Full Idea
Philosophers in droves have held that Frege cases are convincing arguments that concepts have not just referents but also senses.
Gist of Idea
Frege's puzzles suggest to many that concepts have sense as well as reference
Source
Jerry A. Fodor (LOT 2 [2008], Ch.3.2)
Book Reference
Fodor,Jerry A.: 'LOT 2: the Language of Thought Revisited' [OUP 2008], p.56
A Reaction
[Frege cases are puzzles where simple reference seems to lead to confusion] I take the Fregean approach to concepts (of Dummett, Peacocke) to attempt to give an account of the sense, once the reference is decided. Idea 12629 gives Fodor's view.
Related Idea
Idea 12629 For the referential view of thought, the content of a concept is just its reference [Fodor]