Full Idea
I take truth to be a property because the truth predicate has an extension - the collection of all true sentences - and this collection does not (unlike the 'extension' of 'exists') consist of everything, or even of all sentences.
Gist of Idea
Truth is a property, because the truth predicate has an extension
Source
Leon Horsten (The Tarskian Turn [2011], 01.1)
Book Reference
Horsten,Leon: 'The Tarskian Turn' [MIT 2011], p.2
A Reaction
He concedes that it may be an 'uninteresting' property. My problem is always that I am unconvinced that truth is tied to sentences. I can make perfect sense of animal thoughts being right or wrong. Extension of mental propositions?
Related Idea
Idea 5420 Truth is a property of a belief, but dependent on its external relations, not its internal qualities [Russell]