Combining Philosophers
Ideas for Speussipus, Noam Chomsky and George Berkeley
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16 ideas
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 1. Perceptual Realism / a. Naïve realism
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3958
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Since our ideas vary when the real things are said to be unchanged, they cannot be true copies [Berkeley]
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11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 1. Perceptual Realism / b. Direct realism
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3943
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If existence is perceived directly, by which sense; if indirectly, how is it inferred from direct perception? [Berkeley]
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11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 2. Phenomenalism
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3931
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Sensible objects are just sets of sensible qualities [Berkeley]
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6722
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Perception is existence for my table, but also possible perception, by me or a spirit [Berkeley]
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5192
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Berkeley did not deny material things; he merely said they must be defined through sensations [Berkeley, by Ayer]
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5174
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Berkeley needed a phenomenalist account of the self, as well as of material things [Ayer on Berkeley]
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11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / c. Empirical idealism
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6724
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The only substance is spirit, or that which perceives [Berkeley]
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6723
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The 'esse' of objects is 'percipi', and they can only exist in minds [Berkeley]
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6732
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When I shut my eyes, the things I saw may still exist, but in another mind [Berkeley]
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1103
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'To be is to be perceived' is a simple confusion of experience with its objects [Russell on Berkeley]
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6403
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For Berkelely, reality is ideas and a community of minds, including God's [Berkeley, by Grayling]
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3945
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There is nothing in nature which needs the concept of matter to explain it [Berkeley]
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3947
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Perceptions are ideas, and ideas exist in the mind, so objects only exist in the mind [Berkeley]
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3936
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Time is measured by the succession of ideas in our minds [Berkeley]
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3930
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There is no such thing as 'material substance' [Berkeley]
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3939
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I conceive a tree in my mind, but I cannot prove that its existence can be conceived outside a mind [Berkeley]
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