Full Idea
Russell clearly anticipated Donnellan when he said proper names can also be used as descriptions, adding that 'there is nothing in the phraseology to show whether they are being used in this way or as names'.
Clarification
Donnellan distinguished between 'referential' and 'attributive' descriptions
Gist of Idea
Russell admitted that even names could also be used as descriptions
Source
report of Bertrand Russell (Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy [1919], p.175) by Kent Bach - What Does It Take to Refer? 22.2 L1
Book Reference
'Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Language', ed/tr. Lepore,E/Smith,B [OUP 2008], p.536
A Reaction
This seems also to anticipate Strawson's flexible and pragmatic approach to these things, which I am beginning to think is correct.