Single Idea 14311

[catalogued under 10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / d. Non-truthfunction conditionals]

Full Idea

The conclusion that disposition ascriptions are not equivalent to stronger-than-material conditionals is largely to be accepted.

Gist of Idea

Dispositions are not equivalent to stronger-than-material conditionals

Source

Stephen Mumford (Dispositions [1998], 04.7)

Book Reference

Mumford,Stephen: 'Dispositions' [OUP 1998], p.81


A Reaction

[he attributes the view to C.B.Martin 1994] It is hard to see how to describe a disposition in anything other than conditional terms. Mumford's 'functional role' probably has to be described conditionally. It is how the conditional cashes out.

Related Idea

Idea 14309 Truth-functional conditionals can't distinguish whether they are causal or accidental [Mumford]