Single Idea 10642

[catalogued under 7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / c. Commitment of predicates]

Full Idea

Frege claims that second-order quantifiers are committed to concepts, just as singular first-order quantifiers are committed to objects.

Gist of Idea

Second-order quantifiers are committed to concepts, as first-order commits to objects

Source

report of Gottlob Frege (Grundlagen der Arithmetik (Foundations) [1884]) by Øystein Linnebo - Plural Quantification 5.3

Book Reference

'Stanford Online Encyclopaedia of Philosophy', ed/tr. Stanford University [plato.stanford.edu], p.18


A Reaction

It increasingly strikes me that Fregeans try to get away with this nonsense by diluting both the notion of a 'concept' and the notion of an 'object'.