Single Idea 12884

[catalogued under 9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 12. Essential Parts]

Full Idea

We cannot say - with complete fidelity to the truth of things - that the same whole continues to exist if a part of it is lost.

Gist of Idea

The same whole ceases to exist if a part is lost

Source

Gottfried Leibniz (New Essays on Human Understanding [1704], 2.27.11)

Book Reference

Leibniz,Gottfried: 'New Essays on Human Understanding', ed/tr. Remnant/Bennett [CUP 1996], p.238


A Reaction

This is the reference Simons 1987:319 gives when he claims that Leibniz accepts mereological essentialism. I think this is mereological necessity of identity, but not what I call 'essentialism'. That has to distinguish essential from non-essential.