Combining Philosophers

Ideas for Aristotle, Allan Gibbard and Deborah Achtenberg

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54 ideas

8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 1. Nature of Relations
The separation from here to there is not the same as the separation from there to here [Aristotle]
Aristotle said relations are not substances, so (if they exist) they must be accidents [Aristotle, by Heil]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 1. Nature of Properties
There cannot be uninstantiated properties [Aristotle, by Macdonald,C]
An individual property has to exist (in past, present or future) [Aristotle]
Properties are just the ways in which forms are realised at various times [Aristotle, by Frede,M]
The 'propriae' or 'necessary accidents' of a thing are separate, and derived from the essence [Aristotle, by Koslicki]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 2. Need for Properties
Aristotle promoted the importance of properties and objects (rather than general and particular) [Aristotle, by Frede,M]
For two things to differ in some respect, they must both possess that respect [Aristotle]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 3. Types of Properties
An 'accident' is something which may possibly either belong or not belong to a thing [Aristotle]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 4. Intrinsic Properties
To seek truth, study the real connections between subjects and attributes [Aristotle]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 5. Natural Properties
For Aristotle, there are only as many properties as actually exist [Aristotle, by Jacquette]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 6. Categorical Properties
Some things said 'of' a subject are not 'in' the subject [Aristotle]
We call them secondary 'substances' because they reveal the primary substances [Aristotle]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 8. Properties as Modes
Whiteness can be explained without man, but femaleness cannot be explained without animal [Aristotle]
The features of a thing (whether quality or quantity) are inseparable from their subjects [Aristotle]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 9. Qualities
Four species of quality: states, capacities, affects, and forms [Aristotle, by Pasnau]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 10. Properties as Predicates
If we only saw bronze circles, would bronze be part of the concept of a circle? [Aristotle]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 1. Powers
Heavy and light are defined by their tendency to move down or up [Aristotle]
Potentiality is a principle of change, in another thing, or as another thing [Aristotle]
Active 'dunamis' is best translated as 'power' or 'ability' (rather than 'potentiality') [Aristotle, by Gill,ML]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 2. Powers as Basic
The main characteristic of the source of change is activity [energeia] [Aristotle, by Politis]
Actualities are arranged by priority, going back to what initiates process [Aristotle]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 4. Powers as Essence
Sight is the essence of the eye, fitting its definition; the eye itself is just the matter [Aristotle]
Giving the function of a house defines its actuality [Aristotle]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 5. Powers and Properties
Potentiality in geometry is metaphorical [Aristotle]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / d. Dispositions as occurrent
The Megarans say something is only capable of something when it is actually doing it [Aristotle]
Megaran actualism is just scepticism about the qualities of things [Aristotle]
Megaran actualists prevent anything from happening, by denying a capacity for it to happen! [Aristotle]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 1. Universals
Substance is not a universal, as the former is particular but a universal is shared [Aristotle]
Universals are indeterminate and only known in potential, because they are general [Aristotle, by Witt]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 2. Need for Universals
The acquisition of scientific knowledge is impossible without universals [Aristotle]
Separate Forms aren't needed for logic, but universals (one holding of many) are essential [Aristotle]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 3. Instantiated Universals
No universals exist separately from particulars [Aristotle]
Colour must be in an individual body, or it is not embodied [Aristotle]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / a. Platonic Forms
Forms are said to be substances to which nothing is prior [Aristotle]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / b. Partaking
There is a confusion because Forms are said to be universal, but also some Forms are separable and particular [Aristotle]
If partaking explains unity, what causes participating, and what is participating? [Aristotle]
If you accept Forms, you must accept the more powerful principle of 'participating' in them [Aristotle]
How can the Forms both be the substance of things and exist separately from them? [Aristotle]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / c. Self-predication
Forms have to be their own paradigms, which seems to fuse the paradigm and the copy [Aristotle]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / d. Forms critiques
If two is part of three then numbers aren't Forms, because they would all be intermingled [Aristotle]
It is meaningless to speak of 'man-himself', because it has the same definition as plain 'man' [Aristotle]
Eternal white is no whiter than temporary white, and it is the same with goodness [Aristotle]
How will a vision of pure goodness make someone a better doctor? [Aristotle]
We can forget the Forms, as they are irrelevant, and not needed in giving demonstrations [Aristotle]
Predications only pick out kinds of things, not things in themselves [Aristotle]
If men exist by participating in two forms (Animal and Biped), they are plural, not unities [Aristotle]
The Forms have to be potentialities, not actual knowledge or movement [Aristotle]
There is no point at all in the theory of Forms unless it contains a principle that produces movement [Aristotle]
All attempts to prove the Forms are either invalid, or prove Forms where there aren't supposed to be any [Aristotle]
Are there forms for everything, or for negations, or for destroyed things? [Aristotle]
Aristotle is not asserting facts about the location of properties, but about their ontological status [Aristotle, by Moreland]
What possible contribution can the Forms make to perceptible entities? [Aristotle]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / b. Nominalism about universals
The thesis of the Form of the Good (or of anything else) is verbal and vacuous [Aristotle]