Full Idea
In my 'Semantic Relationism' the fact that two utterances say the same thing is not entirely a matter of their intrinsic semantic features; it may also turn on semantic relationships among the utterances of their parts not reducible to those features.
Gist of Idea
That two utterances say the same thing may not be intrinsic to them, but involve their relationships
Source
Kit Fine (Semantic Relationism [2007], Intro)
Book Reference
Fine,Kit: 'Semantic Relationism' [OUP 2007], p.3
A Reaction
You'll need to read the book slowly several times to get the hang of this, but at least it allows that two different utterances might say the same thing (express the same proposition, I would say).
Related Idea
Idea 15588 You cannot determine the full content from a thought's intrinsic character, as relations are involved [Fine,K]