Combining Philosophers

Ideas for Francois-Marie Voltaire, John Searle and Barbara Vetter

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11 ideas

17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 1. Reductionism critique
Consciousness has a first-person ontology, so it cannot be reduced without omitting something [Searle]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 3. Property Dualism
Property dualism is the reappearance of Cartesianism [Searle]
Consciousness is a brain property as liquidity is a water property [Searle]
Property dualism denies reductionism [Searle]
Property dualists tend to find the mind-body problem baffling [Searle]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 4. Emergentism
There is non-event causation between mind and brain, as between a table and its solidity [Searle]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 5. Supervenience of mind
If mind-brain supervenience isn't causal, this implies epiphenomenalism [Searle]
Upwards mental causation makes 'supervenience' irrelevant [Searle]
Mental events can cause even though supervenient, like the solidity of a piston [Searle]
Mind and brain are supervenient in respect of cause and effect [Searle]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 6. Mysterianism
Consciousness seems indefinable by conditions or categories [Searle]