Combining Philosophers

Ideas for Francois-Marie Voltaire, John Searle and Barbara Vetter

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29 ideas

17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 2. Interactionism
Mind and brain don't interact if they are the same [Searle]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 7. Zombies
Without internal content, a zombie's full behaviour couldn't be explained [Searle]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 4. Behaviourism Critique
Mental states only relate to behaviour contingently, not necessarily [Searle]
Wanting H2O only differs from wanting water in its mental component [Searle]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 1. Functionalism
Functionalists like the externalist causal theory of reference [Searle]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 7. Chinese Room
Maybe understanding doesn't need consciousness, despite what Searle seems to think [Searle, by Chalmers]
A program won't contain understanding if it is small enough to imagine [Dennett on Searle]
If bigger and bigger brain parts can't understand, how can a whole brain? [Dennett on Searle]
A program for Chinese translation doesn't need to understand Chinese [Searle]
I now think syntax is not in the physics, but in the eye of the beholder [Searle]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 8. Functionalism critique
Computation presupposes consciousness [Searle]
If we are computers, who is the user? [Searle]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 1. Reductionism critique
Consciousness has a first-person ontology, so it cannot be reduced without omitting something [Searle]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 3. Property Dualism
Property dualism is the reappearance of Cartesianism [Searle]
Property dualism denies reductionism [Searle]
Property dualists tend to find the mind-body problem baffling [Searle]
Consciousness is a brain property as liquidity is a water property [Searle]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 4. Emergentism
There is non-event causation between mind and brain, as between a table and its solidity [Searle]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 5. Supervenience of mind
If mind-brain supervenience isn't causal, this implies epiphenomenalism [Searle]
Upwards mental causation makes 'supervenience' irrelevant [Searle]
Mental events can cause even though supervenient, like the solidity of a piston [Searle]
Mind and brain are supervenient in respect of cause and effect [Searle]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 6. Mysterianism
Consciousness seems indefinable by conditions or categories [Searle]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
The pattern of molecules in the sea is much more complex than the complexity of brain neurons [Searle]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 2. Reduction of Mind
Can the homunculus fallacy be beaten by recursive decomposition? [Searle]
Searle argues that biology explains consciousness, but physics won't explain biology [Searle, by Kriegel/Williford]
If mind is caused by brain, does this mean mind IS brain? [Searle]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / a. Physicalism critique
If tree rings contain information about age, then age contains information about rings [Searle]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
If mind is multiply realisable, it is possible that anything could realise it [Searle]