Single Idea 12666

[catalogued under 5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic]

Full Idea

In logic, acceptability conditions can replace truth conditions, ..and the only price one has to pay for this is that one has to abandon the implausible Fregean idea that logic is the theory of truth preservation.

Gist of Idea

We can base logic on acceptability, and abandon the Fregean account by truth-preservation

Source

Brian Ellis (The Metaphysics of Scientific Realism [2009], 1)

Book Reference

Ellis,Brian: 'The Metaphysics of Scientific Realism' [Acument 2009], p.14


A Reaction

This has always struck me as correct, given that if you assign T and F in a semantics, they don't have to mean 'true' and 'false', and that you can do very good logic with propositions which you think are entirely false.