Full Idea
If we take account of the fact that a speaker is in a community, then we must adopt an assertability-conditions semantics (based on what is legitimately assertible), and reject truth-conditional semantics (based on correspondence to the facts).
Gist of Idea
Community implies assertability-conditions rather than truth-conditions semantics
Source
report of Saul A. Kripke (Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language [1982]) by Robert Hanna - Rationality and Logic 6.1
Book Reference
Hanna,Robert: 'Rationality and Logic' [MIT 2006], p.163
A Reaction
[Part of Hanna's full summary of Kripke's argument] This sounds wrong to me. There are conditions where it is agreed that a lie should be told. Two people can be guilty of the same malapropism.