Combining Philosophers

Ideas for Peter B. Lewis, David Papineau and K Marx / F Engels

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17 ideas

17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 6. Epiphenomenalism
The epiphenomenal relation of mind and brain is a 'causal dangler', unlike anything else [Papineau]
Maybe minds do not cause actions, but do cause us to report our decisions [Papineau]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 8. Dualism of Mind Critique
How does a dualist mind represent, exist outside space, and be transparent to itself? [Papineau]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 8. Functionalism critique
Functionalism needs causation and intentionality to explain actions [Papineau]
Role concepts either name the realising property, or the higher property constituting the role [Papineau]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 2. Anomalous Monism
If causes are basic particulars, this doesn't make conscious and physical properties identical [Papineau]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 5. Supervenience of mind
Supervenience requires all mental events to have physical effects [Papineau]
Epiphenomenalism is supervenience without physicalism [Papineau]
Supervenience can be replaced by identifying mind with higher-order or disjunctional properties [Papineau]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
Knowing what it is like to be something only involves being (physically) that thing [Papineau]
The completeness of physics is needed for mind-brain identity [Papineau]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 2. Reduction of Mind
Mind-brain reduction is less explanatory, because phenomenal concepts lack causal roles [Papineau]
Weak reduction of mind is to physical causes; strong reduction is also to physical laws [Papineau]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 5. Causal Argument
It is absurd to think that physical effects are caused twice, so conscious causes must be physical [Papineau]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 6. Conceptual Dualism
Accept ontological monism, but conceptual dualism; we think in a different way about phenomenal thought [Papineau]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
If a mental state is multiply realisable, why does it lead to similar behaviour? [Papineau]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / c. Knowledge argument
Mary acquires new concepts; she previously thought about the same property using material concepts [Papineau]