Combining Philosophers

Ideas for Kenelm Digby, Willard Quine and Brian R. Martin

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26 ideas

10. Modality / A. Necessity / 2. Nature of Necessity
Necessity can attach to statement-names, to statements, and to open sentences [Quine]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 4. De re / De dicto modality
To be necessarily greater than 7 is not a trait of 7, but depends on how 7 is referred to [Quine]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
Contrary to some claims, Quine does not deny logical necessity [Quine, by McFetridge]
Frege moved Kant's question about a priori synthetic to 'how is logical certainty possible?' [Quine]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 11. Denial of Necessity
Necessity is in the way in which we say things, and not things themselves [Quine]
Whether 9 is necessarily greater than 7 depends on how '9' is described [Quine, by Fine,K]
Quine's attack on the analytic-synthetic distinction undermined necessary truths [Quine, by Shoemaker]
Necessity only applies to objects if they are distinctively specified [Quine]
There is no necessity higher than natural necessity, and that is just regularity [Quine]
Necessity could be just generalisation over classes, or (maybe) quantifying over possibilia [Quine]
Necessity is relative to context; it is what is assumed in an inquiry [Quine]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
Quine wants identity and individuation-conditions for possibilia [Quine, by Lycan]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / b. Types of conditional
Some conditionals can be explained just by negation and conjunction: not(p and not-q) [Quine]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / c. Truth-function conditionals
Normal conditionals have a truth-value gap when the antecedent is false. [Quine]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / e. Supposition conditionals
Conditionals are pointless if the truth value of the antecedent is known [Quine]
Normally conditionals have no truth value; it is the consequent which has a conditional truth value [Quine]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 9. Counterfactuals
What stays the same in assessing a counterfactual antecedent depends on context [Quine]
Counterfactuals are plausible when dispositions are involved, as they imply structures [Quine]
We feign belief in counterfactual antecedents, and assess how convincing the consequent is [Quine]
Counterfactuals have no place in a strict account of science [Quine]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 3. A Posteriori Necessary
For Quine the only way to know a necessity is empirically [Quine, by Dancy,J]
Quine's indispensability argument said arguments for abstracta were a posteriori [Quine, by Yablo]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / e. Against possible worlds
Possible worlds are a way to dramatise essentialism, and yet they presuppose essentialism [Quine]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
Can an unactualized possible have self-identity, and be distinct from other possibles? [Quine]
We can't quantify in modal contexts, because the modality depends on descriptions, not objects [Quine, by Fine,K]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / b. Rigid designation
A rigid designator (for all possible worlds) picks out an object by its essential traits [Quine]