Single Idea 15335

[catalogued under 3. Truth / E. Pragmatic Truth / 1. Pragmatic Truth]

Full Idea

Peirce's anti-realist theory of a truth is a verificationist theory. Truth is judged to be an epistemic notion. But the way things are is independent of the evidence we may be able to obtain for or against a judgement.

Gist of Idea

Peirce's theory offers anti-realist verificationism, but surely how things are is independent of us?

Source

comment on Charles Sanders Peirce (Pragmatism in Retrospect [1906]) by Leon Horsten - The Tarskian Turn 02.1

Book Reference

Horsten,Leon: 'The Tarskian Turn' [MIT 2011], p.13


A Reaction

This criticism doesn't quite capture the point that Peirce's theory is that truth is an ideal, not the set of opinions that miserable little humans eventually settle for when they get bored. Truth is an aspect of rationality, perhaps.