Single Idea 16231

[catalogued under 9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 6. Identity between Objects]

Full Idea

Gallois' Occasional Identity Thesis is that objects can be identical at one time without being identical at all times.

Gist of Idea

Occasional Identity: two objects can be identical at one time, and different at others

Source

report of André Gallois (Occasions of Identity [1998]) by Katherine Hawley - How Things Persist 5.4

Book Reference

Hawley,Katherine: 'How Things Persist' [OUP 2004], p.154


A Reaction

The analogy is presumably with two crossing roads being identical at one place but not at others. It is a major misunderstanding to infer from Special Relativity that time is just like space.

Related Idea

Idea 16233 Gallois hoped to clarify identity through time, but seems to make talk of it impossible [Hawley on Gallois]