Single Idea 11849

[catalogued under 9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects]

Full Idea

Russell's definition of '=' is inadequate, because according to it we cannot say that two objects have all their properties in common. (Even if this proposition is never correct, it still has a sense).

Gist of Idea

It at least makes sense to say two objects have all their properties in common

Source

comment on Bertrand Russell (The Principles of Mathematics [1903]) by Ludwig Wittgenstein - Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus 5.5302

Book Reference

Wittgenstein,Ludwig: 'Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (Pears)', ed/tr. Pears,D. /McGuinness,B. [RKP 1961], p.52


A Reaction

This is what now seems to be a standard denial of the bizarre Leibniz claim that there never could be two things with identical properties, even, it seems, in principle. What would Leibniz made of two electrons?