Single Idea 12661

[catalogued under 15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 7. Seeing Resemblance]

Full Idea

The ways in which different kinds of thing are similar to one another aren't, in general, similar to one another.

Gist of Idea

The different types of resemblance don't resemble one another


Jerry A. Fodor (LOT 2 [2008], Ch.5.4)

Book Reference

Fodor,Jerry A.: 'LOT 2: the Language of Thought Revisited' [OUP 2008], p.157

A Reaction

Nice, but I think one would say that they lack similarity at the level of primary thought, but have obvious similarity (as concept-connectors) at the level of meta-thought.

Related Idea

Idea 4441 'Resemblance Nominalism' won't work, because the theory treats resemblance itself as a universal [Russell]