Full Idea
If a particular thing is a bundle of located universals, we might say it is a mereological fusion of them, but if two universals can be instantiated by more than one particular, then two particulars can have the same universals, and be the same thing.
Clarification
'Mereology' involves parts combining into wholes
Gist of Idea
Things can't be fusions of universals, because two things could then be one thing
Source
Alex Oliver (The Metaphysics of Properties [1996], §11)
Book Reference
-: 'Mind' [-], p.26
A Reaction
This and Idea 10725 pretty thoroughly demolish the idea that objects could be just bundles of universals. The problem pushes some philosophers back to the idea of 'substance', or some sort of 'substratum' which has the universals.
Related Idea
Idea 10725 Abstract sets of universals can't be bundled to make concrete things [Oliver]