Single Idea 15127

[catalogued under 8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 2. Powers as Basic]

Full Idea

The categorical basis would be a poor explanans for the disposition as explanandum, if the categorical basis did not drag any causal powers along with it.

Gist of Idea

A categorical basis could hardly explain a disposition if it had no powers of its own

Source

John Hawthorne (Causal Structuralism [2001], 2.4)

Book Reference

Hawthorne,John: 'Metaphysical Essays' [OUP 2002], p.223


A Reaction

The idea that the world is explained just by some basic stuff having qualities and relations always strikes me as wrong, because the view of nature is too passive.

Related Ideas

Idea 9490 The categoricalist idea is that a property is only individuated by being itself [Bird]

Idea 14194 Proper ontology should only use categorical (actual) properties, not hypothetical ones [Sider]