explains it by mental files.
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference
Field says reference is a causal physical relation between mental states and objects [Field,H, by Putnam]
     Full Idea: In Field's view reference is a 'physicalistic relation', i.e. a complex causal relation between words or mental representations and objects or sets of objects; it is up to physical science to discover what that physicalistic relation is.
     From: report of Hartry Field (Tarski's Theory of Truth [1972]) by Hilary Putnam - Reason, Truth and History Ch.2
     A reaction: I wouldn't hold your breath while the scientists do their job. If physicalism is right then Field is right, but physics seems no more appropriate for giving a theory of reference than it does for giving a theory of music.
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 1. Causation
Explain single events by general rules, or vice versa, or probability explains both, or they are unconnected [Field,H]
     Full Idea: Some think singular causal claims should be explained in terms of general causal claims; some think the order should be reversed; some think a third thing (e.g. objective probability) will explain both; and some think they are only loosely connected.
     From: Hartry Field (Causation in a Physical World [2003], 2)
     A reaction: I think Ducasse gives the best account, which is the second option, of giving singular causal claims priority. Probability (Mellor) strikes me as a non-starter, and the idea that they are fairly independent seems rather implausible.
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 5. Direction of causation
Identifying cause and effect is not just conventional; we explain later events by earlier ones [Field,H]
     Full Idea: It is not just that the earlier member of a cause-effect pair is conventionally called the cause; it is also connected with other temporal asymmetries that play an important role in our practices. We tend to explain later events in terms of earlier ones.
     From: Hartry Field (Causation in a Physical World [2003], 1)
     A reaction: We also interfere with the earlier one to affect the later one, and not vice versa (Idea 8363). I am inclined to think that attempting to explain the direction of causation is either pointless or hopeless.
Physical laws are largely time-symmetric, so they make a poor basis for directional causation [Field,H]
     Full Idea: It is sometimes pointed out that (perhaps with a few minor exceptions) the fundamental physical laws are completely time-symmetric. If so, then if one is inclined to found causation on fundamental physical law, it isn't evident how directionality gets in.
     From: Hartry Field (Causation in a Physical World [2003], 1)
     A reaction: All my instincts tell me that causation is more fundamental than laws, and that directionality is there at the start. That, though, raises the nice question of how, if causation explains laws, the direction eventually gets left OUT!
The only reason for adding the notion of 'cause' to fundamental physics is directionality [Field,H]
     Full Idea: Although it is true that the notion of 'cause' is not needed in fundamental physics, even statistical physics, still directionality considerations don't preclude this notion from being consistently added to fundamental physics.
     From: Hartry Field (Causation in a Physical World [2003], 1)
     A reaction: This only makes sense if the notion of cause already has directionality built into it, which I think is correct. The physicist might reply that they don't care about directionality, but the whole idea of an experiment seems to depend on it (Idea 8363).
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 2. Electrodynamics / b. Fields
In theories of fields, space-time points or regions are causal agents [Field,H]
     Full Idea: According to theories that take the notion of a field seriously, space-time points or regions are fully-fledge causal agents.
     From: Hartry Field (Science without Numbers [1980], n 23)
27. Natural Reality / C. Space-Time / 1. Space / d. Substantival space
Both philosophy and physics now make substantivalism more attractive [Field,H]
     Full Idea: In general, it seems to me that recent developments in both philosophy and physics have made substantivalism a much more attractive position than it once was.
     From: Hartry Field (Science without Numbers [1980], 4)
     A reaction: I'm intrigued as to what philosophical developments are involved in this. The arrival of fields is the development in physics.
27. Natural Reality / C. Space-Time / 1. Space / e. Relational space
Relational space is problematic if you take the idea of a field seriously [Field,H]
     Full Idea: The problem of the relational view of space is especially acute in the context of physical theories that take the notion of a field seriously, e.g. classical electromagnetic theory.
     From: Hartry Field (Science without Numbers [1980], 4)
     A reaction: In the Leibniz-Clarke debate I sided with the Newtonian Clarke (defending absolute space), and it looks like modern science agrees with me. Nothing exists purely as relations.