Combining Philosophers

Ideas for Kenelm Digby, Willard Quine and Brian R. Martin

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     choose another area for these philosophers

display all the ideas for this combination of philosophers


11 ideas

10. Modality / A. Necessity / 2. Nature of Necessity
Necessity can attach to statement-names, to statements, and to open sentences [Quine]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 4. De re / De dicto modality
To be necessarily greater than 7 is not a trait of 7, but depends on how 7 is referred to [Quine]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
Contrary to some claims, Quine does not deny logical necessity [Quine, by McFetridge]
Frege moved Kant's question about a priori synthetic to 'how is logical certainty possible?' [Quine]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 11. Denial of Necessity
Necessity is in the way in which we say things, and not things themselves [Quine]
Whether 9 is necessarily greater than 7 depends on how '9' is described [Quine, by Fine,K]
Quine's attack on the analytic-synthetic distinction undermined necessary truths [Quine, by Shoemaker]
Necessity only applies to objects if they are distinctively specified [Quine]
There is no necessity higher than natural necessity, and that is just regularity [Quine]
Necessity could be just generalisation over classes, or (maybe) quantifying over possibilia [Quine]
Necessity is relative to context; it is what is assumed in an inquiry [Quine]