Combining Philosophers

Ideas for Kenelm Digby, Willard Quine and Brian R. Martin

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9 ideas

10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
Quine wants identity and individuation-conditions for possibilia [Quine, by Lycan]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / b. Types of conditional
Some conditionals can be explained just by negation and conjunction: not(p and not-q) [Quine]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / c. Truth-function conditionals
Normal conditionals have a truth-value gap when the antecedent is false. [Quine]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / e. Supposition conditionals
Conditionals are pointless if the truth value of the antecedent is known [Quine]
Normally conditionals have no truth value; it is the consequent which has a conditional truth value [Quine]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 9. Counterfactuals
What stays the same in assessing a counterfactual antecedent depends on context [Quine]
Counterfactuals are plausible when dispositions are involved, as they imply structures [Quine]
We feign belief in counterfactual antecedents, and assess how convincing the consequent is [Quine]
Counterfactuals have no place in a strict account of science [Quine]