Full Idea
While positive and perhaps even negative atomic facts may be unproblematic, it seems excessive to commit oneself to the existence of logically complex facts such as disjunctive facts.
Gist of Idea
We may believe in atomic facts, but surely not complex disjunctive ones?
Source
Leon Horsten (The Tarskian Turn [2011], 02.1)
Book Reference
Horsten,Leon: 'The Tarskian Turn' [MIT 2011], p.13
A Reaction
Presumably it is hard to deny that very complex statements involving massive disjunctions can be true or false. But why does commitment to real facts have to involve a huge ontology? The ontology is just the ingredients of the fact, isn't it?
Related Idea
Idea 15337 The correspondence 'theory' is too vague - about both 'correspondence' and 'facts' [Horsten]