Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Peter B. Lewis, Ullin T. Place and D.J. O'Connor

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12 ideas

3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 5. Truth Bearers
Must sentences make statements to qualify for truth? [O'Connor]
     Full Idea: Maybe a sentence is not a candidate for truth until it is used to make a statement.
     From: D.J. O'Connor (The Correspondence Theory of Truth [1975], Ch.6)
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
Beliefs must match facts, but also words must match beliefs [O'Connor]
     Full Idea: Our beliefs must claim a correspondence with facts, and then the verbal expression of the belief must correspond to the belief itself.
     From: D.J. O'Connor (The Correspondence Theory of Truth [1975], Ch.4)
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 2. Semantic Truth
The semantic theory requires sentences as truth-bearers, not propositions [O'Connor]
     Full Idea: The Semantic Theory of truth requires that sentences are truth-bearers (rather than statements, or propositions).
     From: D.J. O'Connor (The Correspondence Theory of Truth [1975], Ch.6)
What does 'true in English' mean? [O'Connor]
     Full Idea: We do not seem to have any use in ordinary discourse for phrases like 'true in English', 'false in German'.
     From: D.J. O'Connor (The Correspondence Theory of Truth [1975], II.1)
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 4. Pure Logic
Logic seems to work for unasserted sentences [O'Connor]
     Full Idea: If sentences can have truth-values only when they occur as asserted, it would be impossible to have a truth-functional basis to logic.
     From: D.J. O'Connor (The Correspondence Theory of Truth [1975], Ch.6)
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / c. Reduction of events
Events are fast changes which are of interest to us [O'Connor]
     Full Idea: The standard cases of events are physical changes which happen sufficiently fast to be observed as changes, and which are of sufficient interest to us to be noticed or commented on.
     From: D.J. O'Connor (The Correspondence Theory of Truth [1975], Ch.7)
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / a. Beliefs
Without language our beliefs are particular and present [O'Connor]
     Full Idea: Without language we would be restricted to particular beliefs about the here and now.
     From: D.J. O'Connor (The Correspondence Theory of Truth [1975], Ch.8)
We can't contemplate our beliefs until we have expressed them [O'Connor]
     Full Idea: It is only when beliefs are given some symbolic expression that they acquire the precision and stability that enables us to entertain them.
     From: D.J. O'Connor (The Correspondence Theory of Truth [1975], Ch.5)
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / d. Absolute idealism
Fichte, Schelling and Hegel rejected transcendental idealism [Lewis,PB]
     Full Idea: Fichte, Schelling and Hegel were united in their opposition to Kant's Transcendental Idealism.
     From: Peter B. Lewis (Schopenhauer [2012], 3)
     A reaction: That is, they preferred genuine idealism, to the mere idealist attitude Kant felt that we are forced to adopt.
Fichte, Hegel and Schelling developed versions of Absolute Idealism [Lewis,PB]
     Full Idea: At the University of Jena, Fichte, Hegel and Schelling critically developed aspects of Kant's philosophy, each in his own way, thereby giving rise to the movement known as Absolute Idealism, see reality as universal God-like self-consciousness.
     From: Peter B. Lewis (Schopenhauer [2012], 2)
     A reaction: Is asking how anyone can possibly have believed such a bizarre and ridiculous idea a) uneducated, b) stupid, c) unimaginative, or d) very sensible? It sounds awfully like Spinoza's concept of God. Also Anaxagoras.
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / b. Intentionality theories
Intentionality is the mark of dispositions, not of the mental [Place]
     Full Idea: My thesis is that intentionality is the mark, not of the mental, but of the dispositional.
     From: Ullin T. Place (Intentionality and the Physical: reply to Mumford [1999], 1)
     A reaction: An idea with few friends, but I really like it, because it offers the prospect of a unified account of physical nature and the mind/brain. It seems reasonable to say my mind is essentially a bunch of dispositions. Mind is representations + dispositions.
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / c. Essence and laws
Dispositions are not general laws, but laws of the natures of individual entities [Place]
     Full Idea: Dispositions are the substantive laws, not, as for Armstrong, of nature in general, but of the nature of individual entities whose dispositional properties they are.
     From: Ullin T. Place (Intentionality and the Physical: reply to Mumford [1999], 6)
     A reaction: [He notes that Nancy Cartwright 1989 agrees with him] I like this a lot. I tend to denegrate 'laws', because of their dubious ontological status, but this restores laws to the picture, in the place where they belong, in the stuff of the world.